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Abstract
Password-based authentication is the most popular authentication mechanism for hu-
mans today, not only on the internet. Despite increasing efforts to move to supposedly
more secure alternatives, password-based authentication is most likely to stay for the
foreseeable future due to its user experience and convenience. However, although
secure cryptographic protocols for password-based authentication and key-exchange
exist, they are hardly used in practice. While previous work on password-based cryp-
tography including secure password-based key-exchange, authentication, and secret
sharing protocols, this thesis sets out to bring cryptographic password-based protocols
closer to real world deployment as well as improving their security guarantees. To
this end we propose frameworks for password-based authentication and key-exchange
in the verifier-based and two-server setting as a step towards deploying cryptograph-
ically secure password-based protocols. These frameworks do not only include the
authentication/key-exchange step, which has been researched before, but also inves-
tigate registration of prospective client passwords, which has not been considered
before.
In particular, the first step of each proposed framework is the secure registration of
passwords with limited trust assumptions on server and client that requires the server
to enforce a password policy for minimum security of client passwords and enables the
client to compute the password verifier or password shares on the client side. While
this first essential step for password-based authentication and key-exchange has hardly
been explored before, the second step, the actual authentication and key-exchange
protocol enjoys a large body of research in the plain single-server setting. In this thesis
however we focus on the less well studied verifier-based and two-server settings where
we propose new protocols for both settings and the first security model for two-server
protocols in the UC framework.
The theoretical work is underpinned by implementations of the password registration
phase that allows the comparison of not only security but also performance of the
proposed protocols. To further facilitate adoption and demonstrate usability we show
vi
real world usage of the verifier-based framework by implementing a demo application
and Firefox extension that allows the use of the proposed framework for account
registration and authentication.
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Chapter I
Introduction
This work is concerned with cryptography from low-entropy secrets, better known
as passwords. In contrast to conventional cryptographic algorithms and protocols,
secrets used here have low-entropy, such that an adversary is able to iterate through
all possible secrets in reasonable time. This leads directly to the threats dictionary
attacks (cf. Section 1.1) that are inherent to everything we are dealing with in this
work. So why do we want to perform cryptography with passwords at all, when they
comprise intrinsic attack possibilities?
“Humans are incapable of securely storing high-quality cryptographic keys,
and they have unacceptable speed and accuracy when performing crypto-
graphic operations.” Kaufman et al. [131]
While human’s lack of speed and accuracy in performing cryptographic operations
can be mitigated by using computers, human’s inability to remember high-quality
cryptographic keys is a major challenge. Even though there exist several standardised
authentication tokens for humans, we nowadays heavily rely on passwords. In general
we distinguish between three major categories of authentication data according to Burr
et al. [51]:
• Something you know (e. g., password, Personal Identification Number (PIN))
• Something you have (e. g., mobile phone, cryptographic key)
• Something you are (e. g., fingerprint)
But since everything someone has or is may be stolen or duplicated, knowledge (of a
password) is a very important factor in authenticating a human (as long as it is not
written down). To perform cryptography with humans entering a secret/authentication
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token, those have to be human-memorable. This leads to the necessity of password-
based cryptography as everything humans are able to remember correctly is rather
short and has limited entropy.
Outline of this Chapter This chapter gives a broad overview of password-based
security mechanisms, security research, and cryptography research. Section 1 gives
necessary definitions in the context of passwords used in this thesis and gives an
overview of different ways of looking at passwords. Section 2 describes general concepts
and models used in the field of provable security this thesis is placed in. Sections 3 and
4 give an overview of password-based cryptography research and related work. The
chapter is concluded with Section 5 describing real world challenges and architectures
in the password context and the outline of this thesis in Section 6.
1 Password-based Security
Using passwords as means of authentication in a computer system allows users to
log into the system without the need for any additional devices or tools. This huge
advantage over other ways of authenticating, i. e. with something you have or are, is
probably responsible for passwords being the most popular authentication mechanism
and is likely to stay such despite increasing efforts to changes this (cf. Section 1.2.1).
The most common place where passwords are used as user authentication mechanism is
the Internet, where personal content is protected with a username and password. Only
when providing a valid identifier (username, often e-mail address) and the according
password that the server stored for this identifier, the client is allowed to access data
associated with this account. Password and identifier are usually chosen by the client
when registering a new account. When someone forgets the password or wants to
change it, websites offer the possibility to change the password for an account after
providing the old password or other means of authentication (often done by sending a
one-time link to the registered e-mail address). This and other practical challenges
such as password resets bring additional security risks that are out of scope of this
thesis.
While passwords are used in other contexts such as device logins as well, we focus
on the online setting in this thesis. We look in particular at the previously described
scenario of registering user accounts and their use for authentication and login purposes.
The used setting therefore contains a client (controlled by the human user) that
interacts with a remote server controlling the client’s account.
1 Password-based Security 3
Password-based protocols are usually classified as symmetric because both parties
hold the same secret (password). Other variants exist where the server uses only
a password verifier, which can be classified as asymmetric. In contrast to other
cryptographic mechanisms where keys are chosen from a key space, passwords are
chosen from a dictionary. (A dictionary is defined as an efficiently traversable set.)
Note that dictionaries in our case denote sets of characters, i. e. passwords, rather
than a real lexicon like dictionaries containing a certain set of words. When talking
about those we use the term lexicon. Even though password is the umbrella term, we
distinguish between several types of passwords, discussed in the following.
Password The term password refers to character strings chosen from a dictionary
consisting of alpha-numeric characters a-z, A-Z, 0-9 and special characters like $,%,@
and so on. While UTF-8 based passwords or passwords based on other character
encodings are possible, we focus on ASCII based passwords in this thesis for convenience.
Despite the fact that many (online) services have password policies in place, humans
tend to choose easily memorable and therefore often easy to guess passwords that can
be found in a lexicon [91, 99]. To encourage users to use stronger passwords, password-
strength meters are used by many services, which display some measure of password
strength entered by the client. A recent study by Ur et al. [192] on password-strength
meters shows that this could have a significant impact on user’s password-strength.
We define several other forms of user authentication that are similar to passwords in
the following.
Graphical Passwords Graphical passwords were first proposed by Blonder [35].
Microsoft Window’s picture passwords [152, 183] is the best known implementation of
a subclass of graphical passwords. Instead of relying on entropy in a character string,
graphical passwords require the user to recognise certain images or features in an image.
The security usually stems from the ability of humans to reliably recognise pictures and
small features inside pictures whereas algorithms struggle to do so. This approach is
somewhat related to using CAPTCHAs to distinguish between humans and machines
by asking a question hard for computers to solve, but easy for humans (hence the name
CAPTCHA, Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans
Apart). The term CAPTCHA was coined by von Ahn et al. [193].
Passphrase Passphrases are very similar to passwords in the sense that they are
character strings. But instead of using relatively short words with characters from
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a big character set in order to reach security (entropy), passphrases are longer and
generate their strength (entropy) from length over a rather small character set. One big
advantage of passphrases over passwords is that they are usually easier to memorise.
Personal Identification Number PINs are rather short passwords, chosen only
from the numeric dictionary containing numbers 0-9. They are mainly used to secure
access to the actual authentication token like credit or other smart cards. Since the
card is a second authentication factor (something you have), a short PIN is sufficient
to reach reasonable security. The smaller dictionary containing only numbers is most
likely due to practical restrictions on the input device, used to enter the PIN and the
fact that they are easier to memorise.
One-time Password While most passwords are meant to be memorised by humans,
One-time Passwords (OTPs) are used only once and therefore do not have to be
memorised. They are mainly chosen from the numeric dictionary 0-9. OTPs have
become more popular recently as a second factor, in addition to the “regular” password,
in two-factor authentication, e. g., Google [112], Facebook [86], Twitter [191] and
GitHub [104]. The most popular standards for OTP that are for example implemented
in the Google Authenticator App [111] are the HMAC based algorithm specified in
RFC 4226 [155] and the time based algorithm specified in RFC 6238 [156].
Transaction authentication numbers Transaction authentication numbers (TANs)
are special OTPs mainly used to authorise single financial transactions in online bank-
ing applications. These mainly short passwords are usually drawn from the numeric
dictionary containing numbers 0-9. They can be seen as transaction bound OTPs.
1.1 The inherent Threat of Dictionary Attacks
As mentioned already, most cryptographic mechanisms use high-entropy secrets such
that it is impossible for anyone (any algorithm) to traverse all possible secrets from the
particular key space in reasonable time. Password-based schemes in contrast assume
low-entropy secrets that are drawn from a polynomial sized dictionary. Therefore, it
is feasible for an algorithm to walk through the entire dictionary and just try every
possible secret (password). This kind of attack, dictionary attack, is inherent to any
password-based algorithm and is therefore one of the main challenges in password-based
cryptography compared to mechanisms on high-entropy secrets.
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We differentiate between offline and online dictionary attacks. Offline dictionary
attacks allow an attacker to try elements from the dictionary in question against offline
available data, while online dictionary attacks require the attacker to perform online
queries to another party/oracle to verify whether an element from the dictionary is the
right password or not.
Poorly Chosen Passwords While dictionary attacks are unavoidable, poorly chosen
passwords worsen the situation. Due to poorly chosen passwords it is often sufficient
to perform a lexicon attack that traverses only a relatively small dictionary containing
for example words of the English language instead of a brute force dictionary attack
that iterates the entire dictionary. By choosing passwords that are available in lexicons
or easy to derive from other parameters like the public e-mail address, the search space
for dictionary attacks gets significantly smaller. Password cracking tools like John
the Ripper [164] or HashCat [117] gather lexicons of different languages in password
lists [165] to speed up attacks. Not only language lexicons can be used for brute-force
attacks on passwords, but password lists of often used passwords that got somehow
leaked. Using for example a list with the most used passwords [40, 49, 50], dictionary
attacks on online accounts may be performed very efficiently. Other common attack
vectors on poorly chosen passwords is by exploiting common password composition
rules such as <word><numbers>.
1.2 Passwords in The Wild
Systems currently deployed on the Internet use the approach of password-over-HTML
— sending the password over an encrypted channel (Transport Layer Security (TLS))
to the server for verification or registration — which is risky due to the threat of
disclosing user credentials to malicious parties via a plethora of attacks such as phishing
attacks or man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. Even though a confidential HTTP Secure
(HTTPS) connection — HTTP over a TLS-encrypted connection — is often used to
transport sensitive data such as passwords, the server authentication of the underlying
TLS protocol depends on the user actually validating the server’s certificate, the
accessed Uniform Resource Locator (URL), and trust in a properly working Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI). (This includes sophisticated and government aided attacks.)
Password-based mechanisms on the web are (except for some exceptions such as
[154]) missing cryptographic treatment of the password for authentication purposes all
together. Instead, their security relies on the security of the secure channel used for
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transportation (TLS) and thus the user’s ability to verify the channel and the server’s
correct handling.
1.2.1 Enhanced User Login
As discussed previously humans are hardly able to remember high-entropy secrets.
But even remembering passwords seems complicated in many cases such that users
re-use their passwords and choose them from lexicons to simplify the process of
recalling [91, 99]. To simplify the user login process many technical solutions are in
use of which some require passwords and others do not. This work is not primarily
concerned with these technical aspects but we give a brief overview on what is out
there. Those mechanisms either avoid the process of logging onto a website all together
or automate it as far as possible. The former is achieved by Single Sign-On (SSO)
services such as Kerberos [158] OpenID [93] or OAuth [116]. The latter is done by
using password managers in combination with auto completion implementations that
store login information for websites and fill forms automatically. Other mechanisms
try to enhance security by adding additional authentication factors to the password.
Enhancements to password-based logins such as multi-factor authentication [90] exist
where multiple authentication mechanisms are combined. Popular implementations of
this paradigm use the two factors OTP and password.
1.3 On Password Security Research
Security research on passwords holds an excessive body of works at topics such as “how
to measure password strength”, “how to securely hash and store passwords”, or “how to
encrypt using a password”. Since this thesis is primarily concerned with cryptographic
treatment of passwords and therefore uses idealised assumptions we give only a brief
introduction into these research fields and highlight links to this thesis.
Password Strength One of the most difficult topics in password research is the
question of how to measure the strength of a password. While cryptography research
usually assumes uniform or some other idealised distribution of passwords, this is clearly
not the case in reality with humans choosing them. Measuring password strength
involves many non technical tasks (such as research into how humans choose passwords)
and focuses on user studies and analysis of password database leaks [142, 149, 179] in
order to come up with a good model to predict min-entropy of passwords. Min-entropy
can capture many realistic password creation models and has been standardised by
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Turan et al. [188]. However, although min-entropy seems a reasonable measure for
modelling dictionary attack resistance of passwords we stress that min-entropy alone is
not sufficient to estimate the real password strength. As shown by Mazurek et al. [149],
password strength is a complex matter (due to a variety of real-world attacks) and
can hardly be captured through a single metric like min-entropy. While min-entropy
is the most practical way to model password strength, Mazurek et al. [149] also use
other metrics such as password length, number of characters from specific ASCII
subsets, substituting characters with numbers, placement of digits, and so on. For a
full overview of other metrics we refer to Mazurek et al. [149].
Password Hashing and Storage In order to securely store passwords or use them
for encryption, hashing them in some form is essential to make attacks on them more
expensive. The current state of the art password hashing schemes are the Password-
Based Key Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) [125], bcrypt [173], and scrypt [168]. This
very limited number of possible password hashing schemes should be resolved by the
recently concluded password hashing competition (https://password-hashing.net that
proposes a new hashing scheme called Argon2 by Biryukov et al. [32]). Other more
technical means to avoid stealing stored passwords is to hide them in a huge amount of
data that makes it impossible to steal without being detected (a recent implementation
is given by Taplink https://taplink.co/technology/).
1.4 Password-based Cryptography
Cryptography research in the area of passwords focuses mainly on Password Authenti-
cated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols and recently Password Protected Secret Sharing
(PPSS). PAKE allows to exchange an authenticated session key between two parties
holding a common password for authentication. In contrast to other authenticated
key exchange protocols PAKE has to consider online dictionary attacks, i. e. that an
attacker is always able to run the protocol often enough with the server in order to
eventually successfully authenticate. The recent development of PPSS moves away from
key exchange and tackles the problem of encrypted online storage that is secured with
the user’s password. In order to achieve high security, data stored on servers should
be encrypted with common encryption mechanisms such as Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [162]. However, to access the data, users would have to store the
key used in AES to encrypt the remote storage. The solution proposed by PPSS
allows to split the key in shares that are stored at different servers and can only be
retrieved if the user successfully authenticates itself to the servers with the correct
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password. PPSS therefore allows to achieve secure remote storage with only a password
for authentication, where security is achieved by sharing the password and key among
multiple servers. By not trusting a single server, password and key shares can get
leaked or stolen without compromising security directly. A comprehensible overview of
password-based cryptography research can be found at Kiefer [133].
Strong Cryptography from Low-Entropy Secrets Despite authentication and
key exchange, passwords are used in other contexts such as general strong cryptography.
Due to the low-entropy of passwords this obviously introduces new interesting challenges.
Abdalla et al. [6] show how to build strong cryptography from weak secrets. In particular,
they propose a method to perform distributed public key cryptography when each
party holds only a low entropy password, based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
assumption. Boyen et al. [43] extend the notion to the pairing world.
2 On Provable Security
We briefly discuss general security models used in the field of provable security, this
thesis is placed in, as well as other means of establishing confidence in the security
of an algorithm. More specialised methods used in password-based cryptography are
analysed later.
To prove a cryptographic primitive secure, reductionist arguments are used. Thereby,
the attempt is made to reduce the security of the algorithm/protocol under consideration
to a problem that is believed to be hard.1 Thus, given a (tight) reduction from the
primitive to an underlying problem, one can be confident that the primitive is secure
as long as the underlying problem is actually hard to solve. For an insightful and
sceptical discussion on this kind of security verification we refer to the “Another Look”
series by Koblitz and Menezes [141].
Cryptographic primitives can only be proven secure considering the abilities of a
certain adversary. Therefore, before being able to proof anything about a cryptographic
primitive it has to be modelled considering an appropriate (hostile) environment. It
always has to be kept in mind that the resulting proof is only valid within the used
model and thus not necessarily in every scenario, i. e. the real world. Before further
discussion we give a brief introduction to another approach to analyse security: The
Formal World. A formal view on modelling security goes back to work throughout the
1Note that this work is not concerned with the question whether specific problems are actually
hard. We consider only well investigated problems, which the cryptography community beliefs to be
hard.
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1980’s [52, 79, 81, 132, 150, 153]. While they explore different approaches of formal
modelling, the so called Dolev-Yao model [81] may be the best known one. In this
formal world, everything is modelled by formal expressions rather than bit strings. The
adversary controls the entire communication channel between participating parties and
can replay, modify or drop messages. A major drawback of this model is that it allows
only all-or-nothing and no probability or computational statements.
The Computational World In this thesis we deal with computational modelling.
The foundation of today’s computational models were laid in the 1980’s by Goldwasser
and others [37, 109, 110, 199]. The computational world consists of bit-string messages
and cryptographic primitives performing computations on them. It is therefore based on
complexity theory rather than formal methods. In this world the attacker is modelled
as a Probabilistic Polynomial-Time (PPT) Turing machine [189] that must not have
significant success probability. We give necessary formal definitions in Chapter II.
Reconciling the Two Worlds Even though efforts have been made to reconcile
the two approaches of formal and computational models [1, 118], there remain big
differences in theory as well as in their communities. For more discussion on these two
worlds we refer the interested reader to Cortier et al. [69].
2.1 Game-based Security
In this and the following section we give a short introduction to the two general
directions of computational security proofs, game-based and simulation-based security.
Game-based security models allow the (PPT) adversaries to play a game against a
challenger. During this game (a. k. a. experiment) he is allowed to query a set of oracles
to simulate and interact with the primitive or protocol under consideration. Eventually,
the adversary outputs his answer to the challenger who decides whether the adversary
wins the game or not.
Oracles are black-box functions simulating parts of the protocol’s behaviour, the
adversary can query. On (possibly empty) input they return the result of their
computation to the caller. Thereby, oracles define an interface for the adversary to
interact with the primitive. The actual security definition and strength of the adversary
therefore strongly depends on the available oracle.
Since simple reduction proofs from a protocol to a hard problem are rare, techniques
have been developed to do this step by step. An example on game-based security
proofs using so called “sequences of games” is given by Shoup [181].
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2.2 Simulation-Based Security
The idea of simulation-based security proofs is due to Goldreich et al. [108], further
formalised by Canetti [58]. (We use the formalism by Goldreich [105, 106].) In contrast
to the previously described game-based approach simulation-based security does not
define a challenger and oracles the adversary interacts with, but an ideal functionality
in an ideal world the actual protocol should mimic in the real world. The adversary’s
goal is to distinguish between the execution in the ideal world with a perfectly secure
(ideal) algorithm/protocol, and the real world with the actual algorithm/protocol.
Security reasoning is then done as follows: since the ideal primitive does not leak any
information other than publicly observable and its behaviour is indistinguishable from
the real world, the real world primitive is secure. Most game-based security models
only allow to derive statements about the algorithm in a shielded environment or are
limited otherwise. As soon as the algorithm is used with other primitives, and thus
sharing Input/Output (IO) channels and data, the security can not be guaranteed
anymore. Simulation-based security in contrast allows for composition of protocols.
This is strengthened in the Universally Composability (UC) framework.
Universal Composability The UC framework proposed by Canetti [59] is a popular
general purpose simulation-based security model. It overcomes an inherent shortcoming
of most game-based security models and improves on general simulation-based tech-
niques as it allows for secure arbitrary concurrent composition with other primitives
once a primitive is proven secure, which is stronger than the general simulation-based
approach from Canetti [58]. The main difference between the general simulation-based
security by Canetti [58] and the UC framework by Canetti [59] is that the composition
theorems from Canetti [58] only hold in a non-concurrent setting. The UC framework
uses “distinguisher” Z, the environment, that generates all inputs for all parties, and
reads their outputs. A protocol is secure in UC when it realises a given ideal function-
ality F , such that for any real-world adversary A, interacting with the protocol, there
exists an ideal-world adversary S, such that no environment Z can decide whether it
interacts with A and the real-world protocol, or with the ideal world attacker SIM and
the ideal functionality F .
3 Cryptographic Password Registration
Before using passwords for any kind of authentication protocol a password has to be
registered with the server that performs the authentication process. While registration
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of symmetric keys is not a particularly interesting cryptographic problem since security
there has to be guaranteed by other means, password registration is more involved.
This is due to two different reasons; First, passwords are not necessarily symmetric
secrets. In the verifier-based setting (cf. Section 4.2) the server stores only a randomised
function of the password and some randomness in order to authenticate the user holding
the correct password, which results in an asymmetric setting. Second, passwords are
not chosen uniformly at random in practice but by humans and require additional
attention. In particular, systems commonly impose restrictions on possible passwords
such as password policies in order to ensure a certain min-entropy of passwords in the
system. This should guarantee strong passwords that have reasonable security against
dictionary attacks.
When users select passwords for remote access to systems or services, the password
policy enforcement mechanism must be able to verify that selected passwords comply
with the existing policy. This compliance check can be performed either on the client
side or on the server side. For instance, when a web browser is used to register for
some web service the policy can be checked within the browser using scripts embedded
into the registration website, or on the server side upon the initial transmission of the
password (e. g., over a TLS channel). Both approaches, however, have security risks as
discussed in the following. If policy enforcement is performed solely on the client side,
the server must trust the client to obey the policy and execute the check correctly. This
is not a threat if the compliance check is assumed to be in the interest of an honest
user. Nonetheless, malicious users or users who are too lazy to remember complicated
passwords can easily circumvent such script-based verification and register passwords
that are not compliant with the policy. The corresponding service provider might
want to exclude this threat. In this case the compliance check must be performed
on the server side. In order to perform policy checks with available technologies the
client’s password must be transmitted to the server, possibly over a secure channel.
This ultimately requires the client to trust the server to process and store the received
password in a secure way. While many servers adopt the current state-of-the-art
approach for storing passwords in a hashed form, e. g., using PBKDF2 [125, 188]
or bcrypt [173], with a random salt2 to protect against server compromise or re-use
attacks, there have been many known cases, e. g., [77, 160, 186], where passwords have
been stored in clear and compromised subsequently. The ultimate goal, therefore, is
to avoid trusting servers with secure processing and storage of user passwords. This
goal imposes two main challenges: (1) in the registration phase users must be able to
2The randomness used in password hashing is commonly called salt.
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choose passwords and prove their policy compliance to a remote server without actually
transmitting their passwords, and (2) after the registration phase users must be able
to authenticate themselves to the server using their passwords without transmitting
them. The first challenge of registering password verifiers while maintaining the server’s
ability to check their policy compliance has not been solved yet and is part of the
contribution of this thesis (cf. Chapter III Section 4).
4 Cryptographic Password Authentication
In this section we give a broad overview on password-based authentication and key
exchange protocols found in literature. We start with the most popular protocol PAKE
before investigating more specialised protocol classes like threshold and group PAKE.
4.1 Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange
The notion of PAKE was introduced by Bellovin and Merritt [27] and corresponding
security models were initially developed by Bellare et al. [24], Boyko et al. [44], and
Goldreich and Lindell [107]. The first and maybe best known PAKE protocols include
SPEKE by Jablon [120] and EKE by Bellovin and Merritt [27], proven secure by Bellare
et al. [24]. Until now, numerous subsequent work explored the notion of PAKE in
depth. PAKE allows two parties, holding low-entropy keys, to negotiate a common
authenticated session key. Despite the key exchange functionality it authenticates the
two parties explicitly or implicitly. They aim to protect against offline dictionary attacks
but require restrictions on the number of failed password trials as all password-based
protocols in order to preserve security against online dictionary attacks. In particular,
security models aim at Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE)-security introduced by
Bellare and Rogaway [25] and Bellare and Rogaway [26]. One of the most promising
applications of PAKE protocols is the online authentication of users. It is considered a
more secure alternative to the nowadays mainly deployed approach of password-over-
HTML, i. e. transmitting the password over a secure channel (HTTPS) and let the
server perform a check against a stored credential. The standard model of PAKE does
not require any PKI, which is necessary for the secure TLS channel, and assumes that
only a low-entropy secret, i. e. a human memorable password, is shared between both
parties. Thereby, PAKE protocols solve the problem of potential password leakage,
inherent to the approach based on secure channels.
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In general, all PAKE models (see Pointcheval [170] for a recent overview) take into
account unavoidable online dictionary attacks and aim to guarantee security against
offline dictionary attacks. While many PAKE constructions require a constant number
of communication rounds (Abdalla et al. [3, 14], Gennaro [100], Gennaro and Lindell
[101], Katz et al. [128, 129], Katz and Vaikuntanathan [130]); recent frameworks by
Katz and Vaikuntanathan [130] and Benhamouda et al. [30] offer optimal one-round
PAKE.
In addition to the aforementioned approaches that are tailored to the password-based
setting there exist several more general authentication and key exchange frameworks
such as the ones proposed by Camenisch et al. [53] and Blazy et al. [34] that also lend
themselves to the constructions of (somewhat less practical) PAKE protocols.
Like key exchange protocols with high entropy secrets, PAKE protocols can be
modelled in one of the following general settings.
4.1.1 Game-Based PAKE-Security
The original game-based PAKEmodels in Bellare et al. [24] (denoted Bellare-Pointcheval-
Rogaway (BPR-M) here) and Boyko et al. [44] specify the Find-then-Guess (FtG)
approach where the semantic security of the session key is considered with respect
to one particular session, referred to as a test session, determined by the adversary
through one call to a Test oracle. (Semantic security states that no PPT adversary
exists that has non-negligible probability of winning the experiment, in this case the
PAKE experiment.) The adversary has furthermore access to oracles that allow him to
eavesdrop on protocol executions, take active part in executions and corrupt protocol
participants to retrieve private information from a party. Abdalla et al. [14] proposed
the stronger notion in the Real-or-Random (RoR) setting to model semantic security
of PAKE protocols by allowing polynomially-many queries to the Test oracle. They
showed not only that their RoR approach leads to stronger security but were also able
to simplify the model by removing the reveal oracle. The models in Bellare et al. [24]
and Abdalla et al. [14] remain the most popular game-based PAKE models, adopted
in the analysis of many protocols, including the random oracle-based protocols by
Abdalla et al. [8] and Abdalla et al. [13] and protocols requiring a Common Reference
String (CRS) (Gennaro [100], Gennaro and Lindell [101], Katz et al. [128, 129]).
Find-then-Guess The term Find-then-Guess goes back to Bellare et al. [23] whose
definition of FtG-security for symmetric encryption is based on work by Goldwasser
and Micali [110] and Micali et al. [151]. In this thesis we focus on password-based
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cryptography where one of the first formal models for PAKE, proposed by Bellare et al.
[24], employs the FtG approach. The security requirement there is that an adversary
must not be able to decide whether a given bit-string is the real key computed by
honest parties performing the protocol, or a random element of the same length. The
adversary has only one approach to retrieve such a test key.
Real-or-Random The term Real-or-Random has been introduced by Bellare et al.
[23] in a different context and a different meaning. The notion of RoR in the context
of Authenticated Key Exchange protocols has been introduced by Abdalla et al. [14]
to strengthen and simplify the FtG approach used in the original BPR-M model
towards the RoR approach. In the AKE context RoR allows the adversary to query
multiple keys before deciding whether all of them have been computed by honest parties
performing the protocol, or all of them have been randomly chosen from the key space.
4.1.2 Simulation-Based PAKE-Security
Simultaneously with the first game-based models by Bellare et al. [24] and Boyko
et al. [44], the first simulation-based PAKE model has been proposed by Goldreich and
Lindell [107]. Their work also comprises the first (and until now the only, but fairly
inefficient) PAKE protocol that is built from general secure multi-party computation
techniques but does not require any setup assumptions nor random oracles.3 The
protocol has been subsequently simplified at the cost of weakened security by Nguyen
and Vadhan [159]. While the model from Goldreich and Lindell [107] is hardly used in
the analysis of PAKE protocols, a stronger simulation-based model in the framework
of Universally Composability by Canetti [59] has later been proposed by Canetti et al.
[62]. In contrast to game-based PAKE protocols, UC-secure protocols require setup
assumptions [62], with CRS being the most popular one [130], albeit ideal ciphers
/ random oracles [9] and stronger hardware-based assumptions [74] have also been
used. The most recent and most efficient PAKE protocols are proven secure in the
UC-framework [2–4, 30].
4.2 Verifier-based Password Authenticated Key Exchange
A challenge intrinsic to all PAKE protocols is the issue of server compromise. It has
been mentioned from the first PAKE protocols by Bellovin and Merritt [28] (augmented
3The work by Goldreich and Lindell [107] is concerned with the general possibility of such a
protocol rather than building a practical one.
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EKE) describing the threats arising from stolen password databases. Servers store
passwords in databases to retrieve them when necessary. In order to offer better
protection against password database compromise servers are supposed to store only
the randomised password hash and the random salt that was used. Bellovin and Merritt
[28] first described how password authenticated key-exchange can be performed while
the server stores only a verifier of the actual password. The idea sketched by Bellovin
and Merritt [28] resembles the concept of Verifier-based PAKE (VPAKE). This concept
is also known as asymmetric [24] or augmented PAKE [28]. While this might sound
compelling, the research community never picked up on VPAKE with only few works
considering this protocol class [31, 42, 102, 196]. Gentry et al. [102] propose a way of
transforming PAKE protocols into UC-secure VPAKE protocols. Benhamouda and
Pointcheval [31] recently proposed the first game-based security model, based on the
well known BPR model for PAKE protocols.
4.2.1 On Rainbow Tables
The reason for protecting passwords on a server is rather simple. Computing a verifier
from a password using only a one-way function allows an attacker to precompute a list
of verifiers such that inverting the one-way function can be performed rather efficiently
considering human password choice. Those lists that can further be shared and re-used
are commonly called rainbow tables. Note that actual rainbow tables usually build hash
chains to reduce their size. We refrain from further description of rainbow table as
they are out of scope of this thesis. Adding a small amount of true randomness to the
input of the one-way function alleviates these attacks as rainbow tables for all possible
random values would have to be created, which leads to a time/memory trade-off up
to a point where storing those tables becomes inefficient. This additional randomness
is commonly referred to as salt.
4.2.2 Discussion
One reason for the relatively limited interest in Verifier-based PAKE might be the
somewhat questionable security benefits of VPAKE, depending on its definition. Se-
curity models for PAKE protocols consider security of a key-exchange protocol using
a password as authentication mechanism. Often however, they do not consider any
malicious server or attacker that tries to steal the authentication information, i.e. the
password. VPAKE security models try to capture whether the protocol is secure (in the
sense of Password Authenticated Key Exchange) and if the server securely handles and
stores the passwords/verifiers. Since those security goals are significantly different and
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somewhat unrelated, it is difficult to find a meaningful security model for it. Instead
of checking the hardness of retrieving the actual password from a password hash it
might be for example more interesting to model whether an attacker is able to use the
password verifier as authentication credential directly (as is the case for naïve VPAKE
constructions such as the discussed tSoke, see Section 2.3.3 in Chapter II).
Another reason for low adoption rate of VPAKE in the research community could be
its questionable benefit considering efficiency of password cracking tools. Nonetheless,
VPAKE is an interesting primitive that deserves more investigation because it gives
stronger security guarantees than PAKE and models a real-world need where servers
store only password verifiers.
4.3 Threshold and Two-Server PAKE
Two-server PAKE protocols such as the one proposed by Abdalla et al. [14] and general
threshold PAKE protocols [13, 145, 175] tackle the problem of server compromise and
malicious servers in a different way than VPAKE. They share the client’s password
amongst two or more servers that then jointly authenticate the client. By splitting the
password a malicious or compromised server can only recover a password share that
does not allow to recover the password. In contrast to PAKE protocols two-server and
threshold PAKE protocols are less well studied.
4.3.1 Threshold PAKE
Ford and Kaliski [92] first suggested to split the client’s password among multiple servers
to protect against server compromise. Raimondo and Gennaro [175] and MacKenzie
et al. [145] were the first to propose t-out-of-n threshold PAKE protocols, where the
protocol remains secure as long as t out of n servers, participating in the protocol and
holding a password share, are honest. But not all of them, such as the protocol from
MacKenzie et al. [145] are password-only and they require additional cryptography
such as a PKI in addition to the password.
4.3.2 Two-Server PAKE
Two-Server Password Authenticated Key Exchange (2PAKE) can be seen as a special
case of threshold PAKE for t = n = 2. Compared to general threshold PAKE, 2PAKE
is deemed more practical requiring only two participating servers. In case of a server
compromise, password change notifications can be sent to users. Threshold PAKE
protocols are not necessarily 2PAKE protocols. The threshold PAKE from Raimondo
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and Gennaro [175] for example requires t < n/3 such that it can not be modified to a
2PAKE protocol. The first real 2PAKE protocol is due to Brainard et al. [45], which
was proven secure by Szydlo and Kaliski [184] in a modified version. The first and
only 2PAKE with thorough security model based on the popular game-based BPR-M
model is due to Katz et al. [127].
4.4 Other Password Authenticated Protocols
Besides the client-server authentication and key-exchange scenario, there exist several
others in the password-based authentication setting we briefly discuss in the following.
Tag-based Password Authentication While PAKE is the most popular password-
based authentication protocol in cryptography research, it is often sufficient to perform
authentication without key exchange. To this end Manulis et al. [147] introduced
tag-based Password Authentication (tPAuth) that essentially strips a PAKE protocol of
its key exchange phase and performs mutual authentication instead. The additional tag
allows to use tPAuth protocols to be used in Password Authenticated and Confidential
Channel Establishment (PACCE) protocols, which is useful when performing password-
based authentication on top of an already confidential channel. PACCE allows to bind a
confidential channel to a password-based authentication protocol and thus authenticate
the confidential channel using the password. This provides an alternative to using
the session key output by a PAKE protocol to create a confidential and authenticated
channel.
Three-Party Password Authenticated Key Exchange The three-party setting
(3PAKE) considers two humans who want to securely communicate with each other.
Since sharing passwords with everyone else is not practical, a trusted server (the third
party) comes into play. Thus, the users have to share only one password with the
trusted sever, which assists in the three-party protocol between the two users. The first
three-party security model is due to Abdalla et al. [14]. Subsequent works [67, 187, 200]
propose further protocols and improved security models.
Group Password Authenticated Key Exchange Password authenticated group
key exchange is another popular protocol, extending two-party PAKE to the group
setting. Authenticated group key exchange protocols allow a group of parties to
negotiate a session key. One way to achieve group PAKE is to use general group key
exchange protocols and modify them for the password setting as proposed by Bresson
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et al. [47, 48]. Similar to PAKE, group PAKE enjoys a large body of research papers
[5, 8, 10, 11, 15, 38, 84, 115, 140].
Multi-Factor Authenticated Key Exchange As mentioned before, using pass-
words is only one possible authentication mechanism for humans. Combining several
authentication techniques leads to multi-factor authentication protocols. The most com-
monly used reference for (multi-factor) authentication is the aforementioned National
Institue of Standards and Technology (NIST) standard [51] that defines four security
levels for authentication. Starting from level three at least two authentication factors
are necessary. Research in the area of multi-factor authentication [114, 144, 171, 182]
proposes protocols and security models for two-party and three-party scenarios.
Password Protected Secret Sharing The notion of Password Protected Secret
Sharing was recently introduced by Bagherzandi et al. [18] (improved by Jarecki et al.
[122]). It allows to share a secret such as a symmetric key, among multiple servers,
protected by a password. A security model in the UC framework was proposed later by
Camenisch et al. [57] (enhanced to resist malicious servers by Camenisch et al. [56] and
transient corruptions by Camenisch et al. [55]). PPSS has many interesting applications
such as secure remote storage, an increasingly important use-case. A similar notion
called hidden credential retrieval using only a single server has been introduced by
Boyen [41] to allow users with knowledge of a password to store high-entropy messages
securely on a server.
5 Real World Architectures and Challenges
As discussed in the beginning, the scenario where cryptographic password-based
authentication protocols are most needed is user login on the Internet. However, due
to the Internet’s architecture the use of protocols like PAKE on the internet involves
several challenges. To understand the challenges one first has to understand how
HTTPS and thus TLS works.
TLS is, in its current version 1.2 [33, 80, 190], the successor of the Secure Socket
Layer (SSL) protocol [95], a suite of cryptographic protocols for secure and authenticated
communication. It is standardised by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
(https://www.ietf.org/) and, while called transport layer security, is implemented on
the presentation layer and is initialised on the session layer. In order to secure network
traffic however, it can be seen as the transport layer while all lower layers only transport
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the encrypted content. When accessing a website via HTTPS a TLS session is first
established between the client and the server (authenticated by the server’s public
key, usually wrapped in an X.509 certificate [68]), which is then used to transport the
content via HTTP. Thus, when the user is presented with a website to log on, the
secure channel has been established already such that executing a PAKE protocol for
authentication and subsequent exchange of TLS keys with the newly created key from
the PAKE protocol is rather impractical (and not supported by any common browser).
The place to use PAKE is actually before the TLS channels is set up, such that it
can be used as key exchange in the TLS handshake protocol. This approach has been
followed by Taylor et al. [185], which uses the Secure Remote Password (SRP) protocol
by Wu [197] and is implemented in major TLS implementations such as OpenSSL
(https://www.openssl.org/). The problem with such an approach however is that it
requires the user to login before the actual website is sent, besides other problems,
including the logout problem. Most problems are transferable from the scenario where
clients use X.509 certificates for authentication to the case where the client uses a
password for authentication. See Parsovs [166] for a discussion of these problems.
Real world implementations of multi-factor authentication protocols include the
popular Google authenticator [111] amongst others. However, implementations usually
combine only passwords with OTPs or push notifications. Using biometric factors is
rarely seen in practice so far.
Looking at the current state of the Internet and the used tools and protocols it is
simply not reasonable to use PAKE as TLS authentication. The challenge is therefore
to deploy cryptographic password-based authentication on top of TLS, i. e. on the
application level, in order to secure user logins on the Internet. While this might sound
straight-forward, one has to consider that executing for example PAKE with mutual
authentication via an HTTPS channel does not necessarily yield an authenticated and
confidential channel between client and server, depending on the composition of the
TLS and PAKE protocols. In particular, the security guarantees in the case where
the TLS session keys are not replaced with the PAKE keys are not clear. To achieve
security in this case the password-based authentication protocol has to be bound to
the TLS channel by other means. This has been recently achieved by Manulis et al.
[146] by introducing PACCE on top of TLS.
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6 Outline & Summary of Results
This thesis consists of four more chapters. Chapter II gives prerequisites and building
blocks used throughout this work. The remainder of the work consists of the two main
Chapters III and IV before concluding the work in Chapter V.
Chapter III describes a framework for password registration and authentication.
It comprises the first two password registration protocols with security models that
allow to register passwords in a blind way that does not reveal the password to the
server but only transmits and stores a verifier. While being blind, the registration
protocols allow the server to impose rules on password strength. In particular, the
server can verify a password policy on the password that corresponds to the registered
verifier. To use the registered verifier a new password-based authentication protocol in
the verifier-based setting is proposed. The proposed protocols were implemented to
compare performance of the protocols in addition to their security. To demonstrate
practicability of the framework, we further give a demo that shows how a real-world
deployment of could look like. The demo consists of a server necessary to perform
registration and authentication, a corresponding client application implemented as
Firefox extension, and an application that is accessed after logging in.
Chapter IV describes a framework similar to the one from Chapter III but for
the two-server setting. In particular, it proposes a password registration protocol for
the two-server setting with an according security model. While being similar to the
single-server setting, this involves additional challenges as no single server retrieves
an element that is able to verify the client’s password on its own. The focus in this
chapter however is on 2PAKE. It proposes in particular a new framework for 2PAKE
using the new notion of Distributed Smooth Projective Hash Function (D-SPHF) that
distributes computation of Smooth Projective Hash Functions (SPHFs) between the
two servers. Building on D-SPHF and the proposed 2PAKE framework allows us to
propose a new 2PAKE protocol that is secure in the newly proposed security definition
for 2PAKE in the UC framework.
Chapter II
Prerequisites and Building Blocks
In this chapter we recall known facts and assumptions as well as notations used
throughout this thesis. We start with some general mathematical fundamentals before
giving generally useful definitions in our setting. While most of these definitions are all
well known and do not need reference, most of them can be found (in maybe slightly
different version) in Katz and Lindell [126] or Goldreich [105].
1 Mathematical Background
This is not a complete mathematical introduction but recalls the most important
definitions needed in our context.
1.1 Groups
Groups are an important mathematical structure in cryptography. In the following we
give some useful definitions in the context of cyclic and composite order groups.
Definition 1 (Groups). Let G denote a set and ◦ a binary operation on two elements
from G. G is a group if it has closure, a neutral element, every element has an inverse
element, and it is associative, i. e.:
• For all g, h ∈ G, g ◦ h ∈ G
• There exists an element e ∈ G, called identity, such that for all g ∈ G, e ◦ g =
g = g ◦ e.
• For all g ∈ G there exists an inverse element h ∈ G such that g ◦ h = e = h ◦ g.
• For all g, h, k ∈ G, (g ◦ h) ◦ k = g ◦ (h ◦ k). ♢
22 Prerequisites and Building Blocks
The order of a finite group G is denoted by |G| and is defined as the number of elements
in G. An abelian group additionally is commutative, i. e. for all g, h ∈ G, g ◦ h = h ◦ g.
In this work, and cryptography in general, we mainly use cyclic groups.
1.1.1 Cyclic Groups
Since many computational assumptions on groups used in cryptography rely on the
cyclic property of groups we have to ensure that all groups used in this context are
cyclic.
Definition 2 (Cyclic Groups). Let G denote a finite group of order p. G is cyclic if
there exists a generator g ∈ G such that {g0, g1, . . . , gp−1} = G. ♢
Therefore, we usually use groups of prime order p since groups of prime order are
cyclic. Another useful feature of prime order groups is that all elements of group
G, except the identity, are generators of G. We write G = ⟨g⟩ to denote a group
G is generate by g. Working in subgroups of Zp it is further useful to know that
Z∗p = {x ∈ 1, . . . , p− 1 | gcd(x, p) = 1} is a cyclic group as well. In the case of cyclic
groups where p is prime all elements in Z∗p are relatively prime to p (and thus invertible
modulo p) such that ϕ(p) = p− 1, where ϕ(p) = |Z∗p| denotes the cardinality of Z∗p.
1.1.2 Composite Order Groups
Composite order groups Z∗N for integers N = pq that are product of two distinct
primes p and q are another useful group for cryptography. Note that Z∗N = {x ∈
1, . . . , N − 1 | gcd(x,N) = 1} is always an abelian group under multiplication modulo
integer N > 1. The cardinality of Z∗N is given by ϕ(p) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
1.2 Elliptic Curves
This work is only marginally concerned with elliptic curve cryptography. We therefore
keep this section short and refer to Hankerson et al. [113] for further introduction into
elliptic curves in cryptography and more general definitions. An elliptic curve E over
prime-field Zp is given by
y2 = x3 + ax+ b mod p,
with a, b ∈ Zp, p > 5, and 4a3 + 27b2 ̸= 0 mod p. Points on curve E are given by
pairs (x, y) ∈ Z2p that fulfil those equations. The set containing all these points, plus
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the point at infinity ∞, are denoted E(Zp). E(Zp) with ∞ as identity and common
arithmetic operations such as addition, subtraction, multiplication, and inversion form
an abelian group. Note that we use the multiplicative notation for elliptic curves (even
though it is an additive group).
1.3 Pairings
Let G1 = ⟨g1⟩,G2 = ⟨g2⟩, and GT = ⟨gT ⟩ denote cyclic groups of prime-order p. A
pairing is defined by an efficient bilinear map e : G1 ×G2 7→ GT with e(gx1 , gy2) = gxyT
for x, y ∈ Zp. In cryptography we usually distinguish between three different types of
pairings [98]:
• Type I: G1 = G2;
• Type II: G1 ̸= G2 and there exists an efficiently computable homomorphism
ϕ : G2 7→ G1 (but not for G1 7→ G2);
• Type III: G1 ̸= G2, without any efficiently computable homomorphism between
G1 and G2.
1.3.1 Computational Assumptions
In this section we recall computational assumptions used in the remainder of this thesis.
We distinguish between assumptions on cyclic groups and assumptions on composite
order groups. When saying something is hard with respect to the security parameter
λ, this means that there exists no algorithm that can solve the problem in polynomial
time in λ.
Asymptotic notation allows us to describe the behaviour of a function when its
arguments converge towards some limit. As mentioned earlier, security models used in
this work are from the computational world. In particular, running time and success
or advantage probabilities of algorithms, i. e. adversaries, are modelled as functions of
security parameter λ. Security is therefore only given for reasonable security parameters.
To express this asymptotic notation is used.
Definition 3 (Negligible Functions). A function f is negligible if for every polynomial
p(·) there exists an N ∈ N such that for all n ∈ N with n > N it holds that f(n) <
1/p(n). ♢
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Probabilistic Polynomial-Time We use PPT to describe an efficient algorithm.
The actual definition of PPT, first defined by Gill [103], is given for Probabilistic
Polynomial (PP), how PPT is usually called in complexity theory, as follows:
Definition 4 (Probabilistic Polynomial). PP denotes the class of decision problems
solvable by a Probabilistic Turing Machine (PTM) A such that
• A runs in polynomial-time,
• at least 1/2 of the computation paths accept when the answer is ‘yes’, and
• less than 1/2 of the computation paths accept when the answer is ‘no’. ♢
The informal description for Probabilistic Turing Machines is given in Definition 5. We
refer the interested reader to works concerned with complexity theory, e. g., [176, 201]
for more on PTM and a formal definition.
Definition 5 (Probabilistic Turing Machine [103]). A PTM is a Turing machine
with distinguished states called coin-tossing states. For each coin-tossing state, the
finite control unit specifies two possible next states. The computation of a PTM is
deterministic except that in coin-tossing states the machine tosses an unbiased coin to
decide between the two possible next states. ♢
Note that the running time is always parametrised with security parameter λ. One may
think of PPT as a notion for “feasible strategies” or “efficient algorithms” running in
time polynomial in λ. In other words, this means that for some constants a and c the
algorithm runs in time a·λc with security parameter λ. One very central definition when
modelling computational security is the notion of computational indistinguishability.
Definition 6 (Computational Indistinguishability). Polynomial-time indistinguisha-
bility between two ensembles X = {Xn}n∈N and Y = {Yn}n∈N is given if for every PPT
algorithm D, there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that
|Pr[D(X) = 1]− Pr[D(Y ) = 1]| < ε(n).
We use computational or polynomial-time indistinguishable interchangeably and write
X
ε= Y . ♢
1.3.2 Cyclic Groups
In this section we recall some computational assumptions in the group context that
are believed to be hard. The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is the basis of all
assumptions in those groups.
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Definition 7 (Discrete Logarithm Problem). Let G denote a group of prime order p
with generator g. The DLP in G states that given a random element h ∈R G it is hard
to compute x such that h = gx, i.e.
Pr[DLogA,G(λ) = 1] ≤ ε(λ)
ExpDLogA,G (λ) :
obtain cyclic group G of prime order p with length λ and generator g
choose h ∈R G
x← A(G, p, g, h)
output 1 iff gx = h, otherwise 0
♢
Several DLP-based assumptions have been proposed. The two most important ones
are the DDH and Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumptions.
Definition 8 (Computational Diffie-Hellman). Let G denote a group of order p of
length λ with generator g. The CDH assumption in G states that given (g, ga, gb) ∈ G3
it is hard relative to λ to compute gab for random scalars a, b ∈R Zp. ♢
Definition 9 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman). Let G denote a group of order p of length λ
with generator g. The DDH assumption in G states that given (g, ga, gb, gc) ∈ G4 it is
hard relative to λ to determine whether c = ab for random scalars a, b, c ∈R Zp, i.e.∣∣∣Pr[A(G, p, g, ga, gb, gc) = 1]− Pr[A(G, p, g, ga, gb, gab) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ε(λ).
♢
When using DLP-based assumptions in pairing groups we have to be more careful as
the DDH assumption might not hold and additional treatment of the pairing setting is
necessary.
Definition 10 (Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman [17, 20]). Let G1 = ⟨g1⟩, G2 = ⟨g2⟩,
and GT = ⟨gT ⟩ denote groups of prime-order p of length λ with associated bilinear
map e. The SXDH assumption states that the DDH assumption in G1 and G2 is hard
relative to λ, i.e. given (w1, x1, y1, z1) ∈ G41 and (w2, x2, y2, z2) ∈ G42 it is hard to
decide whether there exist values a1, a2 such that x1 = wa11 , z1 = ya11 , x2 = wa22 , and
z2 = ya22 . ♢
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1.3.3 Composite Order Groups
The basic problem underlying all hardness assumptions in composite order groups is
the factoring problem.
Definition 11 (Factoring Problem). Let N = pq denote an integer with prime factors
p and q of length λ each. The factoring problem in Z∗N states that given modulus N it
is hard relative to λ to compute p′, q′ such that N = p′q′. ♢
To define RSA-based assumptions we have to define the RSA key generation algorithm
first. Let (N, e, d) $← KGen(λ) denote the RSA key-generation algorithm that generates
(N, e, d) such that N = pq for two distinct primes p and q of size λ each, gcd(e, ϕ(N)) =
1, and ed = 1 mod ϕ(N).
Definition 12 (RSA Assumption). Let N = pq denote an integer with prime factors
p and q of length λ each and y ∈R Z∗N a random element from Z∗N . The RSA problem
over Z∗N states that given (N, e, d, y) defined as above it is hard with respect to λ to
compute x such that xe = y mod N . ♢
The one-more RSA assumption is a variant of the RSA assumption, indicating that
the RSA problem is hard relative to λ even if the adversary is given access to an RSA
oracle.
Definition 13 (One-more RSA). Let (N, e, d) $← KGen(λ) denote the RSA key-
generation algorithm, and rj ∈R Z∗N be uniformly random integers in Z∗N for j ∈ [1, t+1].
We say the one-more RSA problem is (λ, t)-hard if for every PPT adversary A we have
Pr[{xi}i∈[1,t+1] ← A(·)d mod N(N, e, λ, r1, . . . , rt+1)] ≤ ε(λ),
where xei = ri mod N , A made at most t queries to the RSA oracle (·)d mod N and ε(·)
is a negligible function. ♢
2 Security Models
The two most popular general models to define security in are the Random Oracle Model
(ROM) and the standard model. In the ROM a public randomly chosen black-box
function H is available to all parties, whereas no such function exists in the standard
model. While this function H can not be instantiated in the real world it is useful
(sometimes necessary) in security proofs. Implementations of protocols requiring a
random oracle usually instantiate it with a cryptographic hash function. The function
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H is queried on an input x and returns the “hash value” of x. It is consistent, such
that y = H(x) for all y ← H(x), and the output y of H is uniformly at random such
that one can think of H as drawing a random element y each time it is queried on
a new x. If H has seen x before, it returns the previously chosen element y. While
not including random oracles, the standard model often includes a CRS that is made
available to all parties and can be seen as common set-up parameters. The Common
Reference String model, proposed by Canetti and Fischlin [61], is a generalisation of
the common random string model. In the CRS model all parties have access to a
common reference string that was chosen according to some predefined distribution.
This model is usually referred to as the standard model with CRS as the assumption
of the additional CRS being available is rather weak.
2.1 Simulation-based Security
We recall the basic setting of the malicious model from Goldreich [106]. Let f : {0, 1}∗×
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ be a functionality such that f(x, y) = (f1(x, y), f2(x, y))
and Π a two-party protocol to compute f . In the ideal model every party gets an input
and access to a trusted party. Honest participants send their input to the trusted party
while malicious parties, with additional input z and random tape r, either abort or
send some value with the length of their non-additional input to the trusted party.
The trusted party answers to the first party with f1(x, y) after obtaining input (x, y).
If only one input is received, the trusted party replies with ⊥ to both parties. The
trusted party further answers the second party with f2(x, y) if it did not stop before,
⊥ otherwise. It may stop depending on its input and output if the first party is
malicious. While an honest party always outputs the value received from the trusted
party, malicious parties can output any polynomially computable function of all its
inputs. The ideal and real model are formalised as follows.
Definition 14 (Ideal Model). Let B = (B1, B2) be a pair of PPT algorithms repre-
senting strategies in the ideal model. Such a pair is admissible in the ideal malicious
model if for at least one honest i ∈ {1, 2}, we have Bi(u, z, r) = u and Bi(u, z, r, v) = v
for all possible u, z, r and v. Furthermore, |Bi(u, z, r)| = |u| must hold for both i’s.
The joint execution of f under B in the ideal model on input pair (x, y) and auxiliary
input z, denoted idealf,B(z)(x, y), is defined by uniformly selecting a random tape r
for the adversary and letting
idealf,B(z)(x, y) := Ξ(x, y, z, r),
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with Ξ(x, y, z, r) defined as follows. If party 1 is honest:
Ξ(x, y, z, r) := (f1(x, y′), B2(y, z, r, f2(x, y′)))
with y′ ← B2(y, z, r); If party 2 is honest:
Ξ(x, y, z, r) :=
 (B1(x, z, r, f1(x
′, y),⊥) ,⊥ ) if B1(x, z, r, f1(x′, y)) = ⊥;
(B1(x, z, r, f1(x′, y)) , f2(x′, y) ) otherwise,
with x′ ← B2(x, z, r). ♢
Definition 15 (Real Model). Let A = (A1, A2) be a pair of PPT algorithms rep-
resenting strategies in the real model. Such a pair is admissible with respect to Π
if at least one Ai coincides with the strategy specified in Π. The joint execution of
Π under A in the real model, on input pair (x, y) and auxiliary input z, denoted
realΠ,A(z)(x, y), is defined as the output pair resulting from the interaction between
A1(x, z) and A2(y, z). ♢
A protocol Π is said to be secure if its execution in the real model emulates execution
of the ideal model with a trusted party for the according functionality.
Definition 16 (Security [106, Definition 7.2.6]). Protocol Π is said to securely compute
f in the malicious model if for every PPT pair of algorithms A = (A1, A2) that is
admissible for the real model, there exists a PPT pair of algorithms B = (B1, B2) that
is admissible for the ideal model such that
{idealf,B(z)(x, y)}x,y,z c≡ {realΠ,A(z)(x, y)}x,y,z
where x, y, z ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that |x| = |y| and |z| = poly(|x|). ♢
The Hybrid Model When proving security of a protocol that is combined of
other primitives and protocols we view those protocols as black boxes and prove
security in the hybrid model instead of the real model. Security then follows
from the composition theorem by Canetti [58]. In the g-hybrid world protocol
f is executed between two parties like in the real world, but every invocation
of sub-protocol g is replaced with the according ideal functionality, i. e. a call to
the trusted party that computes g. The output of the g-hybrid world for func-
tionality f and protocol Π is denoted by hybridgΠ,A(z)(x, y). Let ΠΓ denote the
real world protocol Π that uses Γ as a sub-protocol, i. e. instead of querying the
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trusted party to compute g, the real protocol Γ is executed. To prove security it
is sufficient to show {idealf,B(z)(x, y)}x,y,z c≡ {hybridgΠ,A(z)(x, y)}x,y,z, which implies
{idealf,B(z)(x, y)}x,y,z c≡ {realΠΓ,A(z)(x, y)}x,y,z as shown by Canetti [58].
2.2 Universally Composable PAKE
The UC framework is a special simulation-based security framework. We refrain from
recalling the UC-framework itself and refer to Chapter I Section 2.2 for a brief overview
and Canetti [59] for a complete formal description. In the following we give definitions
of common UC functionalities used in this thesis. In particular, FPAKE and helper
functionalities Fcrs, Fca, and Finit.
The CRS functionality by Canetti and Fischlin [61], recalled in Figure 1, describes
generation and distribution of the CRS.
Functionality Fcrs
Fcrs is parametrised by a distribution D and proceeds as follows:
NewValue: Upon input (NV, sid) choose a value d ∈R D, send d back to the
activating party and store the value if this is the first invocation. In any
other case return the value d to the activating party.
Fig. 1: Ideal Functionality Fcrs
Working with PKIs we require the functionality of a Certificate Authority (CA). The
ideal CA functionality Fca was introduced by Canetti [60], recalled in Figure 2.
Functionality Fca
Registration: Upon receiving the first message (Register, sid, v) from party P ,
send (Registered, sid, v) to the adversary; upon receiving ok from adversary
SIM, and if sid = P and this is the first request from P , then record the pair
(P , v).
Retrieve: Upon receiving a message (Retrieve, sid) from party P ′, send
(Retrieve, sid,P ′) to the adversary, and wait for an ok from adversary
SIM. Then, if there is a recorded pair (sid, v) output (Retrieve, sid, v) to
P ′. Otherwise output (Retrieve, sid,⊥) to P ′.
Fig. 2: Ideal Functionality Fca
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To establish unique query identifiers between protocol participants we use the Finit
functionality from Barak et al. [21], recalled in Figure 3.
Functionality Finit
Finit, with fixed session identifier 0, runs in the universe with parties U and
adversary SIM. When called the first time, it sets Hist = ∅.
Init: Upon receiving (init, 0, ⟨Pi,P ,F⟩) from Pi, where P ⊆ U , execute the
following:
1. Send (init, 0, ⟨Pi,P ,F⟩) to SIM.
2. Upon receiving back (setId, 0, ⟨sid′, Pi,P ,F⟩) from SIM, do the follow-
ing:
(a) If sid′ ∈ Hist, choose an arbitrary sid ̸∈ Hist.
(b) If sid′ ̸∈ Hist, set sid← sid′.
(c) Update Hist← Hist ∪ {sid}.
(d) Send (invoke, 0, ⟨sid, Pi,P ,F⟩) to SIM.
3. Upon receiving a message (sendoutput, 0, ⟨sid, Pi,P ,F⟩) from SIM:
(a) If Pj ∈ P and it has not yet been sent to the invoke message with
⟨sid, Pi,P ,F⟩), send it (invoke, 0, ⟨sid, Pi,P ,F⟩).
Fig. 3: Ideal Functionality Finit
For reference we also recall the UC functionality by Canetti et al. [62] FPAKE for PAKE
protocols in Figure 4.
2.3 Game-based PAKE and VPAKE
We recall game-based PAKE and VPAKE security models proposed by Bellare et al.
[24] and Abdalla et al. [14], and Benhamouda and Pointcheval [31] respectively, and
further describe the tagged PAKE protocol tSOKE by Manulis et al. [147], which is
based on the PAKE protocol by Abdalla et al. [7].
2.3.1 PAKE
We describe the commonly used game-based PAKE model from Bellare et al. [24]
and highlight modifications introduced by Abdalla et al. [14]. The model considers
two parties; a client C, holding a password pwd, and a server S, holding a vector of
passwords of all registered clients. Both parties are chosen from a fixed disjoint set of
2 Security Models 31
Functionality FPAKE
The functionality FPAKE is parametrised by a security parameter λ. It interacts
with an adversary SIM and a set of parties via the following queries:
NewSession: Upon input (NS, sid, Pi, Pj, pwd, role) from Pi, check that Pj is legit
and send (NS, sid, Pi, Pj, role) to SIM. If this is the first NewSession query, or
if this is the second NewSession query and there is a record (sid, Pj, Pi, pwd′),
then record (sid, Pi, Pj, pwd) and mark this record fresh.
TestPwd: Upon input (TP, sid, Pi, pwd′) from SIM, check that a fresh record
(sid, Pi, Pj, pwd) exists, then do: If pwd = pwd′, mark the record as
compromised and reply to SIM with “correct guess”. If pwd ̸= pwd′, mark the
record interrupted and reply with “wrong guess”.
NewKey: Upon input (NK, sid, Pi, sk) from SIM, check that a record
(sid, Pi, Pj, pwd) exists, |sk| = λ and this is the first NewKey query for
Pi, then:
• If the record is compromised, or either Pi or Pj is corrupted, then output
(sid, sk) to Pi.
• If the record is fresh, and there is a record (sid, Pj, Pi, pwd′) with
pwd′ = pwd, and a key sk′ was sent to Pj and (sid, Pj, Pi, pwd) was fresh
at the time, then output (sid, sk′) to Pi.
• In any other case, pick a new random key sk′ of length λ and send
(sid, sk′) to Pi.
Either way, mark the record (sid, Pi, Pj, pwd) as completed.
Fig. 4: Ideal Functionality FPAKE
clients and servers. (For convenience it is assumed that every client shares a password
with every server.) Passwords pwd are drawn from a dictionary D of size |D| = n.
Each participant instance Pi holds a state with sidiP , pidiP , and skiP to keep track of
sessions, partners, and the negotiated session key. Further termiP and acciP keep track
whether Pi terminated, respectively accepted, and stateiP and usediP record the state
and whether a session has been used. Adversary A has access to the following oracles
to interact with protocol participants:
• Send(Pi,m) sends message m to Pi and returns message m′ output by Pi, if any.
State variables are updated as necessary.
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• Execute(Ci,Sj) executes the protocol between the two parties and returns the
transcript. In addition, the adversary is given the internal state of any corrupted
party as well as the state variables of all participants.
• Reveal(Pi) returns session key skiP of Pi.
• Test(Pi) returns ⊥ if skiP = NULL, and either skiP of Pi if a randomly chosen bit
b
?= 1, or a random value if b ?= 0. This oracle can only be queried once.
Two protocol participants are partnered if they have matching transcripts, i. e. the
recorded transcript of one participant is a subset of the one recorded by the other party.
A PAKE protocol is correct if for two partnered instances Ci and Sj acciC ?= accjS ?= true
and skiC
?= skjS . An instance Pi is fresh unless one of the following is true at the
conclusion of the experiment: (1) at some point, the adversary queried Reveal(Pi); or
(2) at some point, the adversary queried Reveal(Pj), where Pj and Pi are partnered.
The attacker can only succeed if at the time of the Test query the queried instance is
fresh and has accepted, i. e. acciP
?= true. The attacker’s advantage is then given by
AdvA,Π(λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[Succ]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ qs|D| + ε(λ)
for qs active sessions and dictionary D.
Sometimes an additional Corrupt oracle is given that allows the attacker to retrieve
passwords from protocol participants. (Corrupted sessions are then prohibited in
Test queries as well.) Abdalla et al. [14] showed that allowing multiple Test queries
strengthens the model and allows to drop the Reveal oracle.
2.3.2 Verifier-based PAKE
We now recall the game-based security model for VPAKE protocols proposed by
Benhamouda and Pointcheval [31]. It considers client C, holding password pwdC, and
servers S, holding password verifier ver = (H, sH) with H ← PHash(pP, sH , pwdS) and
random salt sH ← PHSalt(pP). Passwords pwdC and pwdS are drawn from dictionary
D with min-entropy β. Adversary A has access to the following oracles to interact
with protocol participants:
• Execute(Ci,Sj) returns the transcript of the protocol execution between two
honest instances Ci and Sj. This models passive eavesdropping attacks.
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• Send(Pi, P ′j ,m) returns the result of P ′j on input of message m from alleged sender
Pi. Invoking Send with a specific message initiates a session between Pi and P ′j .
This models active attacks.
• Corrupt(S) returns the server’s secret ver = (H, sH). Clients with pwdS are
marked as corrupted.
Let b denote a bit chosen prior to every execution of the experiment. Security is
modelled with a real-or-random style Test(Pi) oracle that, on input of participant
instance Pi, returns a session key sk chosen as follows:
• If Pi has not computed a session key or Pi is a partnered and corrupted client
instance, return ⊥.
• If Pi is partnered with compatible P ′j and a Test query has been asked for P ′j
previously, then return the same session key as for P ′j .
• If Pi has been queried before, output the same as for the previous query.
• Otherwise return the real session key of Pi if b ?= 1, and a random session key if
b
?= 0.
Two protocol participants are partnered if they have matching transcripts, i. e. the
recorded transcript of one participant is a subset of the one recorded by the other
party. A VPAKE protocol Π is secure if for all PPT adversaries A running in time t
there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that the advantage of A is upper-bounded
by 2−βqs + AdvOW(B, λ) + ε(λ) for some attacker B on the one-wayness of the used
password hashing scheme running in time r, qs active sessions, and independently
chosen passwords from D of min-entropy β. Password hashing and its security if
defined in Chapter III Section 2.
2.3.3 tSoke
In our demo we use the tSoke protocol proposed by Manulis et al. [147] as authentication
protocol for convenience. It is recalled in Figure 5. First note that the description
in Figure 5 omits session key generation and describes a tPAuth protocol. Further
note that while the original tSOKE protocol is proven to be a secure PAKE protocol,
it is not a secure VPAKE protocol. Since it is sufficient for the client to know the
password hash (he does not have to know the password), it is straightforward to build
a successful attacker against the tSOKE protocol in the VPAKE security experiment.
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Client C Server S
Input: tg, pwd Input: tg
x ∈R Zp
X = gx
C, X−−−−−−−−−→
Look up ver for C.
y ∈R Zp
Y = gy
Y ∗ = Y · hH for ver = (H, r)
r, Y ∗←−−−−−−−−−
H ← HashP(pwd, r)
Y = Y ∗/hH
Z = Y x Z ′ = Xy
K ← SHA(C, H, tg, X, Y ∗, Z) K ′ ← SHA(C, H, tg, X, Y ∗, Z)
A1 ← SHA(K, “auth1”)
A1−−−−−−−−−→
Abort if A1 ̸= SHA(K ′, “auth1”)
A2 ← SHA(K ′, “auth2”)
A2←−−−−−−−−−
Abort if A2 ̸= SHA(K, “auth2”)
Accept Accept
Fig. 5: The tSoke Protocol by Manulis et al. [147]
VPAKE protocols built according to the framework from Benhamouda and Pointcheval
[31] (including the one proposed in this thesis) are however secure VPAKE protocols.
Nonetheless, the protocol has advantages stemming from the use of a verifier such that
it is not possible to re-use the verifier on a different server where the client may use
the same password.
2.4 Two-server PAKE Security
We briefly recall the 2PAKE security from Katz et al. [127]. This model assumes that
a client negotiates a distinct session key with each server. It is assumed that adversary
A corrupted servers before the execution of the experiment such that not more than
one server in a protocol execution is corrupted. Server to server communication is
assumed to be secured with common mechanisms while client to server communication
3 Building Blocks 35
can be fully controlled by the attacker. We consider clients C and servers S chosen from
some fixed set of participants. Clients hold a uniformly at random chosen password
pwd ∈R D and each server S0 and S1 that C is registered with holds an according
password share s0, s1 respectively. Each participant instance Pi holds a state with
sidiP , pidiP , and skiP to keep track of sessions, partners, and the negotiated session
key. Further termiP and acciP keep track whether Pi terminated, respectively accepted.
The adversary is given access to the following oracles in order to communicate with
protocol participants:
• Send(S, Ci,m) for Ci registered with S sends message m, supposedly from S, to
Ci and returns message m′ output by Ci, if any. An empty message m initiates
the protocol.
• Send(C,Si,m) for C registered with Si sends message m, supposedly from C, to
Si and returns message m′ output by Si, if any. If S is corrupted, the adversary
receives the internal state of S; if the other associated server is corrupted as well,
the attacker is given the internal state of that server too.
• Execute(Ci,S0,j,S1,j) for Ci registered with (S0,j,S1,j) executes the protocol and
returns the transcript. In addition, the adversary is given the internal state of
any corrupted server.
• Reveal(Pi, P ′i ) for partnered instances Pi and P ′i returns session key skPi,P ′i of Pi.
• Test(Pi, P ′i ) for partnered instances Pi and P ′i returns ⊥ if skPi,P ′i = NULL, and
either skPi,P ′i of Pi if a randomly chosen bit b
?= 1, or a random value if b ?= 0.
Partnering is defined based on matching transcripts as usual. The attacker, after
interacting with the oracles, outputs a bit b′. Succ for A is then defined as b ?= b′. A
2PAKE protocol Π is called secure if the advantage of any PPT adversary A there
exists a negligible function ε(·) such that
AdvA,Π(λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[Succ]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ qs|D| + ε(λ)
for qs active sessions and dictionary D.
3 Building Blocks
This section describes building blocks used throughout this work.
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3.1 Hash Functions
Hash functions, denotedH, take arbitrary long strings as input and output a compressed
string of shorter length than the input. While originally used in data structures to
store and retrieve data in constant time, they are an important cryptographic building
block. A main goal of (cryptographic) hash functions is to be as collision-resistant as
possible. Informally speaking, a collision is a pair of distinct input elements x and x′
to hash function H such that H(x) = H(x′).
In cryptography families of functions are used, indexed by a key s, such that a hash
function is given by Hs(x) = H(s, x). Note that the key is usually chosen in advance
and omitted. A successful PPT attacker on the collision resistance of a hash function
family Hs is able to produce two distinct elements (x, x′) (which may be subject to a
certain length if Hs requires so) such that Hs(x) = Hs(x′). H is a collision resistant
hash function if any such attacker has negligible probability in succeeding.
The SHA hash family is one of the most used hash function family, specified by
NIST [163].
3.2 Commitments
Let C = (SetupC, Com) denote a commitment scheme and C ← Com(x; r) a commitment
on x using randomness r, with SetupC generating parameters for C. A commitment
scheme C = (SetupC, Com) is efficient if SetupC(λ) and (C, d) ← Com(x; r) are com-
putable in polynomial time (d denotes the decommitment to C and is usually omitted),
complete if Com(d) = (C, d) for (C, d)← Com(x; r), and secure if it is
• Binding: For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function εbi(·) such
that for all (x, x′, r, r′, C) ← A(λ): Pr[x ̸= x′ ∧ (C, d) = Com(x; r) ∧ (C, d′) =
Com(x′; r′)] ≤ εbi(λ),
• Hiding: For all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function εhi(·) such
that for all x0, x1 with |x0| = |x1|, b ∈R {0, 1}, (C, d) ← Com(xb; r), and b′ ←
A(C, x1, x2): Pr[b ?= b′] ≤ 1/2 + εhi(λ).
A commitment scheme is further homomorph if there exist functions ◦ and ⋆ such that
for all commitments (Ci, di)← Com(xi; ri) for i ∈ [1, n], C1 ◦ · · · ◦ Cn = Com(x1 ⋆ · · · ⋆
xn, ri ⋆ · · · ⋆ rn).
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3.2.1 Pedersen commitments
Pedersen [167] commitments are perfectly hiding, computationally binding, homo-
morphic commitments, defined as follows. Let CP = (SetupC, Com) with (g, h, p, λ)←
SetupC(λ) and C ← Com = (x; r) = gxhr denote the Pedersen commitment scheme
where g and h are generators of a cyclic group G of prime order p with bit-length in the
security parameter λ and the discrete logarithm of h with respect to base g is not known.
Pedersen commitments are additively homomorphic, i. e. for all (Ci, di)← Com(xi; ri)
for i ∈ 1, . . . , n it holds that ∏ni=1Ci = Com(∑ni=1 xi; ∑ni=1 ri).
Trapdoor commitments In some scenarios such as zero-knowledge proofs of knowl-
edge with malicious verifiers we require trapdoor commitments, which allow a party
knowing the correct trapdoor to open a commitment to any value (equivocable com-
mitment). Pedersen commitments are trapdoor commitments as they can be opened
to any element using the discrete logarithm logg h as trapdoor.
3.3 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
A zero-knowledge proof is executed between a prover and a verifier, proving that a
word x is in a language L, using a witness w proving so, i. e. there exists w such that
(x,w) ∈ R for relation R. An interactive protocol Π for a language L between prover
P and verifier V is a zero knowledge proof if the following holds:
• Completeness: If x ∈ L, V accepts if P holds a witness proving so.
• Soundness: For every malicious prover P ∗(x) with x ̸∈ L the probability of
making V accept is negligible.
• Zero-Knowledge: If x ∈ L, then there exists an efficient simulator Sim that
on input of x is able to generate a view, indistinguishable from the view of a
(malicious) verifier V ∗.
Σ Protocols
Σ-protocols describe a common structure of Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge
(ZKPoK) protocols. Damgård [76] gives a detailed description of Σ-protocols and their
properties. The basic definition is given as follows. A ZKPoK protocol Π is said to be
a Σ protocol for relation R if it has the following message structure:
1. P sends the first message (commitment) m1← P1(x,w, r) for element (x,w) ∈ R
and randomness r.
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2. V sends random challenge c (with length in security parameter λ) and returns it
to prover P .
3. P sends the seconds message (response) m2← P2(x,w, r, c) back to verifier V .
4. V accepts iff (x,m1, c,m2) can be verified.
Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge A ZKPoK is a zero-knowledge proof with
the following special soundness definition:
• Special Soundness: For any x and any pair of accepting conversations on input x,
(m1, c,m2), (m1, c′,m2′) with c ̸= c′ there exists an efficient knowledge extractor
Ext that can extract a witness w such that (x,w) ∈ R.
3.3.1 Committed Zero-knowledge Proofs
Damgård [75] and Jarecki and Lysyanskaya [123] propose the following committed
Σ-protocol to ensure extractability (ZKPoK) and simulatability when interacting with a
malicious verifier and preserve zero-knowledge under parallel execution. Let P1(x,w, r)
and P2(x,w, r, c) denote the two prover steps of a Σ-protocol and H : {0, 1}∗ 7→
Zp a collision-resistant hash function. A committed Σ-protocol based on Pedersen
commitments is then given by the following four steps:
1. The prover computes the first message m1← P1(x,w, r), and
m̂1← Com(H(x,m1); r1) = gH(x,m1)hr1 ,
and sends m̂1 to the verifier.
2. The verifier chooses challenge c (with length in security parameter λ) and returns
it to the prover.
3. The prover computes the second message m2← P2(x,w, r, c), and
m̂2← Com(H(m2); r2) = gH(m2)hr2 ,
and sends m̂2 to the verifier.
4. Further, the prover opens the commitments m̂1 and m̂2 by sending (x,m1,m2, r1,
r2) to the verifier.
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5. The verifier accepts iff both commitments are valid and if the verification of the
Σ-protocol (x,m1, c,m2) is successful.
3.4 Public Key Encryption
Public key encryption allows party A holding a public key pk of some party B to
encrypt a message m in ciphertext c such that only the party holding the according
secret key sk (B usually) to decrypt the ciphertext c to m. It is formally defined as
follows.
Definition 17 (Public Key Encryption). A public key encryption scheme PKE =
(KGenPK, Enc, Dec) consists of the following three algorithms:
• KGenPK(λ) generates a secret/public key-pair (sk, pk) on input of the security
parameter λ
• Encpk(m; r) encrypts message m with public key pk and randomness r, and outputs
ciphertext c
• Decsk(c) decrypts ciphertext c with secret key sk and outputs message m ♢
3.4.1 Public Key Encryption secure against Chosen-Plaintext Attacks
Chosen-Plaintext Attacks (CPAs) define security for Public Key Encryption (PKE)
schemes where the attacker is allowed to query an encryption oracle.
Definition 18 (IND-CPA Security). A PKE scheme Π = (KGenPK, Enc, Dec) is IND-
CPA secure if for all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ε(·) such
that:
AdvIND−CPAΠ,A (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ExpIND−CPAΠ,A (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε(λ)
ExpIND−CPAΠ,A (λ) :
(pk, sk) $← KGen(λ), b ∈R {0, 1}
(m0,m1)← AEncpk(·)(λ, pk)
c← Encpk(mb)
b′ ← AEncpk(·)(λ, pk,m0,m1, c)
return b ?= b′ ♢
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ElGamal Encryption El Gamal [85] encryption operates on a multiplicative group
G of prime order p with generator g. Note that we assume m ∈ G, which can be
achieved by m = gm′ for a message m′ ∈ Zp.
• KGenPKEG(λ) outputs (pk, sk) with public key pk = h = gz and secret key
sk = z ∈R Zp.
• EncEGpk (m; r) outputs C = (u, e) with u = gr and e = hrgm.
• DecEGsk (C) outputs m = e/uz.
3.4.2 Public Key Encryption secure against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks
Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks (CCAs) define security for PKE schemes where the attacker
is allowed to query encryption and decryption oracles. It is therefore a stronger security
notion than CPA. Note that we always refer to adaptive CCA-security, i.e. CCA2,
when talking about CCA-security.
Definition 19 (IND-CCA Security). A PKE scheme Π = (KGenPK, Enc, Dec) is IND-
CCA2 secure if for all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function ε(·) such
that:
AdvIND−CCAΠ,A (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ExpIND−CCAΠ,A (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε(λ)
ExpIND−CCAΠ,A (λ) :
(pk, sk) $← KGenPK(λ), b ∈R {0, 1}
(m0,m1)← AEncpk(·),Decsk(·)(λ, pk)
c← Encpk(mb)
b′ ← AEncpk(·),Decsk(·)(λ, pk,m0,m1, c)
return b ?= b′ if A did not query Decsk(c); 0 otherwise ♢
Labelled Public Key Encryption Labelled PKE [62, 180] is a variant of PKE
that takes a public label ℓ as additional input to the encryption (Encpk(m, ℓ; r)) and
decryption algorithm (Decsk(c, ℓ)). The attacker in the CCA-security experiment is
now also allowed to query the decryption oracle on c as long as the label ℓ′ handed to
the oracle is different from ℓ ̸= ℓ′.
Cramer-Shoup Encryption Labelled Cramer-Shoup (CS) encryption operates on
a multiplicative group G of prime order p with generators g1 and g2. Note that we
assume m ∈ G again, which can be achieved by m = gm′ for a message m′ ∈ Zp. While
we describe labelled CS encryption, common CS encryption simply omits label ℓ.
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• KGenPKCS(λ) outputs (pk, sk) with public key pk = (c, d,Hk) for c = gx11 gx22 , d =
gy11 g
y2
2 , h = gz1 and hash function Hk such that sk = (x1, x2, y1, y2, z) denotes the
decryption key.
• EncCSpk (ℓ,m; r) on input label ℓ, message m, and randomness r outputs C =
(ℓ,u, e, v) with u = (u1, u2) = (gr1, gr2), e = hrgm1 and v = (cdξ)r with ξ =
Hk(ℓ,u, e)
• DecCSsk (ℓ, C) outputs m = e/uz1 if u
x1+y1·ξ′
1 u
x2+y2·ξ′
2 = v with ξ′ = Hk(ℓ,u, e).
3.5 Oblivious Bloom Intersection
The Oblivious Bloom Intersection (OBI) protocol by Dong et al. [82] was designed for
Private Set Intersection (PSI) such that at the end of the protocol, the client learns
the intersection I ∩ V and the server learns nothing. As observed by Wen and Dong
[195], OBI can be extended to a Private Set Intersection with Data Transfer protocol.
In this case, the server can associate each element si ∈ V with a data item di. At the
end of the protocol (see Figure 6 for an overview), for each element in the intersection
the client also receives the corresponding data item from the server. The protocol can
be described at a high level as follows: let the server hold a set V = {si} and a data
set Vd = {di}. The two sets are of equal cardinality and each (si, di) can be viewed as
a key-value pair. The server generates a garbled Bloom filter GV on V and Vd using
Wen and Dong [195, Algorithm 1] (recalled in Algorithm 2). The garbled Bloom filter
encodes both V and Vd in a way such that querying the key si ∈ V against GV returns
the data item di and querying sj ̸∈ V returns a random string. Let the client hold a
set I. The client encodes the set into a conventional Bloom filter [36] BI . (Note that
we assume BI and GV respectively as input to the algorithm in Figure 6 instead of the
plain sets.) The protocol starts by choosing m = 2λn random bit strings ri, where n
is an upper bound on the set size, and sends them to the server. After generating a
random secret key sk, the server encrypts ri||GV [i] in ci with sk and shares sk in m
shares ti. Then client and server run an oblivious transfer protocol using the Bloom
filter and {(ci, ti)}i∈[0,m−1] as inputs. As a result, the client receives a garbled Bloom
filter GI∩V that encodes the intersection I ∩ V and the data items associated with the
elements in I ∩ V after successfully resembling sk, decrypting ci and verifying ri. The
client can then query GI∩V with each element ci ∈ I. If ci is in the intersection then
there must be some sj ∈ V such that ci = sj and the query result is dj, the data item
associated with sj, otherwise the client gets a random string.
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Client C Server S
Input: BF BI , Set I Input: GBF GV
neg. params
(n,m, k,H,E)
for i ∈ [0,m− 1]
gen. ri $← {0, 1}λ
{ri}i∈[0,m−1]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ sk $← KGenE(λ)
∀i ∈ [0,m− 1]
ci ← Encsk(ri||GV [i])
share sk into t0, . . . , tm−1 (⊕)
OT on
Recover ti if BI [i] = 0
B and {(ci, ti)}i∈[0,m−1]←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Recover sk from ti
∀ recovered ci
di ← Decsk(ci)
∀ recovered di :
di[0, λ− 1] ?= ri
else return with ⊥
Build GI∩V with Algorithm 1
on ({di}, BI ,m, λ)
Query GI∩V with I
to retrieve I ∩ V
Fig. 6: Oblivious Bloom Intersection
3.6 Linear Secret Sharing
Given set V and access structure ΓV over V, a Monotone Span Program (MSP) is
defined as a triple (F,M, ρ) where F is a field, M is a l × n share-generating matrix
over F (l and n are constants depending on V and ΓV) and ρ : {1, ...l} → V labels each
row of M with an element in V . (Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) matrix M can
be generated from a boolean formula for example using Cao et al. [65, Algorithm 1].)
Given a secret s ∈ F, we can choose r2, . . . , rn ∈ F at random and set a column vector
v = (s, r2, . . . , rn). Then Mv is a vector of l shares of the secret. The jth share (Mv)j
is associated with an element ρ(j) ∈ V. For any set I ∈ ΓV that is an authorised set,
we can define a set I ⊆ {1, . . . , l} as I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ I}. The vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) is in the
span of rows of M indexed by I, i. e. there exists a set of constants {ωi}i∈I such that
ωiMi = (1, 0, . . . , 0). The set of shares associated with I is {si}i∈I and the secret s can
be reconstructed from it by computing s = ∑i∈I ωisi.
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Algorithm 1 GBFIntesection (G,B,m, λ)
Input: Garbled bloom filter G, Bloom filter B, integer m,λ
Output: An (m,n, k,H, λ)-garbled Bloom filter GBFX
1: GBFX = [m] {create empty array of size m}
2: for i = 0 to m− 1 do
3: if B[i] == 1 then
4: GBFX [i] = G[i]
5: else
6: GBFX [i] $← {0, 1}λ
7: end if
8: end for
3.7 Smooth Projective Hashing
Smooth projective hashing allows to compute a hash value of an element from a set in
two different ways: either by using a secret hashing key on the element, or utilising
the public projection key and some secret information proving that the particular
element is part of a specific subset under consideration. In addition, smooth projective
hash values guarantee to be uniformly distributed in their domain as long as the input
element is not from a specific subset of the input set. SPHFs are due to Cramer and
Shoup [73] who used them to construct CCA-secure public key encryption schemes
and analyse mechanisms from Cramer and Shoup [72]. While SPHFs are useful in
many areas of cryptography we focus on describing them in the context of PAKE,
which is where it will be used in this work. For a general treatment we refer to [29, 73].
The first use of SPHFs in the construction of a PAKE protocol is due to Gennaro
and Lindell [101], who introduced the additional requirement of pseudorandomness to
SPHFs that was later extended by Katz and Vaikuntanathan [130]. This is also the
setting SPHFs are used in in this thesis. The SPHF-based approach taken by Gennaro
and Lindell [101] was further helpful in the “explanation” of the KOY protocol from
Katz et al. [128], where those functions were implicitly applied.
First, we recall definitions for SPHFs tailored to the PAKE use-case and cyclic
groups G of prime-order p. To this end we use languages of ciphertexts with the
password as message and the encryption randomness as witness. An SPHF language L
for a given password pwd from dictionary D is given by Lpwd, containing all possible
ciphertexts encrypting pwd. The public parts of the language are given by the Common
Reference String crs containing the public key pk of the used encryption scheme. By τ
we denote the crs trapdoor, the secret key to pk. Let L denote the encryption scheme
used to generate words in Lpwd.
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Algorithm 2 GBF (V ,Vd, n,m, k,H, λ)
Input: A set V, a set of data Vd with |V| = |Vd|, integers n,m, k, λ, set of hash
functions H = {h0, . . . , hk−1}
Output: An (m,n, k,H, λ)-garbled Bloom filter GBFV of k
1: GBFV = [m] {create empty array of size m}
2: for i = 0 to |V| − 1 do
3: emptySlot = −1; s = Vd[i]
4: for j = 0 to k − 1 do
5: α = hi(V [i])
6: if GBFV [α] == NULL then
7: if emptySlot == −1 then
8: emptySlot = α
9: else
10: GBFV [j]←$ {0, 1}λ
11: s = s⊕GBFV [α]
12: end if
13: else
14: s = s⊕GBFV [α]
15: end if
16: end for
17: GBFV [emptySlot] = s
18: end for
19: for i = 0 to m− 1 do
20: if GBFV [i] == NULL then
21: GBFV [i]←$ {0, 1}λ
22: end if
23: end for
Benhamouda et al. [30] identify three different SPHF classes: word-independent
key and adaptive smoothness (KV-SPHF, first proposed by Katz and Vaikuntanathan
[130]), word-independent key and non-adaptive smoothness (CS-SPHF, first proposed
by Cramer and Shoup [73]), and word-dependent key (GL-SPHF, first proposed by
Gennaro and Lindell [101]). In this work we focus on the strongest notion behind
KV-SPHF: word-independent key with adaptive smoothness. Unless stated otherwise
all SPHFs in the following are KV-SPHFs where the projection key is independent of
the ciphertext and L is a labelled CCA-secure encryption scheme.
Definition 20 (Languages of Ciphertexts). Let Lpwd ⊆ {(ℓ, C, pwd∗)} = E denote the
language of labelled ciphertexts under consideration with ciphertext (ℓ, C) under pk and
password pwd∗ ∈ D. A ciphertext C is in language Lpwd iff there exists randomness r
such that C ← EncLpk(ℓ, pwd; r). ♢
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Smooth projective hashing for languages of ciphertexts is then defined as follows.
Definition 21 (KV-SPHF). Let Lpwd denote a language of ciphertexts such that
C ∈ Lpwd if there exists randomness r proving so. A Smooth Projective Hash Function
for ciphertext language Lpwd consists of the following four algorithms:
• KGenH(Lpwd) generates a random hashing key kh ∈ Znp for language Lpwd.
• KGenP(kh, Lpwd) derives the projection key kp ∈ Gm from hashing key kh.
• Hash(kh, Lpwd, C) computes hash value h from hashing key kh and ciphertext C.
• PHash(kp, Lpwd, C, r) computes hash value h from projection key kp, ciphertext C
and randomness r. ♢
An SPHF has to fulfil the following three properties:
• Correctness: If C ∈ Lpwd, with r proving so, then
Hash(kh, Lpwd, C) = PHash(kp, Lpwd, C, r).
• Smoothness: If {(ℓ, C, pwd∗)} ∋ E ̸∈ Lpwd, the hash value h is (statistically)
indistinguishable from a random element.
• Pseudorandomness: If (ℓ, C, pwd∗) ∈ Lpwd, the hash value h is (computationally)
indistinguishable from a random element.
In a nutshell, smoothness ensures that the hash value always looks random in G when
computed on an element not in the language, while pseudorandomness ensures that it
looks random in G when computed on an element in the language. Adaptive smoothness
with word-independent keys is defined as follows. For any function f : Gm 7→ E \ Lpwd
the following distributions are statistically ε-close:
{(kp, h) | kh $← KGenH(Lpwd); kp ← KGenP(kh, Lpwd);h← Hash(kh, Lpwd, f(kp))}
ε= {(kp, h) | kh $← KGenH(Lpwd); kp ← KGenP(kh, Lpwd);h ∈R G}
Gennaro and Lindell [101] introduced pseudorandomness of SPHFs to show that Hash
and PHash are the only way to compute the hash value even though the adversary
knows some triples (kp, C, Hash(kh, Lpwd, C)) for C ∈ Lpwd. An SPHF is pseudorandom
if the hash values produced by Hash and PHash are indistinguishable from random
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without the knowledge of the uniformly chosen hash key kh or a witness w, i. e. for all
C ∈ Lpwd the following distributions are computationally ε-close:
{(kp, C, h) | kh $← KGenH(Lpwd); kp ← KGenP(kh, Lpwd);h← Hash(kh, Lpwd, C)}
ε= {(kp, C, h) | kh $← KGenH(Lpwd); kp ← KGenP(kh, Lpwd);h ∈R G}
The formalisation from Katz and Vaikuntanathan [130] defines pseudorandomness to
hold even if hashing keys and ciphertexts are re-used, which is necessary in the PAKE
context.
Definition 22 (Pseudorandomness). An SPHF Π offers pseudorandomness if for all
PPT algorithms A and polynomials l there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that
AdvPrΠ,A =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ExpPrΠ,A(λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε(λ)
ExpPrΠ,A(λ) :
choose b ∈R {0, 1}
b′ ← AΩLpk(·),DecLπ (·)(λ, kp1, . . . , kpl)
with kpi ← KGenP(khi, Lpwd, C) and khi
$← KGenH(Lpwd) for all i ∈ 1, . . . , l
return b ?= b′.
ΩLpk(ℓ, pwd) returns elements C ∈ Laux with C ← EncLpk(ℓ, pwd; r) using encryption
algorithm L and label ℓ. It additionally returns Hash(khi, Lpwd, C) if b ?= 0 or
hi ∈R G if b ?= 1 for all i ∈ 1, . . . , l.
DecLπ (ℓ, C) decrypts ciphertext C with label ℓ if (ℓ, C) was not obtained from ΩLpk. ♢
SPHF on Cramer-Shoup Ciphertexts Several SPHFs on labelled Cramer-Shoup
ciphertexts have been proposed in literature. Here the perfectly smooth SPHF pro-
posed by Benhamouda et al. [30] is used. The SPHF is defined as follows, where
(g1, g2, h, c, d, ξ, r, e, u1, u2, v) are variables from the labelled CS encryption:
• KGenH(Lpwd) return kh = (η1, η2, θ, µ, ν) ∈R Z1×5p
• KGenP(kh, Lpwd) returns kp = (kp1 = g
η1
1 g
θ
2h
µcν , kp2 = g
η2
1 d
ν)
• Hash(kh, Lpwd, C) computes H = uη1+ξη21 uθ2(e/g
pwd
1 )µvν
• PHash(kp, Lpwd, C, r) computes H = (kp1kpξ2)r
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3.7.1 Trapdoor Smooth Projective Hashing
To build efficient one-round UC-secure PAKE protocols Benhamouda et al. [30] intro-
duce the notion of Trapdoor Smooth Projective Hash Functions (T-SPHFs). We recall
the definition of T-SPHF and additional security properties such as (t, ε)-soundness and
computational smoothness necessary in this context. T-SPHF adds three additional
functions to the SPHF definition that allow computation of the hash value knowing only
the projection key, ciphertext and a trapdoor τ ′. Note that τ ′ is a different trapdoor
than the CRS trapdoor τ .
Definition 23 (Trapdoor SPHF). Let Lpwd denote a language of ciphertexts such that
C ∈ Lpwd if there exists randomness r proving so. A Trapdoor Smooth Projective Hash
Function for ciphertext language Lpwd consists of the following seven algorithms:
• KGenH, KGenP, Hash and PHash are as given in Definition 21
• TSetup(crs) generates a second crs′ with trapdoor τ ′ on input of crs
• VerKp(kp, Lpwd) returns 1 iff kp is a valid projection key, 0 otherwise
• THash(kp, Lpwd, C, τ ′) computes hash value h of C using projection key kp and
trapdoor τ ′
We assume crs′ is, like crs, made available to all parties. ♢
Correctness Correctness of T-SPHFs extends correctness of SPHFs by the statement
that for every valid ciphertext C, generated by L, and honestly generated keys kh and
kp, it holds that VerKp(kp, Lpwd) = 1 and Hash(kh, Lpwd, C) = THash(kp, Lpwd, C, τ ′).
Soundness To capture soundness of T-SPHFs Benhamouda et al. [30] introduce
(t, ε)-soundness, complementing the previous correctness extension.
Definition 24 ((t, ε)-soundness). Given crs, crs′ and τ , no adversary running in
time at most t can produce a projection key kp, a password pwd, a word C, and valid
witness r such that kp is valid, i. e. VerKp(kp, Lpwd) = 1, but THash(kp, Lpwd, C, τ ′) ̸=
PHash(kp, Lpwd, C, r) with probability at least ε(λ). Perfect soundness states that the
property holds for any t and any ε(λ) > 0. ♢
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Computational Smoothness As statistical smoothness is impossible for T-SPHF,
Benhamouda et al. [30] introduce computational smoothness, which is similar to the
definition of pseudorandomness for SPHFs.
Definition 25 (Computational Smoothness). An SPHF is (t, ε)-smooth if for all
adversaries A running in time at most t
Advsmooth−bΠ,A =
∣∣∣Pr[Expsmooth−1T-SPHF,A(λ) = 1]− Pr[Expsmooth−0T-SPHF,A(λ) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ε(λ).
Expsmooth−bT-SPHF,A(λ) :
generate (crs′, τ ′) $← TSetup(crs)
b′ ← AKGenP1(·),Hash1b(·)(λ, crs, crs′, τ)
return b ?= b′
On input pwd the KGenP oracle draws a new hash key kh for T-SPHF on Lpwd, computes
the according projection key kp using KGenP, and returns it to the adversary. The Hash
oracle returns h← Hash honestly computed on input ciphertext C if b ?= 0 or C ∈ Lpwd,
and h ∈R G if b ?= 1. ♢
T-SPHF on Cramer-Shoup Ciphertexts Benhamouda et al. [30] propose a T-
SPHF for labelled CS ciphertexts under the SXDH assumption. The T-SPHF is a
straight-forward extension of the previously described SPHF on labelled CS ciphertexts.
Let (p,G1,G2,GT , e) denote a bilinear group and replace G from the previous SPHF
with G1 and g1, g2 by g1,1, g1,2, generators for G1. All other previous parameters are in
G1 instead of G and g2 is generator of G2. The additional algorithms for T-SPHF and
changes to the hash functions are defined as follows.
• TSetup(crs) draws a random τ ′ ∈R Zp and sets crs′ = ζ = gτ ′2 .
• KGenP(kh, Lpwd) generates
kp = (kp1 = g
η1
1 g
θ
2h
µcν , kp2 = g
η2
1 d
ν , kp3)
with kp3 = (χ1,1, χ1,2, χ2, χ3, χ4) for χ1,1 = ζη1 , χ1,2 = ζη2 , χ2 = ζθ, χ3 = ζµ, χ4 =
ζν
• Hash(kh, Lpwd, C) computes
h′ = uη1+ξη21 uθ2(e/g
pwd
1 )µvν
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as before and outputs h = e(h′, g2)
• PHash(kp, Lpwd, C, r) computes h′ = (kp1kpξ2)r as before and outputs h = e(h′, g2)
• VerKp(kp, Lpwd) verifies that
e(kp1, crs
′) ?= e(g1,1, χ1,1) · e(g1,2, χ2) · e(h1, χ3) · e(c, χ4)
and
e(kp2, crs
′) ?= e(g1,1, χ1,2) · e(d, χ4)
• THash(kp, Lpwd, C, τ ′) computes
[
e(u1, χ1,1χξ1,2) · e(u2, χ2) · e(e/gpwd1,1 , χ3) · e(v, χ4)
]1/τ ′

Chapter III
A Password-based Authentication Framework for
the Single-Server Setting
As discussed in Chapter I using passwords for authentication is its most common
use case. This is usually done with the inherently flawed approach of password-over-
HTML despite the existence of more secure alternatives such as PAKE. In this chapter
we propose a framework for cryptographic password registration and authentication,
comprising a protocol for clients to register passwords in a secure way with a server
while still allowing for password policies checks, as well as suitable protocols to use the
registered password verifier for password-based authentication.
The first main contribution in this chapter is the definition of Blind Password
Registration (BPR). This protocol class allows a client to register a password verifier
with a server without actually disclosing the password, while allowing the server to
check the password’s policy compliance against a password policy. Note that this still
requires a secure channel (established using for example TLS) between client and server.
This requirement can not be removed as obtaining the password verifier eventually
always leads to password disclosure. However, it is not the goal of BPR to eliminate
the necessity of secure channels for password registration. Instead, BPR offers a way
of removing the trust assumption that the server securely handles client passwords by
never revealing the actual password to the server.
Using registered password verifiers to authenticate clients is the second step of the
proposed framework, which can be performed using VPAKE or tPAuth protocols (see
Section 4.2 and 4.4 in Chapter I for details). While VPAKE is the first natural way
of authenticating using a password on the client side and a password verifier on the
server side, tPAuth protocols can be used with verifiers as well and are more suitable
for password based authentication on the web.
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This chapter is based on the series of works in [83, 135, 136]1.
Outline & Summary of Results This chapter comprises 9 sections organised as
follows. Section 1 gives definitions of passwords, dictionaries, and policies, used in
this chapter and Section 2 describes a novel password hashing algorithm. Methods
introduced in these first two sections allow to convert character strings to elements
usable for cryptographic operations. Section 3 introduces the notion of Zero-Knowledge
Password Policy Checks (ZKPPCs) and how it can be used to build password registra-
tion protocols from it. The resulting notion of BPR is formalised in the subsequent
Section 4 giving a security model and an efficient protocol. Section 5 introduces an
alternative approach to BPR based on set theory. To compare the different password
registration approaches Section 6.2 provides implementations for all three approaches
and gives a comparison of the protocols and their security guarantees. This concludes
the password registration step of the framework. To use passwords registered with
one of the BPR protocols described in Section 3-5, Section 7 discusses and proposes
appropriate PAKE and VPAKE protocols. The chapter is concluded by the description
of an online demo for the proposed framework in Section 8 that demonstrates how to
use the proposed protocols in practice and Section 9 to summarise the results of this
chapter.
1 Modelling Passwords and Policies
In the following we describe how to model passwords, dictionaries they are chosen from,
and password policies. Password strings have to be mapped to integers before they can
be used in cryptographic operations. For our purposes such an integer mapping must
be able to preserve the password structure. In particular, the way a password string is
composed from single characters must remain visible from the resulting integer value.
As part of password modelling we describe an appropriate encoding scheme that maps
password strings defined over the alphabet of printable ASCII characters to integers
while preserving their structure. We further model and define password policies as
some kind of regular expressions over different ASCII character sets. In addition to
the main model we describe an alternative way of modelling that is used in Section 5.
1This chapter contains the products of joint research between myself, Changyu Dong, and Mark
Manulis. Contributions from [135] and [136] are mainly my own while contributions from [83] are
shared between Changy Dong and myself.
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1.1 Password Strings and Dictionaries
We consider password strings pwd over the ASCII alphabet Σ containing all 94 printable
ASCII characters. Although we do not consider password strings consisting of other
characters, our approach is easily adaptable to UTF-8 and other character sets. We
split Σ = d ∪ u ∪ l ∪ s into four subsets:
• set of digits d = [0− 9] (or ASCII codes [48− 57]),
• set of upper case letters u = [A− Z] (or ASCII codes [65− 90])
• set of lower case letters l = [a− z] (or ASCII codes [97− 122])
• set of symbols s = [!"#$%&’()*+,-./ :;<=>?@ [\]ˆ_‘ {|}~] (or ASCII codes
[33− 47, 58− 64, 91− 96, 123− 126])
By D we denote a general dictionary containing all strings that can be formed from print-
able ASCII characters, i. e. all powersets of Σ. A password string pwd = (c0, . . . , cn−1) ∈
Σn ⊂ D of length n is an ordered set of characters ci ∈ Σ.
1.2 Password Mapping — From Strings to Integers
In the following we show how a password string pwd can be mapped to an integer π for
further cryptographic processing in a way that preserves the character composition of
pwd and makes it possible to efficiently reconstruct pwd from π.
1.2.1 Mapping of Password Characters to Integers
In order to preserve the character structure of a password string pwd upon its mapping
to an integer we first define a character mapping function CHRtoINT : Σ 7→ Z94 for any
printable ASCII character c ∈ Σ that internally uses its decimal ASCII code ASCII(c)
to output an integer in Z94:
CHRtoINT(c) =

⊥ if ASCII(c) < 33
ASCII(c)− 33 if 33 ≤ ASCII(c) ≤ 126
⊥ if 126 < ASCII(c)
1.2.2 Position-Dependent Mapping of Password Characters to Integers
A printable ASCII character c ∈ Σ may appear at any position i ∈ [0, n − 1] in a
password string pwd ∈ Σn. For every position i we require a different integer to which
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ci ∈ pwd can be mapped to. Assuming a reasonable upper bound nmax on the password
length n, i. e. n ≤ nmax, and some shift base2 b ∈ N, we define four integer sets Ωx,
x ∈ Σ′ = {d, u, l, s}, where d, u, l, s are the identifiers of the four ASCII character
subsets that were used to define Σ as follows:
• Ωd = {biCHRtoINT(c)} for all digits c ∈ d and i = 0, . . . , nmax − 1 with |Ωd| =
10nmax.
• Ωu = {biCHRtoINT(c)} for all upper case letters c ∈ u and i = 0, . . . , nmax − 1
with |Ωu| = 26nmax.
• Ωl = {biCHRtoINT(c)} for all lower case letters c ∈ l and i = 0, . . . , nmax − 1 with
|Ωl| = 26nmax.
• Ωs = {biCHRtoINT(c)} for all symbols c ∈ s and i = 0, . . . , nmax − 1 with |Ωs| =
32nmax.
Any password character ci ∈ pwd, i ∈ [0, nmax − 1] can therefore be mapped to one
of the four sets Ωx, x ∈ Σ′ with the position-dependent character mapping function
CHRtoINTi : Σ 7→ Ωx, defined as
CHRtoINTi(c, i) = biCHRtoINT(c),
where shift base b ∈ N is a public constant. We write πi ← CHRtoINTi(c, i) for the
integer value of the ith character ci ∈ pwd.
1.2.3 Mapping of Password Strings to Integers
A password mapping function PWDtoINT : Σn 7→ Zbnmax that maps any password string
pwd = (c0, . . . , cn−1) ∈ Σn to an integer in a larger set Zbnmax in a way that preserves
the ith position of each character ci is defined as follows:
PWDtoINT(pwd) =
n−1∑
i=0
biCHRtoINT(ci) =
n−1∑
i=0
CHRtoINTi(ci, i) for ci ∈ pwd
We will use pwd to denote a password string and π ← PWDtoINT(pwd) for its integer
value. Note that π = ∑n−1i=0 πi. The mapping computed through PWDtoINT is injective
and reversible. For example, π = 873217 with b = 100 is the integer value of password
string pwd = (2,A, x). The string can be recovered by concatenation of 873217
2The shift base is important to prevent certain attacks. See Section 2.2 for details.
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mod 100 = 17 =̂ 2 at position 0, (873217 mod 1002)− (873217 mod 100) = 3200 =
32 · 1001 =̂ A at position 1 and 873217− (873217 mod 1002) = 870000 = 87 · 1002 =̂ x
at position 2.
1.3 Password Policies
A password policy is defined to impose requirements on password complexity in terms of
the minimum number of characters, minimal number of character classes, and minimal
number of characters in each class. A password policy f = (R, nmin, nmax) is modelled
using policy expression R over Σ′ = {d, u, l, s}, a minimum length nmin and a maximum
length nmax that a password string pwd must fulfil. The way password policies are
modelled in this work is suitable for policies that put restrictions on the password
length and the nature of password characters. Other types of policies, e. g., lexicon
words in a password, are currently not supported by our framework and thus left for
future work. We write f(pwd) = true to indicate that the policy is satisfied by the
password string pwd. For example,
• f = (ds, 6, 10) means that pwd must have between 6 and 10 characters with at
least one digit and one symbol.
• f = (uss, 8, 12) means that pwd must have between 8 and 12 characters with at
least one upper-case letter and two symbols.
• f = (duls, 8, 16) means that pwd must have between 8 and 16 characters with at
least one character of each type.
A character ci ∈ pwd is called significant if it is necessary to fulfil a policy expression R
and we say the corresponding set Rj ∈ R is the according significant set. Usually for
every Rj ∈ R the first occurrence of a character ci ∈ Rj is considered significant. (Rj
denotes the jth element in R, e. g., if R = uss, then R0 = u,R1 = s, R2 = s.) Note
that Σ, and thus d, u, l and s, in this work can refer to the set of encoded characters,
or the set of ASCII characters, depending on the context.
Remark Note that in practice password policies do not specify nmax. We leave it for
the server administrator to decide whether nmax should be mentioned explicitly in f or
fixed in the system to allow for all reasonable password lengths. A password policy is
called simplified if nmax is omitted, i. e. a simplified policy is given by f = (R, nmin).
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1.4 An Alternative Definition
Instead of the previously described definition of passwords and policies we propose an
alternative description using a set-theoretical approach. Note that only the mapping
of passwords to cryptographic elements and the policy definition changes, not the
definition of dictionaries, character sets, or passwords.
1.4.1 Alternative Policy Definition
An alternative approach of defining password policies is a set-theoretical representation,
i. e. monotone access structures [119]. Note that this approach is more general and can
not only be used for passwords but policies defined over sets in general. We describe in
the following paragraph how the alternative password mapping and policy description
is defined for the special case of password policies. A policy f defines a pair (V ,ΓV)
where V is a set and ΓV is an access structure over V . The access structure is a subset of
the powerset 2V . We say an access structure ΓV is monotonic if for each element in ΓV ,
all its superset is also in ΓV . We say a set C satisfies a policy f , written as f(C) = true,
if C ∈ ΓV . A set C that satisfies f is called an authorised set. Access structures capture
many complex access control and authorisation policies. For example, V can be a set
of credentials and ΓV defines subsets of credentials that are required for authorisation.
It has long been known that an access structure can be mapped to an LSSS
[22, 119]. Given an access structure ΓV defined over V, one can choose a secret and
split it into a set of shares accordingly. Each share is associated with an element in V
and the following holds: (1) any set of shares can reconstruct the secret if the elements
associated with the shares form an authorised set, and (2) any set of shares does not
reveal any information about the secret if the elements associated with the shares do
not form an authorised set. In this way, checking whether a set satisfies a policy is
equivalent to checking whether a set of shares can reconstruct the secret. There are
several generic approaches to map access structures to LSSS, in this paper we will use
the MSP approach introduced by Beimel [22].
1.4.2 Alternative Password Mapping
In order to use passwords with policies as defined here we have to convert them to sets.
To this end we define a mapping from a password (character string) to a set, which can
be used in cryptographic set operations. Since passwords are arbitrary strings they can
have repeated characters. So the collection of characters in a password forms a multiset,
not a set. The problem is that a direct conversion from a character multiset (password)
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to a set results in lost characters. For example, if a client chooses “pa$$w0rd”, the
resulting set would be {p, a, $, w, 0, r, d}. This can be solved by pre-processing the
characters in dictionary and password.
The dictionary pre-processing step converts the dictionary into a set that can later
be used in the password registration protocol. This step is done by the server as follows.
Let Σ = σ1 ∪ · · · ∪ σm be the alphabet where σi is a character class (digits, lower case,
etc.). The server transforms it into Σ′ based on password policy f . For each σi, there
is a threshold ti in policy f that says at least ti characters from σi need to appear in
the password. If ti = 0, then the server skips all characters in this class σi. Otherwise,
the server creates an empty set σ′i, appends an index (from 1 to ti) to each character in
σi, and puts the ti copies of indexed characters into σ′i. For example, if σi = l contains
lower case characters and ti = 2, then σ′i = {a1, a2, b1, b2, . . . , z1, z2}. (Note the results
such as a1 are not characters anymore, but elements of the set σ′i.) The union of σ′i
builds the set Σ′. This step has to be done only once as long as policy f does not
change and can therefore be pre-computed.
The password pre-processing is performed as follows. We define a function PwdMap
for the client to convert a password (character string) into a set. Let pwd = c1, . . . , cx
denote a password of x characters. Function ψ works as follows: the password is
traversed from the first character to the last; let jc = 1 denote the counter for how often
a character has been seen; when character ci is seen, ψ appends jc to it to generate
the element cijc, increments jc, and adds the element to the result set. For example,
“pa$$w0rd” will be converted by ψ into {p1, a1, $1, $2, w1, 01, r1, d1}.
1.5 Password Distributions and Min-Entropy
Intuitively, a password hashing scheme should be considered secure if an attacker can
not retrieve the password from its hash more efficiently than by performing a brute-force
attack over the dictionary. Therefore, security definitions for password hashing or
dictionary attack resistance rely on a notion of guessability, here min-entropy β.
Dictionary D, from which passwords are chosen, has min-entropy β such that
efficient sampling of the dictionary allows guessing a password with probability in
β. Although passwords in cryptographic research are often assumed to be uniformly
at random distributed low-entropy secrets, we consider this somewhat more realistic
password model for password registration. In particular, we consider passwords
to be character strings where the distribution of characters depends on the used
character sets ω, character positions and the password string itself. We thus use
a definition of password min-entropy commonly used in password security research
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[142, 149, 179], which captures the difficulty of brute-force attacks on passwords chosen
from certain dictionaries. As discussed in [142, 179], this definition can capture many
realistic password creation models. Let Dω denote the probability distribution in
password pwd of characters from a character set ω ∈ {Σ, d, u, l, s}. Min-entropy for
pwd = (c0, . . . , cn−1) is then defined according to Shannon [178] as
βDf,l = − maxpwd∈Df,l
n−1∑
i=0
[DΣ(ci) lg(DΣ(ci))].
Note that definitions for min-entropy of D and Df are equivalent to the definition
for Df,l. While this may be surprising at first glance, one has to consider that while
the policy restricts the character space, it does not restrict the positions where these
characters appear, i. e. an adversary cannot exclude any characters at any position.3
Remark Defining how character properties influence the distribution D of characters
and therefore passwords and what are these exact properties, e. g., password length,
neighbouring characters, character distribution in a language etc., is out of scope of
this thesis. Further, although min-entropy seems a reasonable measure for modelling
dictionary attack resistance of BPR protocols, we stress that min-entropy alone might
not be sufficient to estimate the real password strength. See Section 1.3 in Chapter I
for a discussion on password strength metrics.
1.6 Password Verifiers
Password verification information stored by a server is denoted ver and defined as
follows.
• Function ϕ(pwd, r) on input of password pwd and randomness r ∈ {0, 1}λ deter-
ministically outputs a password verifier ver = (H, r).
Note that ver always has the form (H, r) where r is the randomness input into ϕ and
H is some function of pwd and r. In particular, the verifier ver stored by the server is
sufficient to authenticate a user holding only password pwd, and H can be computed
when pwd and r are known.
3Note that we exclude the special case where every character in a password is significant and the
policy expression R does not use all four available character sets. Changes for these can be easily
incorporated.
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2 Randomised Password Hashing
Password hashing is a way to generate verifier ver. (Note that this password hashing
scheme is unrelated to the previously mentioned password hashing competition and
aims for different properties.) A password hashing scheme Π that is used to compute
password verification information ver for later use in VPAKE protocols is defined as
follows, extending the definition introduced by Benhamouda and Pointcheval [31]:
• PSetup(λ) generates password hashing parameters pP. These parameters contain
implicit descriptions of random salt spaces SP and SH .
• PPHSalt(pP) generates a random pre-hash salt sP ∈R SP .
• PPreHash(pP, pwd, sP ) outputs pre-hash value P .
• PHSalt(pP) generates a random hash salt sH ∈R SH .
• PHashP(pP, P, sP , sH) outputs hash value H.
Password verifier ver is given by (H, sH). In the above syntax the algorithm PPreHash is
randomised with a pre-hash salt sP , which extends the notion proposed by Benhamouda
and Pointcheval [31], where PPreHash is deterministic (and realised in constructions as a
random oracle output H(pwd)). In contrast we are interested in algebraic constructions
of both PPreHash and PHashP to allow for efficient proofs of knowledge involving
pre-hash value P , which requires an additional random value in PPreHash in order
to prevent the server form pre-computing pre-hash values. The randomisation of
PPreHash further increases the complexity of an offline dictionary attack that recovers
pwd from P since it removes the ability of an attacker to pre-compute pairs (P, pwd) and
use them directly to recover pwd (see also Section 3.4). We write H ← HashP(pwd, r) to
denoteH ← PHashP(pP, P, sP , sH) with P ← PPreHash(pP, pwd, sP ), where r = (sP , sH)
combines the randomness used in PHashP and PPreHash. A secure Π must satisfy the
following security properties. Note that password-hiding is a new property introduced
here to ensure that password hashes H do not leak any information about pwd. The
remaining four properties are from [31], updated where necessary to account for the
randomised PPreHash:
• Password hiding: For all PPT algorithms A = (A1,A2) where A1 on input
pP ← PSetup(λ) outputs two equal-length password strings pwd0 and pwd1, A2 on
input H ← PHashP(pP, P, sP , sH), where sH ← PHSalt(pP), sP ← PPHSalt(pP),
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and P ← PPreHash(pP, pwdb, sP ) for a random bit b ∈R {0, 1} outputs bit b′,
there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that |Pr[b′ = b]− 12 | ≤ ε(λ).
• Pre-image resistance: For all PPT algorithms A running in time at most t,
there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that
Pr[(i, P )← AHashP(·),Verify(·)(pP); Verify(i, P ) = 1] ≤ αt2βtPPreHash + ε(λ),
for small α and tPPreHash being the running time of PPreHash, with pP ←
PSetup(λ).
– Each ith invocation of HashP(·) returns (H, sH) with H ← PHashP(pP, P, sP ,
sH) and stores T [i] ← PPreHash(pP, pwd, sP ), where sH ← PHSalt(pP),
sP ← PPHSalt(pP), and pwd ∈R D.
– Verify (i, P) allows A to check whether whether a guess is correct, i. e. it
returns 1 iff T [i] = P , 0 otherwise.
• Second pre-image resistance: For all PPT algorithms A there exists a negli-
gible function ε(·) such that for P ′ ← A(pP, P, sH)
Pr[P ′ ̸= P ∧ PHashP(pP, P, sH) = PHashP(pP, P ′, sH)] ≤ ε(λ),
with pP ← PSetup(λ), sP ← PPHSalt(pP), sH ← PHSalt(pP) and P ← PPreHash
(pP, pwd, sP ) for any pwd ∈ D.
• Pre-hash entropy preservation: For all polynomial time samplable dictionar-
ies D with min-entropy β, and any PPT algorithm A, there exists a negligible
function ε(λ) such that for (P, sP )← A(pP) with pP ← PSetup(λ) and random
password pwd ∈R D:
Pr[sP ∈ SP ∧ P = PPreHash(pP, pwd, sP )] ≤ 2−β + ε(λ).
• Entropy preservation: For all polynomial time samplable dictionaries D with
min-entropy β, and any PPT algorithm A, there exists a negligible function ε(λ)
such that for (H, sP , sH)← A(pP)
Pr[sP ∈ SP ∧ sH ∈ SH ∧H = HashP(pP, pwd, sP , sH)] ≤ 2−β + ε(λ),
where pP ← PSetup(λ) and pwd ∈R D.
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2.1 Password Hashing from Pedersen Commitments
We propose a randomised password hashing scheme Π = (PSetup, PPHSalt, PPreHash,
PHSalt, PHashP) for ASCII-based passwords using Pedersen commitments. Let π ←
PWDtoINT(pwd) for an appropriate choice of shift base b and construct Π as follows:
• PSetup(λ) generates pP = (p, g, h, λ) where g, h are independent generators of a
cyclic group G of prime order p of length λ.
• PPHSalt(pP) generates a pre-hash salt sP ∈R Z∗p.
• PPreHash(pP, π, sP ) outputs the pre-hash value P = gsP π.
• PHSalt(pP) generates a hash salt sH ∈R Z∗p.
• PHashP(pP, P, sP , sH) outputs hash value H = (H1, H2) = (gsP , PhsH ).
Observe that H2 = Hπ1 hsH , i. e. H1 can be seen as a fresh generator that is used
to compute the Pedersen commitment H2. The security properties of our password
hashing scheme Π follow from the properties of the underlying cyclic group G and
from the security of Pedersen commitments. We argue informally:
• The password hiding property of the scheme, assuming that pwd0 and pwd1
are mapped to corresponding integers π0 and π1 in Zbn , is perfect and holds
based on the perfect hiding property of the Pedersen commitment scheme. Note
that the adversary receives the corresponding hash value H = (H1, H2) =
(gsP , PhsH ), where H2 = gsP πhsH is a Pedersen commitment on π with respect to
two independent bases gsP and h. The ability of A to distinguish between π0 and
π1 can thus be turned into an attack on the hiding property of the commitment
scheme.
• The pre-image resistance holds since sP and sH are randomly chosen on every
invocation of HashP(·) with a negligible probability for a collision and H2 is a
perfectly hiding commitment with bases gsP and h. Therefore, for any given
output (H = (H1, H2), sH) of HashP(·), A must perform 2β exponentiations Hπ∗1 ,
one for each candidate π∗, in order to find P = H2h−sH . This roughly corresponds
to 2β invocations of PPreHash. Note that this assumes that brute forcing D is
more efficient than solving the discrete logarithm problem, which can be assured
by appropriate choice of shift base b as discussed in Section 2.2.
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• The second pre-image resistance holds since H1 is uniform in G and H2 is a
computationally binding commitment with bases gsP and h. Note that for any
P ′ generated by A, Hπ1 hsH = P ′hsH is true only if P ′ = Hπ1 .
• The pre-hash entropy and hash entropy preservation hold since H1 is a generator
of G such that for every (P, sP ) chosen by the pre-hash entropy adversary,
Pr[P = Hπ1 ] ≤ 2−β + ε(λ), and for every (H, sH) chosen by the hash entropy
adversary, Pr[H2 = Hπ1 hsH ] ≤ 2−β + ε(λ) for a random pwd ∈R D.
2.2 Choosing the Shift Base
As pointed out by Benhamouda and Pointcheval [31], the encoded password (integer)
π in P = Hπ1 can be computed from (H, sH) in time O(
√
n) for π ∈ [0, n − 1], e. g.,
using variants of the Pollard’s kangaroo algorithm [172], and if n corresponds to the
dictionary size |D| then the above password hashing scheme is no longer pre-image
resistant. We observe, however, that the size of n is larger than the dictionary size |D|.
To see this, first note that
n =
|pwd|−1∑
i=0
bi · 93,
which denotes the largest possible value of π ← PWDtoINT(pwd) obtained from a
password string of length |pwd| (normalised to 0 being the smallest possible π). In order
to see the difference to the dictionary size |D| we analyse how the password length
|pwd| impacts the interval of the corresponding integer π: for example, if |pwd| = 1
then π is in [0, 93]; if |pwd| = 2 then π is in [b, b+93]∪ · · · ∪ [93b, 93b+93]; if |pwd| = 3
then π is in [b+ b2, 93 + b+ b2] ∪ · · · ∪ [93b+ 93b2, 93 + 93b+ 93b2], and so on. That
is in contrast to the size of the dictionary D (assuming for now that policy f does
not restrict the character choice), which corresponds to the number of |pwd|-tuples
containing characters chosen out of all 94 printable ASCII characters and is therefore
given by
|D| = 94|pwd|
and therefore independent of shift base b. In order to guarantee the pre-image resistance
of the password hashing scheme we need to ensure that |D| ≈ √n. This can be achieved
by choosing shift base b such that computing π from P = Hπ1 becomes as difficult as a
brute-force search over the dictionary D. In particular, shift base b must be chosen
such that
|D|2 ≤
|pwd|−1∑
i=0
bi · 93. (1)
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Since the required value of b depends on |pwd| as well as policy f it is possible for a
specific password policy f = (R, nmin, nmax) to compute the optimal value for b using
the password length restrictions nmin, nmax and policy expression R, and by this to
optimise the performance of the password hashing scheme with respect to the given
policy. Using dictionary size
|Df | = 94|pwd|−|R|
|R|−1∏
i=0
|Ri|,
for policy f allows to compute an optimal b such that Eq. 1 holds for all policy
compliant passwords. If such optimisation is not required, we recommend setting
b = 105, which should be a safe choice for all sensible policies and password lengths.
Figure 7 depicts relations among password length and optimal shift base b for the
general case (without regular expression) and with regular expression R = duls (i. e.
at least one character from each character class). First it shows that b = 105 is a safe
choice. It further shows that the regular expression has a significant influence on the
choice of an optimal base b, i. e. can be used to tweak performance. In the general
case we see that base b has to grow exponentially the shorter the password gets, which
is responsible for the relatively large suggested default base b = 105. With regular
expression duls in contrast b has to grow with increasing password length. This is due
to the restriction on the character sets from the regular expression.
3 Zero-knowledge Password Policy Checks and
Policy Compliant Passwords Registration
We propose the concept of ZKPPC enabling a client to prove compliance of its chosen
passwords pwd with respect to a server’s password policy f without disclosing pwd.
We give a framework for building ZKPPC protocols for ASCII-based passwords and a
concrete ZKPPC instantiation. We then show how to build registration protocols that
use ZKPPC as a building block.
3.1 Zero-Knowledge Password Policy Checks
A Password Policy Check (PPC) is an interactive protocol between a client C and a
server S where the server’s password policy f and the public parameters of a password
hashing scheme Π are used as a common input. At the end of the PPC execution S
accepts H ← HashP(pwd, r) for any password pwd ∈ D of client’s choice if and only if
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f(pwd) = true, i. e. pwd ∈ Df . A PPC protocol is a proof of knowledge for pwd and r
such that H ← HashP(pwd, r) and f(pwd) = true. It thus includes the requirements
on completeness and soundness. In addition, a ZKPPC protocol is a PPC protocol
with zero-knowledge property to ensure that no information about pwd is leaked to S.
More formally,
Definition 26 (ZKPPC). Let Π = (PSetup, PPHSalt, PPreHash, PHSalt, PHashP) be
a secure password hashing scheme and f be a password policy. A ZKPPC protocol is a
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol between a prover C (client) and a verifier S
(server), defined as
ZKPoK{(pwd, r) : f(pwd) = true ∧H = HashP(pwd, r)}.
♢
3.2 A ZKPPC Framework for ASCII-based Passwords
We present a general ZKPPC construction for password strings pwd composed of print-
able ASCII characters using a homomorphic commitment scheme C = (SetupC, Com, Open),
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a password hashing scheme Π = (PSetup, PPHSalt, PPreHash, PHSalt, PHashP) and ap-
propriate Set Membership Proofs (SMPs) SMP. We assume that the common input of
C and S includes pP ← PSetup(λ), pC ← SetupC(λ), and the server’s password policy
f = (R, nmin, nmax) that is communicated to C beforehand.
The ZKPPC protocol proceeds as follows (see Figure 8 for an overview). Let
Rj be the jth character of R. Rj uniquely identifies one of the four ASCII subsets
of Σ = d ∪ u ∪ l ∪ s and one of the four integer sets Ωx, x ∈ Σ′ = {d, u, l, s}.
Let ΩΣ =
⋃
x∈Σ′ Ωx be a joint integer set of these four sets. The client picks an
ASCII string pwd = (c0, . . . , cn−1) such that f(pwd) = true, computes integer values
πi ← CHRtoINTi(c, i) for all i = 0, . . . , n − 1 and π ← PWDtoINT(pwd) = ∑n−1i=0 πi,
and password hash H ← HashP(π, (sP , sH)) using salt sP ← PPHSalt(λ) and sH ←
PHSalt(λ). For each position i = 0, . . . , n − 1 the client computes commitment
Ci ← Com(πi, ri) and sends its password hash H with the set of commitments {Ci}
to S that by checking |{Ci}| ∈ [nmin, nmax] will be able to check the password length
requirement from f . Since f(pwd) = true, for each Rj in R the client can determine
the first character cj ∈ pwd that fulfils Rj and mark it as significant. Let {ci1 , . . . ci|R|}
denote the set of significant characters from pwd that is sufficient to fulfil R. For each
significant cij ∈ pwd, j = 1, . . . , |R| client C as prover and server S as verifier execute
SMP(πij , rij ,Ωx), i. e. C proves that position-dependent integer value πij committed
to in Cij is in Ωx for one of the four ASCII subsets in Σ identified by Rj. These
SMPs ensure that characters in password pwd fulfil R. For every other character
ci ∈ pwd, i ̸= ij, j = 1, . . . , |R| client C as prover and server S as verifier execute
SMP(πi, ri,ΩΣ) proving that position-dependent integer value πi committed to in Ci is
in the joint integer set ΩΣ. This proves that each remaining ci is a printable ASCII
character without disclosing its type and thus ensures that S does not learn types of
(remaining) password characters that are not necessary for R. Note that in the notation
SMP(πi, ri,Ω′) used in Figure 8, set Ω′ is either one of Ωx, x ∈ Σ′ if πi represents a
significant character or ΩΣ for all remaining characters.
If all SMPs are successful then S is convinced that commitments {Ci} contain some
integer values πi representing characters ci that fulfil R and that n ∈ [nmin, nmax]. This
does not complete the proof yet since two issues remain: (1) committed πi are not yet
linked to the integer value π that represents pwd, and (2) the client has not proved yet
that this π was used to compute the hash value H. In order to address (1) and (2) the
ZKPPC framework first uses the homomorphic property of the commitment scheme.
Both C and S independently compute C ← ∏n−1i=0 Ci = Com(∑n−1i=0 πi, r) = Com(π, r),
where r = ∑n−1i=0 ri, whereas C additionally uses the knowledge of all ri to compute r.
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Client C Server S
Input: (R,nmin, nmax), pP, pC Input: (R,nmin, nmax), pP, pC
Choose pwd ∈R Df
with f(pwd) = true
Let n← |pwd|
for i ∈ [0, n− 1]
let ci ∈ pwd
πi ← CHRtoINTi(ci, i)
ri ∈R SC ;Ci ← Com(πi; ri)
π ←∑i πi; r ←∑i ri
C ← ∏iCi
sP ←R PPHSalt(pP)
sH ←R PHSalt(pP) H, {Ci}
H ← HashP(π; (sP , sH))
∀i : SMP(πi, ri,Ω′)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Let n← |{Ci}|
If n ̸∈ [nmin, nmax] then ABORT
ZKPoK{(π, sP , sH , r) : Else C ← ∏iCi
H = HashP(π; (sP , sH))
∧ C = Com(π; r)}−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ If any SMP or ZKPoK is
not successful then ABORT
Else ACCEPT and store H
Fig. 8: ZKPPC Framework for ASCII-based Passwords
As a last step of the ZKPPC protocol client C as prover and server S as verifier execute
a ZKPoK that C knows π and random salts (sP , sH) that were used to compute H and
that π is an integer contained in the (combined) commitment C for which the client
knows the (combined) randomness r. If this final ZKPoK is successful then S accepts
the hash value H.
In reference to Definition 26, our ZKPPC framework in Figure 8 tailors the general
statement f(pwd) = true to ASCII-based policies f = (R, nmin, nmax) and corresponding
password hashing schemes Π so that the resulting ZKPPC proof is of the following
form:
ZKPoK{(π, r, {πi}, {ri} for i = 0, . . . , n− 1) :
Ci = Com(πi, ri) ∧
∏
i
Ci = Com(π,
∑
i
ri) ∧ πi ∈ Ω′ ∧H = HashP(π, r)}.
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Theorem 1. If C = (SetupC, Com, Open) is an (additively) homomorphic commitment
scheme, Π = (PSetup, PPHSalt, PPreHash, PHSalt, PHashP) a secure randomised
password hashing scheme, SMP a zero-knowledge set membership proof and ZKPoK
a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, then the protocol from Figure 8 is a ZKPPC
protocol according to Definition 26.
Proof. Protocol completeness follows by inspection. To prove soundness we assume
that the server accepts H from a malicious client that was not computed as HashP(π, r)
for integer π that represents a policy-compliant password string pwd. By construction
of the protocol the client must have either (1) cheated in one of the SMP(πi, ri,Ω′)
proofs or the final ZKPoK proof, which contradicts the soundness properties of those
proofs, or (2) was able to compute H in two different ways, as HashP(π, r) using π
that corresponds to a policy-compliant pwd ∈ Df and as HashP(π∗, r∗) using π∗ for
some pwd∗ ∈ D that is not policy-compliant, which contradicts the second pre-image
resistance of Π, or (3) was able to compute at least one Ci in two different ways, as
Com(πi, ri) using πi that corresponds to a character ci that is significant for policy
expression R and as Com(π∗i , r∗i ) using π∗i that does not fulfil any character Rj from R,
which contradicts to the binding property of commitment C.
To prove the zero-knowledge property we need to build a simulator Sim to simulate
the view of the server. Sim internally uses the simulators for SMP proofs and the
ZKPoK proofs to simulate server’s view, thereby relying on the password hiding
property of Π and the hiding property of commitment C in the simulation of H and
every Ci, respectively.
Remark Depending on the maximal password length nmax and complexity of f =
(R, nmin, nmax) using range proofs instead of set membership proofs, may be more
efficient. Although ZKPPC complexity is currently dominated by set membership
proofs, passwords in practice are rather short and policies not too complex, so that
set membership proofs might be sufficiently efficient in most cases. Further notice
that leakage of password length n to the server is not considered as an attack against
the ZKPPC protocol. For policies that implicitly define nmin in policy expression R,
password length n may be hidden using the homomorphic property the commitment
scheme C, i. e. by combining commitments Ci for πi representing (remaining) password
characters that are not needed to satisfy R. However, complexity of the framework is
dominated by the complexity of the set membership proofs SMP, which mainly depends
on the upper bound n on the password length. See Section 6 for further performance
discussions with the instantiation from the following section in mind and comparison
to the BPR protocol of Section 4.
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3.3 A Concrete ZKPPC Protocol for ASCII-based Passwords
To show feasibility of the ZKPPC approach we give a concrete ZKPPC protocol
construction for ASCII-based passwords in a cyclic group G of prime order p. The
protocol is built from the Pedersen commitment scheme C = (SetupC, Com, Open) and
the randomised password hashing scheme Π = (PSetup, PPHSalt, PPreHash, PHSalt,
PHashP) from Section 2.1 that share the same group G. In particular, public parameters
used by C and S in the ZKPPC protocol are defined as (p, g, h, λ) where g and h are
independent generators of G.
Set Membership Proof For set membership proofs SMP(πi, ri,Ω′) we adopt a
three-move honest-verifier proof
ZKPoK{(πi, ri) : Ci = gπihri ∧ (πi = ω0 ∨ · · · ∨ πi = ω|Ω′|)}
for ωj ∈ Ω′, whose length is proportional to |Ω′|. Assuming that for each ωj ∈ Ω′ the
corresponding value gωj ∈ G is pre-computed this proof can be realised as
ZKPoK{(πi, ri) : Ci = gπihri ∧ (Ci = gω0hri ∨ · · · ∨ Ci = gω|Ω′|hri)}.
(See Section 4.2.2 for an example how to realise a Zero-Knowledge (ZK) proof like
this.) More efficient SMPs, e. g., as proposed by Camenisch et al. [54], can possibly
be used with a different commitment and password hashing scheme. In this case care
must be taken when it comes to the instantiation of VPAKE that must be able to
handle password hashes generated in ZKPPC (cf. Section 7.2).
Proof of Correctness The final ZKPoK proof is instantiated as a three-move
honest-verifier proof
ZKPoK{(π, sP , sH , r) : H1 = gsP ∧H2 = Hπ1 hsH ∧ C = gπhr}
that proceeds in the following classical way. C picks random kπ, ksP , ksH , kr ∈ Zp,
computes t1 = gksP , t2 = Hkπ1 hksH , and t3 = gkπhkr , and sends (t1, t2, t3) to S that
replies with a random challenge c ∈ Zp. C computes a1 = ksP+csP mod p, a2 = kπ+cπ
mod p, a3 = ksH + csH mod p and a4 = kr + cr mod p, and sends (a1, a2, a3, a4) to
S that accepts the proof if ga1 = t1Hc1, Ha21 ha3 = t2Hc2, and ga2ha4 = t3Cc holds.
Remark The honest-verifier ZK property of the adopted three-move SMP and ZKPoK
protocols is sufficient since ZKPPC will be executed as part of a registration protocol
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over a server-authenticated secure channel (cf. Section 3.4) where the server is assumed
to be honest-but-curious. If ZKPPC is executed outside of such a secure channel then
common techniques from Cramer et al. [70] or Damgård [75] (cf. Section 3.3.1 in
Chapter II) can be applied to obtain ZK property in presence of malicious verifiers.
We also observe that SMP and ZKPoK can be made non-interactive (in the random
oracle model) using the techniques from Fiat and Shamir [88].
3.4 Blind Registration of Passwords based on ZKPPC
Blind registration of passwords based on our generic ZKPPC construction from Sec-
tion 3.2 proceeds in three main stages and requires server-authenticated secure channel,
e. g., TLS, between C and S: (1) S sends its password policy f to C; (2) C picks its
user login credentials, containing id (such as its email address) which C wants to use
for later logins at S, and initiates the execution of the ZKPPC protocol. If the ZKPPC
protocol is successful then C has a policy-compliant password pwd and S receives id
and the password hash H ← HashP(π, r); (3) C sends used random salt sH to S and S
stores a tuple (id,H, sH) in its password database. This is necessary as the client is
only able to remember the low-entropy password.
The use of a server-authenticated secure channel guarantees that no active adversary
A can impersonate honest S and obtain (id,H, sH) nor can A mount an attack based
on modification of the server’s policy f , e.g. by replacing it with a weaker one.
Especially, sH needs protection since knowledge of (H, sH) enables an offline attack
that recovers pwd. Assuming an efficiently samplable dictionary D with min-entropy
β a brute force attack would require at most 2β executions of HashP(π∗, r), where
π∗ ← PWDtoINT(pwd∗), pwd∗ ∈ D.
The execution of the ZKPPC protocol in the second stage does not require a secure
channel due to the assumed ZK property. However, if a secure channel is in place,
we can work with the honest-verifier ZK property, which may lead to more efficient
ZKPPC constructions. Note that S is not assumed to be fully malicious but rather
honest-but-curios since it cannot be trusted to process plain passwords in a secure
way. By modelling S as a malicious party in the ZKPPC protocol we can offer strong
guarantees that no information about pwd is leaked to S in the second stage and so
the only way for S to recover pwd at the end is to mount an offline dictionary attack
using sH from the third stage.
The resulting password registration protocol guarantees that no server S can do
better in recovering the client’s pwd than any attacker A that compromises S during or
after the registration phase. This is an ideal security requirement for the registration of
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passwords that will be used in authentication protocols with password verifiers on the
server side. Note that security of such verifier-based authentication protocols implies
that any attacker A who breaks into S cannot recover pwd better than by mounting
an offline dictionary attack. The approach thus extends this requirement to password
registration protocols. In the following section we formalise the approach of Blind
Password Registration.
4 Blind Password Registration
The previous section on ZKPPC gives only an informal discussion on how to use
ZKPPC to register passwords. In this section we introduce a formal definition of BPR
and propose an optimised protocol following the idea used in ZKPPC. First observe that
a zero-knowledge property in the context of password verifiers seems an unnecessarily
strong requirement since offline dictionary attacks can always be performed on the
server side. By dropping the zero-knowledge requirement and focusing on the entire
registration process we thus obtain a more reasonable security model and are able to
construct more efficient BPR protocols. It further allows us to drop the maximum
password length and thus use simplified policies f here, consisting of policy expression
R and minimum password length nmin.
A BPR protocol allows a user to register a password verifier at a VPAKE server
and prove that it contains a password that complies with the server’s policy without
disclosing the password. A BPR protocol is thus executed between a client C and a
server S, both holding the server’s password policy f . The policy can be exchanged
before the actual protocol with other general information about the registration. After
choosing a policy compliant password pwd, C engages in a protocol with S to prove
policy compliance of pwd, i.e. f(pwd) = true, and sends a password verifier to the
server, which can later be used in VPAKE protocols. We discuss VPAKE protocols
that can be used with verifiers set-up with this BPR protocol in Section 7. Blind
password registration is formally defined as follows.
Definition 27 (Blind Password Registration). A BPR protocol is executed between a
client C and a server S with the server’s password policy f as common input. At the
end of the protocol the server eventually outputs the password verifier ver for a policy
compliant, client chosen password pwd. ♢
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4.1 Blind Password Registration Model
We consider two security properties for BPR protocols to capture the requirement that
the server learns nothing about the password in the verifier and that the password
verifier ver belongs to a policy compliant password. The first security notion regarding
the server, called Dictionary Attack Resistance (DAR), considers a passive attack in
which the adversary must not be able to retrieve the password from the password
verifier faster than with a brute-force attack over the used dictionary. The second
security notion regarding the client, called Policy Compliance (PC), considers an
active attack where the adversary plays the role of the client and tries to register a
non-compliant password at a server. We propose a game-based security model for
BPR protocols over dictionaries Df,n. Recall that a policy dictionary Df contains all
passwords pwd with f(pwd) = true and a dictionary Df,n contains all passwords pwd
with f(pwd) = true and |pwd| = n. We work in the semi-honest server model where
the client can be malicious, but the server is honest in its execution. As argued before,
this best captures the real world scenario where server S is partially trusted, but in
particular not trusted to handle the client’s password securely. Note that security of
BPR protocols can only be assessed with respect to the used password hashing scheme
HashP since the attackers ability to recover the password from a compromised server
depends on the pre-image resistance of the hashing scheme.
Participants and Parameters A BPR protocol is executed between a client C from
a universe of clients and a server Sf chosen from the universe of servers. The universe
of servers contains servers Sf such that there exists a server Sf for every policy f . Note
that we usually omit f and write S instead. Both protocol participants have common
inputs, necessary for the execution of the protocol, and password policy f . Instances
of protocol participants C or S are denoted Ci or Si. Protocol participants without
specified role are denoted by P . A client can only register one password with a server,
but can register passwords at an arbitrary number of servers. Further, a server only
allows a single registration from a client such that any attempt to register a password
with a server that already stores a verifier from this client is rejected by the server.
The client C is unique and is used as identifier on the server, i. e. as username to store
alongside the password verifier ver for later VPAKE executions. An entry (C, ver) is
only stored on the server if the BPR protocol is successful. To interact with protocol
participants, the adversary has access to an Execute and a Send oracle.
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• Execute(C,S) models a passive attack and executes a BPR protocol between new
instances of C and S. If there exists a verifier ver for client C on server S, the
oracle aborts. Otherwise, it returns the protocol transcript and the internal state
of server S.
• Send(C,Si,m) models an active attack and sends message m, allegedly from client
C, to server instance Si (a new server instance with a unique index i is created if
it does not exist yet). If there exists a verifier ver for client C on server S, the
oracle aborts. Otherwise, it returns the server’s answer m′ if there exists any.
Note that we allow the adversary to register passwords with servers such that we do
not require the existence of a client C after a successful registration of (C, ver) on a
server (client identities C are unique but not secret and can therefore be used by the
adversary).
Policy Compliance Policy compliance is the first natural security property of BPR
protocols, requiring that a password set up with a BPR protocol is compliant with the
server’s policy f . The attacker here plays the role of the client and tries to register a
password pwd on a server that is not policy compliant.
Definition 28 (Policy Compliance). Let A denote a PPT adversary with access to
Execute and Send oracles. The probability that a server instance Si exists after A
terminated that accepted (C, ver) with ver = HashP(pwd; r) and f(pwd) = false is
negligible in λ. ♢
Dictionary Attack Resistance To model the second security property, Dictionary
Attack Resistance, we define another oracle, which models an offline dictionary attack
on password verifier ver. DAR models server compromise (honest-but-curious server)
and requires that it is impossible for an attacker to recover the client’s password from
the password verifier ver in a more efficient way than traversing the used dictionary.
Note that it is always possible for an attacker to brute-force a password verifier such
that the defined definition of DAR is the strongest possible notion with respect to the
used dictionary.
• Verify(C,S, pwd) takes a client, server pair (C,S) and a password pwd as input,
and returns 1 iff there exists a server instance Si that accepted (C, ver) with
ver = (H1, H2, sH) and (H1, H2)← HashP(pwd; r), and Si is a passive session, i.e.
no Send was queried for (C,S) on session Si. Otherwise, return 0.
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The adversary in the DAR experiment outputs a (C,S, pwd) triple after interacting
with the Execute and Send oracle. This triple is handed over to Verify such that the
experiment is successful if and only if Verify returns 1, i. e. the adversary is able to
compute the password pwd from a password verifier ver stored on server S. Since this
is always possible, we have to restrict the time the adversary is allowed to take to
compute the correct password, i. e. he must not be more efficient in computing the
password than performing a brute force attack. We formalise the notion of dictionary
attack resistance in the following definition.
Definition 29 (Dictionary Attack Resistance). A BPR protocol using password hashing
scheme HashP is Dictionary Attack Resistance if for all PPT adversaries A running
in time t (excl. time for oracle computations) and all dictionaries Df there exists a
negligible function ε(·) such that:
Pr[(C,S, pwd)← AExecute(·),Send(·),Verify(·)(λ); Verify(C,S, pwd) = 1]
≤ 2
−βDf,|pwd| · t
tPPreHash
+ ε(λ),
with tPPreHash being the running time of PPreHash. ♢
Note that t used in the above definition measures time that is spent by A on the actual
computation of pwd. This time can be estimated as t = tA − tq,E − tq,S, where tA is
the overall running time of A, tq,E is the time for processing qE Execute queries, and
tq,S is the time for processing qS Send queries.
Using Df,n in the definition of DAR seems a reasonable compromise between the
desired security and efficiency for BPR protocols. Nonetheless, it is possible to change
the balance between security and efficiency by aiming at a stronger form of dictionary
attack resistance using Df , i. e. hide the password length, or at a weaker form of
dictionary attack resistance that would disclose the sets of significant characters to the
adversary. We discuss both variants in the following.
4.1.1 Disclosure of Significant Character Sets
Definition 29 does not leak the significant password character sets to the server and
thus makes the BPR protocol superior to the ZKPPC-based approach proposed from
Section 3, where positions and sets of password characters that are significant for
policy f are disclosed. Note that such weaker notion of dictionary attack resistance
can be modeled by using dictionaries D∗f and D∗f,n in Definition 29 while assuming
that position information of significant password characters is known. That is, let DRj
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denote the probability distribution of characters in password pwd over set Rj, the jth
set in policy expression R. Further, let RS be the set of significant character indices i.
Min-entropy of D∗f,n is then given by
βD∗
f,n
= − max
pwd∈Df,n
n−1∑
i=0,i ̸∈RS
[DΣ(ci) lg(DΣ(ci))] +
n−1∑
i=0,i∈RS
[DRi(ci) lg(DRi(ci))].
Min-entropy of D∗f can be defined accordingly.
4.1.2 Hiding Password Lengths
Definition 29 allows BPR protocols to leak the length of the registered password
to the server, as is also the case for ZKPPC-based password registration protocols.
While this leakage can be tolerated for uniformly distributed passwords, it can be
used to build smaller dictionaries for non-uniform password distributions. We can
easily strengthen Definition 29 to hide password lengths by replacing βDf,n with βDf .
However, in order to realise this stronger requirement BPR protocols would typically
require extra computation and communication costs. We discuss in Section 4.3 how
efficiency of our BPR protocol, which satisfies Definition 29, can be traded in order to
ensure password-length hiding.
4.1.3 A Note on Relation to ZKPPC-based Password Registration
The model proposed in this section defines a complete blind password registration
procedure for VPAKE protocols, in contrast to the protocol given in Section 3 that
defines ZKPPCs and uses it as a building block for a VPAKE registration procedure,
without modelling the latter. We observe that according to the security definition of
BPR protocols, ZKPPC does not necessarily lead to secure BPR constructions. As
mentioned in the previous paragraph the generic blind password registration procedure
based on ZKPPC leaks positions and sets of significant characters. While this is
tolerable in the ZKPPC-based protocol where the actual time needed to retrieve the
password from the verifier is taken before randomness sH is disclosed, in the BPR
model this protocol would not satisfy dictionary attack resistance because an attacker
would be able to retrieve passwords from verifiers significantly faster than required
by Definition 29 with knowledge of sH . Definition 29 models the intrinsic VPAKE
requirement that a server, holding a password hash and used random salt, must not be
able to recover the password faster than by brute-forcing the dictionary.
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4.2 An Efficient BPR Protocol in the Standard Model
We first give a high-level overview of the proposed BPR protocol according to Figure 9
and then proceed with the detailed specification of its steps. The client starts the
registration procedure by choosing an ASCII-based password pwd ∈R Df of length
n, which is then mapped to an integer π ← PWDtoINT(pwd). The client maps each
password character ci ∈ pwd to an integer πi ← CHRtoINT(ci) and computes Pedersen
commitments Ci and C ′i for πi. Note that those commitments are independent of the
character’s position, in contrast to the commitments used in ZKPPC. Note that each
commitment C ′i is obtained by re-randomising Ci. The client builds vector C = {Ci},
shuffles commitments in C ′ = {C ′i}, and proves that C ′ contains commitments to
ASCII characters, including those that are significant to fulfil password policy f . This
proof is performed using an appropriate Proof of Membership (PoM). The client also
computes the randomised password hash (H1, H2) using π, sends (H1, H2) with the
hash salt sH to the server, and proves that π used to compute (H1, H2) is the same as in
the product of shifted commitments Cbii . This proof is performed using an appropriate
Proof of Equivalence (PoE). The product of Cbii used in the verification can be computed
by the server using shift base b and the received commitments Ci ∈ C. Finally, the
client proves to the server that C ′ is a shuffle of C using an appropriate Proof of Shuffle
(PoS). The purpose of this proof is to link the proof that pwd contains ASCII characters
and fulfils policy f (PoM) with the proof that (H1, H2) is the password hash of π (PoE)
without leaking positions and ASCII subsets of characters that are significant for f (as
discussed in Section 4.1). The server, after successful verification of all proofs, stores
the client’s password verifier ver = (H1, H2, sH) in its protected password database
and terminates the registration protocol. For remote registration of the password
verifier we assume that the BPR protocol is executed over a server-authenticated secure
channel in order to protect transmission of ver; otherwise an eavesdropping adversary
would be able to recover the password by brute-forcing the dictionary. For example,
on the web our BPR protocol can be executed on top of a TLS channel established
between the client and the server.
While the high-level idea of the protocol is intuitive, the actual specification becomes
somewhat technical. Note that the three proofs PoM, PoE and PoS can be performed
in parallel. Further note that all sets are ordered in the following and set operations
are assumed to use elements from the correct positions. We first describe local pre-
computation steps of the client such as password encoding and hashing before giving a
detailed specification of the proofs. The protocol uses a cyclic group G of prime order
p with generator g. Let h, fi ∈R G for i ∈ [−4,m] with m is at least |pwd|, denote
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Client C Server S
Input: (C,S, f) Input: (C,S, f)
choose pwd ∈R Df
compute π ← PWDtoINT(pwd)
let n← |pwd|
for i ∈ [0, n− 1]
let ci ∈ pwd
πi ← CHRtoINT(ci)
Ci = gπihri ;C ′i = Cihr
′
i
shuffle C ′i ← C ′ki
let C = {Ci}, C ′ = {C ′i}
sP ←R PPHSalt(pP)
sH ←R PHSalt(pP)
(H1, H2)← HashP(π; (sP , sH))
For ci ∈ pwd identify set ωki
Execute PoE, PoM, PoS: C,C ′,ω, H1, H2, sH , If |C| = |C ′| ≥ nmin:
m1PoM,m1PoE,m1PoS−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ choose cPoM, cPoE, cPoS
cPoM, cPoE, cPoS←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
m2PoM,m2PoE,m2PoS−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ If PoM, PoE, PoS succeed
store (C, ver)
with ver = (H1, H2, sH)
Fig. 9: Blind Password Registration — A High-Level Overview
random group elements whose discrete logarithms with respect to g are assumed to
be unknown. In practice, m can be chosen sufficiently large in order to accommodate
all reasonable password lengths. The public parameters of the protocol are (p, g, h,f)
with f = {fi}. Let n = |pwd| and count indices i ∈ [0, n − 1] when dealing with
password characters from pwd, whereas for the indices of other sets we mostly use the
interval [1, x], x ∈ N. Note that index ranges change frequently in the description of
the protocol.
4.2.1 Pre-Computations
The client chooses some password string pwd = (c0, . . ., cn−1) ∈R Df that is compliant
with policy f , encodes it to π ← PWDtoINT(pwd), and iterates over all password
character positions i ∈ [0, n− 1] to perform the following computations:
• encode the character as πi ← CHRtoINT(ci)
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• commit to πi by computing Pedersen commitments Ci = gπihri , C ′i = Cihr
′ for
ri, r
′
i ∈R Z∗p
• choose a unique random index ki ∈R [0, n− 1] to shuffle each C ′i ← C ′ki
• if πi is significant for any Rj ∈ R, set ωki ← Rj, otherwise ωki ← Σ
• let li ∈ N denote the index in ωki such that ci = ωki [li]
Note that values (Ci, C ′i, ωki , ki, li, πi, ri, r′i) will be used in the proofs of knowledge. The
client then generates random salts SP , sH ∈R Zp for the password hashing scheme and
computes the password verifier ver = (H1, H2, sH) where (H1, H2) ← (gsP , Hπ1 hsH ).
Further, the client combines previously computed values C = {Ci}. The shuffled
commitments and sets ωki are combined in specific order according to the chosen
index ki, i. e. C ′ = {C ′ki} and ω = {ωki}. With these values the client can start the
computation of the three proofs PoM, PoE and PoS. In the following we describe these
three proofs and define their messages. Note that we do not mention standard checks
such as checks for group membership in our description.
4.2.2 Proofs
We use common zero-knowledge techniques to instantiate PoE and PoM proofs. This
includes techniques first proposed by Cramer et al. [71] for partial proofs of knowledge,
techniques proposed by Schnorr [177] to prove knowledge of discrete logarithms, and
techniques proposed by Chaum and Pedersen [66] to prove knowledge of equality of
elements in different representations.
Proof of Equivalence (PoE) This protocol proves that password hash H2 contains
the same encoded password π as the product of the shifted commitments ∏n−1i=0 Cbii and
that the client knows the discrete logarithm sP of H1 to base g, in particular:
ZKPoK{(π, sP , rˆ) : H2/hsH = Hπ1 ∧H1 = gsP ∧
n−1∏
i=0
Cb
i
i = gπhrˆ}.
1. The first client message m1PoE is set to (tsP , tH , tC∗) for tsP = gksP ; tH =
Hkπ1 ; tC∗ = gkπhkr∗ with ksP , kπ, kr∗ ∈R Z∗p.
2. The server stores received values and sets cPoE = c ∈R Zp.
78 A Password Authentication Framework for the Single-Server Setting
3. After receiving challenge C from the server, the client computes the following
verification values
ssP = ksP − csP ; sπ = kπ − cπ; sr∗ = kr∗ − c
n−1∑
i=0
biri
and sets m2PoE = (ssP , sπ, sr∗) as response.
4. To verify the proof, i. e. the product of shifted commitments Cbii for Ci ∈ C
contains the same password π as the password hash H2, the server verifies the
following:
tsP
?= gssPHc1; tH
?= Hsπ1 (H2/hsH )c; tC∗
?= gsπhsr∗
(
n−1∏
i=0
Cb
i
i
)c
.
The server accepts the proof iff those verifications succeed.
Proof of Membership (PoM) This protocol proves that every password character
cki ∈ ωki using the shuffled set of commitments C ′, i. e.
ZKPoK{({πi, ri}i∈[0,n−1]) : C ′ki = gπihri ∧ πi ∈ ωki},
(we use πi ∈ ωki as a short form of ci ∈ ωki with πi ← CHRtoINT(ci)). Note that
C ′ki ∈ C ′.
1. To prove that every C ′ki commits to a value in the corresponding set ωki the client
computes the following values for the first move of the proof:
∀πj ∈ ωki ∧ πj ̸= πi : sj ∈R Z∗p, cj ∈R Z∗p, tj = gπjhsj(C ′ki/gπj)cj
kρi ∈R Z∗p; tlki = gπihkρi
Values (tki , ski , cki , kρi), with tki = tj ∪ {tlki}, ski = {sj}, and cki = {cj} are
stored for future use. Note that tlki has to be added at the correct position
(lki) in tki . After computing the proof for every C ′ki the client sets the message
m1PoM = t = {tki}.
2. The server stores received values, checks them for group membership, chooses a
random challenge c ∈R Zp and sets cPoM = c.
3. After receiving the challenge c from the server, the client computes the following
verification values for all commitments C ′ki (note that Sj and cj for all j ̸= lki
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are chosen already):
clki = c⊕
|ωki |⊕
j=1,j ̸=lki
cj; slki = kρki − clki (ri + r′ki),
where i is the index of C ′ki before shuffling. The client then combines s =
ski ∪{slki} and c = cki ∪{clki}. Note again that the set union has to consider the
position of lki to add the values at the correct position. The response message
m2PoM is then set to (s, c).
4. To verify the proof, i. e. to verify that every commitment C ′ki in C
′ commits to
a character ci from either a subset Rj of Σ if significant or Σ if not, the server
verifies the following for every set ωi ∈ ω with i ∈ [0, n− 1]:
• Let cj ∈ ci for ci ∈ c and verify c ?= ⊕|ωi|j=1 cj
• Let πj ∈ ωi, si ∈ s, ti ∈ t, and ci ∈ c, and verify ti[j] ?= gπjhsi[j](C ′i/gπj )ci[j]
for all j ∈ [1, |ωi|]
The verification of the proof is successful iff all verifications above are successful
and ω contains all significant characters for f .
Proof of Shuffle (PoS) Let ϕ denote a function such that ϕ(i) = ki shuffles the set
C to C ′. We use the efficient proof for correct shuffling for ElGamal ciphertexts from
Furukawa [96], which is an optimised version of the protocol proposed by Furukawa
and Sako [97], and adapt it to Pedersen commitments, which translates
ZKPoK{({ki, r′ki}i) : C ′i = Ckihr
′
ki} into ZKPoK{Aji : C ′i = hA0i ·
n∏
v=1
CAviv }
where the permutation matrix is a n-times-n sub-matrix of Aji.
1. In the first move, the client (prover) builds a permutation matrix and commits
to it. First he chooses random A′j ∈R Z∗p for j ∈ [−4, n]. Let Aji denote a
matrix with j ∈ [−4, n] and i ∈ [0, n], i. e. of size n + 5 × n + 1, such that
a n × n sub-matrix of Aji is the permutation matrix. Further, let ϕ denote
the permutation function that, on input index i, returns the index ki of the
according shuffled element and ϕ−1 its inverse. This allows us to write the shuffle
as C ′i =
∏n
j=0C
Aji
j = Cκihr
′
κi with C0 = h and κi = ϕ−1(i) for i ∈ [1, n]. Matrix
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Aji is defined with Aw0 ∈R Z∗p, A−1v ∈R Z∗p and A0v = r′ϕ(v) for w ∈ [−4, n] and
v ∈ [1, n]. The remaining values in Aji are computed as follows for v ∈ [1, n]:
A−2v =
n∑
j=1
3A2j0Ajv; A−3v =
n∑
j=1
3Aj0Ajv; A−4v =
n∑
j=1
2Aj0Ajv
After generating Aji the client commits to it and sets output m1PoS = (C ′0, f˜ ,
f ′, w, w˜) for f ′ = {f ′v} with v ∈ [0, n].
f ′v =
n∏
j=−4
f
Ajv
j ; f˜ =
n∏
j=−4
f
A′j
j C
′
0 = g
∑n
j=1 πjAj0hA00+
∑n
j=1 rjAj0
w =
n∑
j=1
A3j0 − A−20 − A′−3; w˜ =
n∑
j=1
A2j0 − A−40
Note that C ′0 has the form
∏n
j=0C
Aj0
j = hA00
∏n
j=1C
Aj0
j , but computing g
∑n
j=1 πjAj0
hA00+
∑n
j=1 rjAj0 saves n− 1 exponentiations.
2. The server chooses c = {cv} with cv ∈R Zp for v ∈ [1, n] and sets cPoS = c.
3. After receiving challenges c from the server, the client computes the following
verification values and sets m2PoS = (s, s′) for s = {sv} and s′ = {s′v} with
v ∈ [−4, n]. Let c0 = 1.
sv =
n∑
j=0
Avjcj; s′v = A′v +
n∑
j=1
Avjc
2
j
4. Finally, the server checks the following equations for a randomly chosen α ∈R Z∗p
and C0 = h:
n∏
v=−4
f sv+αs
′
v
v
?= f ′0f˜α
n∏
j=1
f ′j
cj+αc2j ;
n∏
v=0
Csvv
?=
n∏
j=0
C ′j
cj
n∑
j=1
(s3j − c3j) ?= s−2 + s′−3 + w;
n∑
j=1
(s2j − c2j) ?= s−4 + w˜
The server accepts the PoS proof if all verifications succeed.
4.2.3 Security Analysis
The security of our BPR protocol is established by the following theorem.
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Theorem 2 (BPR Security). The protocol from Section 4.2 is BPR-secure, i. e. policy
compliant and dictionary attack resistant, if the discrete logarithm problem is hard in
the used group G.
To prove Theorem 2, we start with the security of the adopted shuffling approach and
prove that PoS is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for the shuffle of C to C ′. The
following Lemma 1 is proven by Furukawa [96] for ElGamal ciphertexts. We recall the
proof here with necessary changes for Pedersen commitments in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (PoS is a ZKPoK). The PoS protocol from Section 4.2 is an honest verifier
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the following statement if the discrete logarithm
problem in the used group is hard,
ZKPoK{Aji : C ′i = hA0i ·
n∏
v=1
CAviv },
where a n × n sub-matrix of Aji is the used permutation matrix and A0i the used
re-randomiser.
Proof. We have to prove soundness and zero-knowledge of the PoS protocol in order
to prove Lemma 1. We start with proving the zero-knowledge property. To do so,
we compute C ′0, f˜ , {f ′j}, w, w˜, {cj}, {sj}, and {s′j}, such that they are indistinguishable
from a view of an honest verifier, given (p, g, h,f ,C,C ′):
f ′j, cj, sv, s
′
v ∈R Z∗p for v ∈ [−4, n], j ∈ [1, n]
C ′0 =
∏n
j=0C
sj
j∏n
j=1C
′
j
cj
; f ′0 =
∏n
v=−4 f
sv
v∏n
j=1 f
′
j
cj
; f˜ =
∏n
v=−4 f
s′v
v∏n
j=1 f
′
j
c2j
;
w =
n∑
j=1
(s3j − c3j)− s−2 − s′−3; w˜ =
n∑
j=1
(s2j − c2j)− s−4
To prove soundness of the PoS scheme we show how to construct an extractor Ext
that extracts the matrix Avj and A′v for v ∈ [−4, n], j ∈ [0, n]. Note that this
includes extraction of the permutation matrix, i. e. ϕ, and the re-randomisation
values r′j, but not the content, i. e. the characters. First, we see that there exists
an extractor Ext using n + 1 linearly independent challenge sets c that is able to
extract Aji from sv =
∑n
j=0Avjcj that fulfils the equation
∏n
v=−4 f
sv
v =
∏n
j=0 f
′
j
cj , and
A′v from s′v = A′v +
∑n
j=1Avjc
2
j that fulfils the equation
∏n
v=−4 f
s′v
v =
∏n
j=1 f
′
j
c2j for
v ∈ [−4, n] and j ∈ [0, n]. In this case we also know that the prover either built
sv and s′v correct, or is able to create (non-trivial) integers {βv} for v ∈ [−4, n] as
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∑n
j=0Avjcj − sv or
∑n
j=1Avjc
2
j − s′v such that
∏n
v=−4 f
βv
v = 1, which is impossible under
the discrete logarithm assumption. Second, equations ∑nj=1(s3j − c3j) = s−2 + s′−3 + w
and ∑nj=1(s2j − c2j) = s−4 + w˜ ensure that the n× n sub-matrix used in Aji is indeed a
permutation matrix, using the fact that every n× n permutation matrix Aab satisfies
the following two equations:
n∑
j=1
AjcAjdAje = 1 if (c ?= d ?= e) otherwise 0;
n∑
j=1
AjcAjd = 1 if (c ?= d) otherwise 0.
Eventually, ∏nv=0Csvv = ∏nj=0C ′j cj guarantees that, for well-formed sv, the prover knows
the used randomness to create the shuffled commitments C ′j for j ∈ [1, n].
Proof of Theorem 2. Policy Compliance To prove policy compliance of the construc-
tion we first show that the three proofs in the protocol are sound. This allows us to
argue that every attacker winning the policy compliance experiment allows us to build
an attacker against one of the three proofs in the protocol.
Claim 1 (PoE Soundness). PoE is sound, i.e. for every client using H2 = Hπ1 hsH and∏n−1
i=0 C
bi
i = gπ
′
hrˆ with π ̸= π′ and rˆ = ∑ni=1 ri the probability that the server accepts
PoE is negligible.
Proof. Soundness of PoE holds if the probability is negligible that
tH
?= Hsπ1 (H2/hsH )c and tC∗
?= gsπhsr∗
(
n−1∏
i=0
Cb
i
i
)c
holds for H2 = Hπ1 hsH and
∏n−1
i=0 C
bi
i = gπ
′
hrˆ with π ̸= π′ and rˆ = ∑ni=1 biri. To show
that this holds we assume w.l.o.g. that sπ and sr∗ are chosen such that the second
equation holds. In particular sπ = x − cπ′ for an appropriate value of x. However,
we see now that for the first equation to hold, the adversary would have to compute
tH = gsP sπ(H2h−sH )c, which implies computing y = logg(sPx− sP cπ′ + βc) for some β.
By assumption β ̸= sPπ′ such that computation of y is impossible under the discrete
logarithm assumption. Note that the additional proof for knowledge of sP ensures that
the client knows the discrete logarithm to basis g of H1, which allows us to define the
equation tH as Hsπ1 (H2h−sH )c = gsP sπ(H2h−sH )c.
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Claim 2 (PoM Soundness). PoM is sound, i. e. for every client C using pwd ̸∈ Df the
probability that the server accepts PoM is negligible.
Proof. Note that while PoM is a proof of knowledge, we are not actually interested
in the knowledge soundness as this comes implicitly under the discrete logarithm
assumption. Instead it is sufficient in our case that client C can not make the server
accept PoM with a password pwd ̸∈ Df . Soundness of PoM implies that if there exists
a commitment C ′ki that commits to an encoded character πi not in the respective set
ωki , then
ti[j] ?= gπjhsi[j](C ′ki/g
πj)ci[j]
does not hold with overwhelming probability for given values. This holds under the
assumption that the discrete logarithm problem is hard in G and cki [l] ∈ c is uniformly
distributed in Zp. The first assumption is clear and the second one holds as long as
c
?= ⊕|ωi|j=1 ci[j] holds for a uniformly at random chosen c ∈R Z∗p. Note that this also
holds for our case in which we use the same c in all n proofs. Assuming that the client
can convince the server that the equation holds in case πi is not in ωki it is easy to
see that this is equivalent to breaking the discrete logarithm problem in G, i. e. the
client can either compute rˆ such that C ′ki = g
πih(r+r
′) = gπjhrˆ, or he can compute
si[j] = πj logh(g) − logh(t) + c logh(C ′kig−πj). Therefore, the claim follows since the
client can not fool the server in accepting a set membership proof for a character
ci ̸∈ ωki in pwd and the server additionally verifies that sets ωi are necessary and
sufficient to fulfil policy f .
Soundness of PoS is given in Lemma 1. Note that we require that PoS is a proof
of knowledge for re-randomiser r′ and permutation matrix. Given soundness of the
three proofs it is easy to construct a reduction from the policy compliance adversary
to the soundness properties of the proofs. Let A denote a policy compliance attacker
that has non-negligible probability to register a non-compliant password pwd ̸∈ Df .
We construct a successful attacker B on the soundness of PoM by simulating Execute
queries honestly for A. Send queries are all simulated honestly, except for one session,
in which B outputs the first part of PoM in a random Send query as its first message.
This Send query returns the challenge that B receives. The second part of PoM in the
second Send query of this session is output by B, which results in a success probability
of SuccA/q, where q is the number of active sessions invoked by A.
Knowing that the Proof of Membership is sound we show how to construct a
successful extractor B′ on the permutation PoS using a successful attacker A on the
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policy compliance experiment. To this end B′ simulates all Execute oracles honestly.
Send queries are simulated honestly, except for one session, in which B′ stores the first
part of PoS in a random Send query and responds with n + 1 linearly independent
challenges c for PoS and a random challenge c for PoM and PoE. Gathering the
n + 1 messages in the second Send query from A on that session, B′ can extract r′i
and the permutation matrix. Building an attacker on the soundness of PoE using a
successful attacker A on the policy compliance experiment is similar to building B on
PoM. Considering claims for PoM and PoE and the soundness proof of PoS Policy
Compliance follows.
Dictionary Attack Resistance First note that the used password hashing scheme
that computes (H1, H2) = (gsP , gsP πhsH ) with sP , sH ∈R Z∗p is secure (cf. Section 2.1).
We show in the following that a successful attacker A on the dictionary attack resistance
of the BPR protocol would be able to distinguish between identical distributions of real
and simulated values. It is easy to see that PoM and PoE on its own are zero-knowledge
proofs and the zero-knowledge property of PoS has been shown in Lemma 1.
We start by observing that breaking the dictionary attack resistance of the protocol
implies that A is able to find a password pwd from a BPR transcript and the server’s
information, i. e. the password verifier ver = (H1, H2, sH), using less than 2βDf,|pwd|
exponentiations (pre-hash computations). This implies that there exists at least one
index i such that PoM leaks the shuffled character cj ∈ pwd for j = ϕ(i), or PoS
exposes the relationship between C ′j and the according Ci and therefore the set Rj
from which ci is chosen. Let i denote the index of such a character. If A can identify
index i, he can distinguish between Xi = (ti = gπihkρi , si = kρi − ci(rϕ−1(i) + r′i), ci)
and X0 = (to = gπohso(C ′ϕ(i)/gπo)co , so, co) with c, so, co ∈R Z∗p and ci = c ⊕ (
⊕
co)
for o ∈ [1, n], o ̸= i. This however is impossible since Xi and all Xo are identically
distributed. Similarly, we can argue that distinguishing between a real and a simulated
proof of shuffle is impossible. Considering that PoM and PoS do not offer any attack
possibilities we see that if A is able to win the dictionary attack resistance game,
we can distinguish between a real and a simulated PoE. However, this is impossible
due to the zero-knowledge property of PoE, i. e. values tsP , tH and tC∗ are identically
distributed in both cases.
4.3 Discussion
The proposed BPR protocol is proven secure in a strong security model, but does not
hide the length of the password from the server. Arguably, this is a strong security
requirement (cf. Section 4.1) that may not be needed in every practical scenarios since
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password policies usually aim at offering some minimum password strength such that
every password of the required minimum length or longer and all necessary character
classes is considered to be secure.
Nonetheless, one may argue that an attacker knowing the password length can
perform a dictionary attack by only trying passwords of the given length and thus use
the reduced search space to speed up the attack. An initial idea for hiding the password
length in our BPR protocol could be to combine commitments for non-significant
password characters into a single commitment and use only nmin commitments in
the proof. This, however, would allow a malicious client to register passwords that
do not comply with the policy unless the client can prove that the exponent of the
combined commitment is of the form ∑ biπj , which is only possible when the length of
the polynomial (and therefore the password length) is known. We can show however
that our BPR protocol can be modified to hide the password length at the cost of its
efficiency. This can be achieved by defining a constant length l ∈ N larger than any
practical n = |pwd|, e.g., l = 50 or l = 100, and apply the following modifications. First,
we change the way shuffling is performed. In particular, C is still randomly shuffled
to C ′, but it is ensured that the first |R| commitments C ′i are for characters that are
significant for policy f . All computations in the protocol are now performed over the
password π∗ = π||0 . . . 0, where π is the original client-chosen, encoded password, and
|π∗| = l. This allows us to define set ωi for character commitment C ′i as either some Rj
if significant, or Σ if i ≤ nmin and the character in C ′i is not significant. This requires
the client to prove at least nmin characters and thus allows the server to verify that
pwd ≥ nmin. The remaining protocol steps remain unchanged. Note that through these
modifications the original password is basically hidden within a longer password and
so a stronger flavour of dictionary attack resistance that would also hide password
length (cf. discussion in Section 4.1.2) can be proven for the modified BPR protocol
using min-entropy βDf = −maxpwd∈Df
∑n−1
i=0 [DΣ(ci) lg(DΣ(ci))] for dictionary Df that
contains all policy-compliant passwords of length up to l. However, it is obvious that
this modification trades off stronger security for efficiency due to the use of l for all
shorter passwords.
Our BPR protocol can also be made more efficient if we are willing to sacrifice
privacy of character positions for significant characters and reveal information about
corresponding character sets (as in the ZKPPC-based BPR protocol). In this case the
proof PoS becomes redundant and all steps related to it can be removed. This would
significantly reduce the number of exponentiations. The resulting BPR protocol would
still offer a weaker flavour of dictionary attack resistance that does not hide positions
86 A Password Authentication Framework for the Single-Server Setting
and sets of significant password characters as discussed in Section 4.1 yet remain more
efficient than the ZKPPC-based registration protocol, which offer comparable security
guarantees.
5 More efficient Blind Password Registration from
Set-based Policy Checking
The BPR protocol proposed in the previous section is secure and has reasonable
performance. However, it uses an approach closely related to the ZKPPC-based
approach from Section 3 and thus shares many of its shortcomings. In this section we
propose an entirely different approach to Blind Password Registration based on set
theory rather than zero-knowledge proofs, which allows us to build a significantly faster
protocol but also requires a different security model. Note that the BPR protocol in
this section is based on a more general approach that can be used in other scenarios
than password policy checks. To this end we first introduce the notion of Set-based
Policy Checking. In order to make the following technical sections easier to understand
we give an examples in Section 5.1.2 on how the SPC protocol works. The idea behind
this approach is to use PSI with data transfer, which allows the client to retrieve data
(shares of a secret) if and only if the intersection between the client’s set and the
server’s set is of a certain form that is described in the server’s policy. If the client is
then able to prove to the server that he was able to reconstruct the secret, the server
believes that the client’s set fulfils the server’s policy.
5.1 Secure Set-based Policy Checking (SPC)
In SPC a server holds a public policy f as defined in Section 1.4 and a client holds a
private set I. The goal is to allow the server to check whether I satisfies f without
learning anything else about I.
Definition 30 (Secure Set-based Policy Checking, SPC). Set-based policy checking
is executed between client C with a private set I and server S with a public policy
f = (V ,ΓV). Server and client retrieve f(I) as result. We call a set-based policy
checking protocol secure iff it fulfils the following three notions.
1. Correctness: Honest execution of the protocol with f(I) = true is accepted by
the server with overwhelming probability.
2. Client Privacy: Server S learns nothing about the client set I other than f(I).
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Client C Server S
Input: I Input: f = (V,ΓV)
choose a secret s ∈R Zp
generate matrix M
and function ρ from f
f,M, ρ←−−−−−−−−− generate shares si s.t. ρ(i) ∈ V
get shares from GI∩V : {si|ρ(i) ∈ V ∩ I} OBI←−−−−−−−−→
if possible: recover s from the shares
else: abort and output ⊥
ms ← H(s, C,S, trans) ms−−−−−−−−−→ accept if ms ?= H(s, C,S, trans)
Fig. 10: Secure Set-based Policy Checking
3. Soundness: A client C holding I with f(I) ̸= true has negligible probability in
getting S to accept the SPC execution. ♢
Definition 30 says in particular that an SPC protocol provides both participants with
the result of f(I) while the server learns nothing about I more than it can can
infer from the result and public information. Formally, privacy is defined using the
simulation-based approach. Privacy of an SPC protocol Π in particular holds if its
execution in the real model emulates execution of the ideal model with a trusted
party for SPC functionality fΠ, i. e. {idealfΠ,B(z)(x, y)}x,y,z
c≡ {realΠ,A(z)(x, y)}x,y,z.
Functionality fΠ outputs f(I) to the server and client, i. e. fΠ(I, f) = (f(I), f(I)).
5.1.1 Instantiation
The high-level idea of this protocol is to use a PSI protocol with data transfer and
LSSS so that the server can check the client’s set of password characters using efficient
symmetric operations. In particular, the server sends a set of secret shares, built
according to the server’s policy, to the client such that the latter can rebuild the secret
only if the client’s set is qualified. Although in general we can use any PSI with data
transfer protocol (e. g., Freedman et al. [94]), OBI is chosen here because of its efficiency.
OBI is very efficient due to the fact that it relies mostly on symmetric operations.
While the performance of OBI can be further improved by the modifications proposed
by Pinkas et al. [169], based on hash table plus oblivious transfer that is more efficient
than OBI, the new PSI protocol cannot be used in our case because it does not support
data transfer.
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An overview of the SPC protocol is depicted in Fig. 10. Let f = (V ,ΓV) be the
server’s policy defined over its set V and I be the client’s set. The two parties want
to check f(I), i. e. whether I satisfies f . Both parties get a collision resistant hash
function H, security parameter λ, and prime p of length λ as common input. The
server can map policy f into a set of secret shares S by first choosing a random secret s
from Zp. Then S generates LSSS matrix M and the mapping function ρ from policy f ,
and computes shares for s. Each share si ∈ S is associated with an element ρ(i) ∈ V .
Depending on the policy, it is possible that an element in sj ∈ V is associated with
multiple shares, i. e. there exist multiple rows i in M such that ρ(i) = sj. In this case,
the server concatenates all si associated with sj so that S still has cardinality |V|. The
two parties then run the OBI protocol with the server using (V ,S) and the client using
I as their inputs. In the OBI protocol, the server’s garbled Bloom filter is built using
elements in V as keys and shares in S as data items. The data items to be transferred
in OBI must be at least λ-bits and of equal length. We assume a proper scheme (e. g.,
zero padding) to pad elements in S to the correct length. At the end of the OBI
protocol the client gets a set of shares {si|ρ(i) ∈ V ∩ I}. If I satisfies policy f , then
the shares obtained from the OBI protocol will allow the client to reconstruct secret s,
otherwise the client learns nothing about s and aborts. In the last step, by proving
knowledge of secret s, the client can convince the server that its set is compliant with
policy f .
5.1.2 Example
To facilitate understanding of SPC we give a short example of the protocol in Figure 10.
Let f = (V ,ΓV) = (V1∪V2, (t1, t2)) = ({a, b}∪{A,B}, (1, 1)) denote the server’s policy.
This translate to; an authorised set must contain at least one element from {a, b} and
one element from {A,B}, i. e. |I ∩ V1| ≥ t1 and |I ∩ V2| ≥ t1. The server chooses a
random element s ∈R Zp. Now the server generates an appropriate matrix M and
function ρ for f as follows. First we can rewrite f as boolean formula (a∨ b)∧ (A∨B)
or ((a, b, 1), (A,B, 1), 2), which is the format used as input to the algorithm by Cao
et al. [65]. The algorithm is used to transform the policy into matrix M :
M =
1 1
1 2
 L =
 (a, b, 1)
(A,B, 1)
 M =

1 1
1 1
1 2
 L =

a
b
(A,B, 1)

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M =

1 1
1 1
1 2
1 2
 L =

a
b
A
B

Function ρ(i) is given by ρ(1) = a, ρ(2) = b, ρ(3) = A, ρ(4) = B. Matrix M and
function ρ is sent to the client. For the OBI protocol the server further prepares
Vd = (s1, s2, s3, s4) with secret shares s1 = s2 ∈R Zp and s3 = s4 = 2s1 − s (according
to M). Execution of the OBI protocol provides the client with shares si for all
{si|ρ(i) ∈ V ∩I}, i. e. all elements that are in the client’s set I as well as in the server’s
set V. If the client retrieves a qualified set of shares, i. e. s1 and (s3 or s4), or s2 and
(s3 or s4), he can reconstruct s, e. g., s = 2s1 − s3 and thus prove to the server that his
set is policy compliant.
5.1.3 Security Analysis
Lemma 2 (Correctness). Let I and V denote sets from some universe and f = (V ,ΓV).
Assuming the used OBI and LSSS algorithms are correct, then the SPC protocol from
Fig. 10 is correct, i. e. honest execution of the protocol with f(I) = true is accepted
by the server with overwhelming probability.
Proof. Assuming correct LSSS and OBI, correctness can be proved by the following
argument. LSSS guarantees correct sharing of secret s, i. e. for any authorised set
Vi ∈ ΓV there is a set of shares associated with the elements in Vi that can reconstruct s
and for any other set the secret cannot be reconstructed. OBI guarantees that for each
element in the intersection of V ∩ I, the client is able to obtain the share associated
with it. All elements in I that are not in the intersection are irrelevant as by definition
they are not in V thus not in any authorised set. Then the client can reconstruct s iff
there exists a subset of V ∩ I that is an authorised set. If there is such an authorised
set then f(I) = true. Eventually, the hash value ms is the same on the client and
server if the same key s, transcript trans, and participants identifiers C and S are
used.
Lemma 3 (Privacy). Let I and V denote sets from some universe, f = (V ,ΓV) a
policy and fSPC(I, f) = (f(I), f(I)). If the OBI protocol is secure and the LSSS is
correct, the SPC protocol from Figure 10 securely realises fSPC in the presence of a
malicious server or client.
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Proof. For the security proof we consider an ideal OBI function fOBI, i. e. show
computational indistinguishability between the world hybridfOBIΠ,A(z)(x, y) and ideal
world idealfSPC,B(z)(x, y) to prove security. First, since we are in the hybridfOBI world,
every OBI operation and message is forwarded to the OBI functionality fOBI. Since we
only require LSSS correctness here, we do not use the ideal functionality. In the following
we show that the hybrid world hybridfOBIΠ,A(z) is computationally indistinguishable from
idealfSPC,B(z) and hence the real world realΠ,A(z). We give a simulator BS(z) that
simulates a malicious server in the ideal world. Note that we omit auxiliary input z
if not needed. We build BS that on input of the server’s policy f , and access to the
real world adversary AS that plays server S, generates viewS that is indistinguishable
from viewAS of AS .
BS starts by invoking server AS with f and z to receive share-generating matrix
M and ρ and policy f ′ from adversary AS in the first protocol message. Then as input
to the OBI functionality BS receives the server’s OBI input from AS , i. e. a set V ′ and
shares Vd = {si}. BS then sends V ′ to the trusted party. If the trusted party replies
with ⊥, the simulation terminates and BS outputs whatever AS outputs. If the trusted
party replies with true, simulator BS generates a set I with f ′(I) = true based on
f ′ and V ′. If the trusted party replies with false, simulator BS generates a set I
with f(I) = false based on f ′ and V ′. Building I from V ′ and f ′ is straightforward.
BS sends client and server input to the OBI functionality to retrieve the server’s and
client’s view on the OBI execution. Further, BS tries to recover s from the output
of fOBI using the combination algorithm of LSSS. If the client can reconstruct s, BS
generates ms using M,ρ, f ′ and V ′, the (simulated) OBI transcript, s, C, and S and
sends it to AS . Otherwise, if BS cannot recover s from the fOBI output, it terminates
the session with ⊥. Eventually BS outputs the transcript and whatever AS returns on
terminating as viewS .
We claim that the output of an honest client in the ideal execution is indistinguish-
able from the client’s output in the real world. This is easy to see as the client always
receives f and the possibility to compute f(I) using either the public server set V,
or the output of the OBI/fOBI execution. Note that the evaluation of f depends on
the set used by AS in the OBI execution (V ′). Since this strategy is the same in the
real and the ideal world, the claim follows. Indistinguishability of viewS and viewAS
follows from the following observations. If the server’s input to OBI is not correct, the
protocol terminates. It is easy to see that the transcript containing f,M, ρ, and V,
and the OBI execution in viewS and viewAS is identical. Since the input to the hash
function H is equivalent in both worlds, viewS and viewAS are indistinguishable.
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Lemma 3 proves that the SPC protocol ensures client privacy, i. e. SPC does not leak
any information about the client’s set. We now give a lemma to show soundness of our
SPC protocol that concludes the security analysis of the proposed SPC protocol.
Lemma 4 (Soundness). Let I and V denote sets from some universe and f = (V ,ΓV)
a policy. Assuming the used OBI and LSSS algorithms are secure and H is collision
resistant, then the SPC protocol from Fig. 10 is sound in the presence of a malicious
client, i. e. the server accepts the protocol with negligible probability if f(I) ̸= true.
Proof. Lemma 4 can be proven by showing that convincing S to accept the protocol
despite the fact that f(I) ̸= true implies a collision in H. First, it is clear that the
attacker is not able to recover the correct secret s from the OBI interaction with S
since this would break either OBI or LSSS security. Now it follows directly that any
attacker that is able to generate a message ms such that ms = H(s, C,S, trans) found
a collision in H as it does not know the correct secret s.
5.1.4 Applications
While SPC can be used in many different scenarios, it will be detailed for use in
password-policy checks in order to build BPR protocols in Section 5.2. Before that we
want to give some ideas of other SPC use-cases. Note that these applications might
have additional requirements on the used sets (such as authorised sets or secret server
sets) we do not detail here. These are possible applications of SPC and would require
further rigorous analysis before usage.
Policy checks for Access Control In a role-based access control scenario [87] a
user has to have a certain role (or combination of roles) in order to access a resource.
SPC can be used in this case to verify whether a client has necessary roles that allow
it to access the resource. The server in this case defines V to contain identifiers for all
allowed roles Vi and ΓV according to the access policy. The user’s set I contains the
client’s role identifiers ci. Access should be granted if and only if the SPC protocol is
successful, i. e. the user can convince the server that he has all necessary roles.
Policies for Friendship Analysis One popular application of set based protocols
is friendship analysis. This test should determine whether two parties become friends
or not depending on the number of mutual friends. SPC can be used in this scenario
as a very efficient alternative while increasing privacy. Using SPC further allows to
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build subsets in friend sets, such as colleagues, family etc., which in turn makes the
friendship-test more “accurate” while leaking as little information about the friendship
relations as possible.
Genome Testing Baldi et al. [19] propose protocols to perform privacy preserving
genome testing, such as paternity tests. The tests can often be reduced to check a
set of Single Nucleotide Polymorphism that are present in a patient’s genome against
some predefined sets. Although it is not exactly policy checking, SPC can be used in
this setting too.
5.2 SPC-based Blind Password Registration
The connection between Set-based Policy Checking and password policies is easy to
see, since password policies are defined in terms of thresholds and subsets over an
alphabet, which is a set of characters. We can use the algorithm proposed by Cao et al.
[65] to translate such threshold access structures efficiently into MSPs. It is also not
difficult to see how SPC can be applied in the password policy checking setting, since
a password can be seen as a set of characters as described in Section 1.4.
5.2.1 The Password Registration Protocol
An overview of the proposed password registration protocol is given in Fig. 11. To
simplify the presentation, we assume the protocol is run over a secure channel, e. g.,
implemented as a server authenticated TLS channel. The secure channel will address
common network-based attacks such as replay, eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle.
The server publishes its password policy f = (V ,ΓV) where V is a set transformed from
alphabet Σ according to Section 1.4 and ΓV is a threshold access structure defined over
V. Other public parameters include security parameter λ, a pseudorandom function
family fk, and three hash functions H1, H2, and H3. The client has a private password
pwd which will be used in the protocol as its input, i. e. we assume the client received
policy f already and entered an appropriate password pwd ∈ Df . The protocol has
two phases, a setup phase and a policy checking phase. In the setup phase the client
commits to its password, and each party blinds its set. The blinded sets are then
used in the policy checking phase. In the policy checking phase, the server checks the
password policy with a secure SPC protocol using the blinded sets.
The protocol proceeds as follows. In the setup phase, the server runs the RSA key
generation algorithm on input of security parameter λ to generate an RSA key pair
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pk = (e,N), sk = (d,N) using KGen(λ). The public key is sent to the client while the
secret key is kept private. Upon receiving the server’s public key pk = (e,N), the
client’s first step is to compute a key k = H1(pwd) for the pseudorandom function by
hashing the password using H1. The client uses the password pre-processing function
PwdMap to generate I ← PwdMap(pwd) and to compute ri = fk(i) and ui = H2(ci) · rei
for each ci ∈ I. The result (u1, . . . , uv) is sent to the server. For each i ∈ [1, v]
the server computes u′i = udi and returns (u′1, . . . , u′v) back to the client. Eventually,
upon receiving (u′1, . . . , u′v), the client creates an empty set Iˆ and for i ∈ [1, v] puts
u′i ·r−1i = (H2(ci))d into Iˆ. The server also creates an empty set Vˆ and for i ∈ [1, w] puts
(H2(si))d into Vˆ. The set Vˆ is partitioned into m subsets according to the character
classes. The server also generates fˆ from f by replacing V with Vˆ . The policy checking
phase is essentially an execution of the SPC protocol using Iˆ and fˆ as inputs. At
the end of the SPC protocol the server learns whether the client’s password satisfies
the policy or not. If the SPC execution is successful, the server computes the hash of
the product of the client’s ui values h← H3(∏vi=1 ui), and stores the password verifier
ver = (h, e,N, d,u), where (e,N, d) is the RSA key pair from the setup phase and
u = {u1, . . . , uv} is the vector of client “commitments”. Note that storing (d,u) as
part of ver is only a technical necessity in order to prove security. Further note that
it is important for e in KGen is chosen uniformly at random here. (Usually e is set
216 + 1 in real world implementation due to efficiency reasons. This however would
break the protocol as ui could be pre-computed in this case and thus enable more
efficient attacks than brute-force dictionary attacks.)
Password Length Hiding (Enhanced Protocol) The protocol in Figure 11 leaks
the password length to the server. By counting the number of blinded characters ui,
the server learns the password length v. This is intentional because this peripheral
information leakage allows the server to efficiently enforce the minimal password length
in the policy. However, in cases where the password length is considered sensitive, it
can be hidden from the server at small additional cost. (This is is contrast to the BPR
protocol proposed in the previous section, where it is expensive to achieve this.)
The client generates a set I ′ ⊆ I and uses it in the setup phase to generate Iˆ. I ′
contains only significant characters to fulfil f . That is, the client first takes characters
from I according to character class Ai and threshold ti, and puts them in I ′. If the
size of I ′ is smaller than the minimal password length nmin, the client pads it with
other characters in I that are not in I ′ yet. In the setup phase, the client only uses
characters in I ′ and obtains the corresponding Iˆ. In this process, the server learns
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Client C Server S
Input: f, pwd Input: f,V = {s1, . . . , sw}
Setup Phase
k ← H1(pwd) (e,N)←−−−−−−−− (e, d,N) $← KGen(λ)
I ← PwdMap(pwd)
∀i ∈ [1, v] : ri ← fk(i)
ui ← H2(ci) · rei
(u1, · · · , uv)−−−−−−−−→ abort if v < nmin
Iˆ = ∅ (u
′
1, · · · , u′v)←−−−−−−−− ∀i ∈ [1, v] : u′i = udi ; Vˆ = ∅
∀i ∈ [1, v] : Iˆ ∪ u′i · r−1i ∀i ∈ [1, w] : Vˆ ∪ (H2(si))d
fˆ ← f, Vˆ
Policy Checking Phase
Iˆ → Run SPC← fˆ
If SPC is successful
store verifier
(H3(
∏v
i=1 ui), e, N, d,u)
Fig. 11: Password Registration using secure SPC
the size of I ′ and can check whether this is equal to the minimal password length nmin
required by the policy. The client then uses this Iˆ in the policy checking phase to
convince the server about the password complexity. If the server accepts, all characters
in I \I ′ that have not been sent to the server are put into an additional u∗ = rev+1 ·
∏
ui
with ri ← fk(i), ui ← H2(ci) · rei for ci ∈ I \I ′. This value u∗ is then sent to the server
and is multiplied with the other ui values the server received in the setup phase. This
product is then used to generate verifier ver, i. e. ver← (H3(rev+1
∏v
i=1 ui), e, N, d,u).
Note that we require rev+1 as a multiplicand when computing u∗. Without this, the
server could learn the client’s password length when I \I ′ = ∅ because the client would
have nothing to send in this case.
5.2.2 Security Analysis
We now analyse the security of the BPR protocol. Recall that in the password
registration protocol, the two parties have different security requirements. For the
server, privacy is not a concern since its input, the policy, is public. On the other hand,
the server cares about the soundness of the protocol because an unsound protocol
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would allow a user to register a password that is not policy compliant. For the client,
privacy is the main concern while soundness is not. Since the policy is public, the client
can check the policy by itself and can detect if the server cheats. We therefore refrain
from using an over-complicated security definition and use the following comprehensible
security model. Note that the BPR model from Section 4 is not usable for this protocol
(cf. Section 6.1 for more details). Let ver ← ϕ(pwd, r) denote a password verifier,
computed from a password pwd and some randomness r, and PwdMap(pwd) a function
to generate set I from password pwd.
1. Privacy: A malicious server must not be able to retrieve more information from
the protocol than the password verifier and the result of the policy verification,
i. e. the protocol must implement the functionality fΠ = (f(I), (f(I), ver)).
Furthermore, the verifier must not give a malicious server advantage in terms of
dictionary attacks.
2. Soundness: The server accepts a password verifier ver← ϕ(pwd, r) if and only
if (i) the password is compliant with the server’s policy, i. e. f(I) = true for
I ← PwdMap(pwd), and (ii) the verifier is uniquely defined by the password
and some server known randomness, i. e. there exists no password pwd′ ̸= pwd
such that ϕ(pwd′, r) = ver and it is not possible to find randomness r′ ̸= r in
polynomial time such that ϕ(pwd, r′) = ver.
In the following we show that the enhanced version of the previously defined protocol
satisfies those properties. Note that the simple version satisfies the same properties
but in a weaker version, i. e. we would have to replace dictionary Df in Lemma 5
with Df,|pwd|, where Df,|pwd| denotes the dictionary that contains all passwords of size
|pwd| that are policy compliant with respect to f . Note that H2 has to be modelled as
random oracle here in order to use the one-more RSA assumption. For the other two
hash functions H1 and H3 it is sufficient to assume collision resistance.
Lemma 5 (Privacy). If fk is a secure pseudorandom function family, H1 is collision
resistant, H2 a random oracle, and the one-more RSA assumption holds in the used
group, the enhanced password registration protocol offers privacy with respect to a
malicious server and dictionary Df .
Proof. We first show that the server is simulatable, i. e. the protocol realises the
functionality fΠ, and then show that the verifier ver is of no help when performing a
dictionary attack.
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We start with the simulation by building a simulator BS , simulating a malicious
server. BS starts by invoking adversary AS with (P,V) that is playing the role of server
S in the protocol, and is provided with (e,N) as a result. Using (e,N), BS generates
(u1, . . . , ul) as ui = αirei for αi ∈R Z∗N , ri ← fH1(pwd)(i), and some l = nmin where
pwd ∈ Df , and returns it to AS . The random oracle H2 is honestly simulated by BS .
After receiving (u′1, . . . , u′l) the simulator builds Iˆ according to protocol specification
and uses it together with fˆ , which is provided by AS , to simulate the SPC execution.
Eventually, BS gives the result of the SPC execution as well as u∗ ∈R Z∗N to AS and
outputs whatever AS returns on termination. It is easy to see that the client’s view
after the protocol is identical in the real and ideal world as the protocol execution
is correct and all server values despite d are public. Further, the adversary’s view is
computationally indistinguishable from the simulator’s output since all client messages
have the same distribution in both worlds.
To see that a malicious server is not able to use the values retrieved in the protocol
to perform a dictionary attack over Df more efficient than without executing the
protocol, i. e. we show that the adversary is not able to perform an attack on the
retrieved elements ui, i ∈ [1, l] and u∗ that contain information about the password,
which is faster than a dictionary attack over Df . Since the client is essentially creating
blind RSA signatures on H2(ci) in ui, those values are indistinguishable from random
elements. While this would be true in the statistical sense if ri would be chosen
uniformly at random, this is not the case here. However, it is easy to see that in order
to verify an element ui, the server has to compute ri, which either requires an offline
dictionary attack on Df to compute k ← H1(pwd), or yields either a collision in H1 or
breaks pseudorandomness in fk. Therefore, the fastest way for a server to retrieve the
password is to perform an offline dictionary attack on Df .
Lemma 6 (Soundness). The enhanced password registration protocol is sound with
respect to a malicious client under the one-more RSA assumption if H1 and H3 are
collision resistant hash functions, and H2 a random oracle.
Proof. First note that the used SPC protocol is secure and therefore guarantees that
the server accepts iff the elements in Iˆ are compliant with policy f with respect to Vˆ .
We therefore only have to show that (i) the client is not able to use different elements
in I than in Iˆ, i. e. the password pwd actually satisfies f , and (ii) the password verifier
ver is uniquely defined by (pwd, e, N, d,u), i. e. there exists no password pwd′ ≠ pwd
that generates the same verifier as pwd and it is not possible to find randomness
(e′, N ′, d′) ̸= (e,N, d) in polynomial time that generates the same verifier as (e,N, d).
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(i) We claim that the mapping from I to Iˆ is an injective function such that the
client is not able to build Iˆ from a password pwd′ ̸= pwd. The elements in Iˆ have the
form cˆi = (H2(ci))d where d is the server’s secret RSA key. If the attacker is able to
generate cˆi = (H2(ci))d from ci ̸∈ I, we can use it to build a successful attacker on the
one-more RSA assumption.
(ii) We claim that the password verifier ver = (H3(rev+1
∏v
i=1 ui), e, N, d,u) is
uniquely identified by (pwd, e, N, d,u). In this case we assume the client chose a policy
compliant password pwd and performed the protocol honestly. The claim is easy to
see since H3(rev+1
∏v
i=1 ui) = H3
(
fH1(pwd)(v + 1)e ·
∏v
i=1
(
H2(ci) · fH1(pwd)(i)
))
. We can
in particular either find collisions in H1 or H3, or distinguish between fk and a random
function.
6 Blind Password Registration — Discussion and
Analysis
Sections 3-5 propose three password registration protocols with different security
guarantees and performance. In this section we compare all three protocols considering
security and performance.
6.1 Security
The ZKPPC-based approach has no formal security model for the password registration
protocol. However, it is clear (as discussed before) that it does not fulfil the security
model proposed for BPR protocols in Section 4 but requires a weaker definition. While
the SPC-based approach has a security model, it differs from the BPR security model
proposed in Section 4. It thus remains to compare security guarantees given by the
BPR protocol in Section 4 with guarantees from the SPC-based approach. We call
these protocols BPR1 and BPR2 respectively in the following.
First note that BPR2 seems not provable in the game-based security model BPR1
is proven in. This is due to the impression that the reduction to the one-more RSA
problem does not work as elaborated in the following. The proof idea would be to
say that the client is only able to register a non-compliant password if he is able to
break one-more RSA, i. e. by creating an element in Iˆ that was not sent to the server
in any ui. The problem is that the challenger has to build Vˆ and therefore breaks
the ability to actually generate that forgery. Alternatively, using only the requested
elements in Vˆ allows the client to create a forgery, but lets the protocol fail because
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the client uses elements in Iˆ that are not in Vˆ . Therefore BPR2 is proven secure in a
new simulation-based security model instead of the game-based model from Section 4.
Proving BPR1 in turn secure in the simulation-based model from the previous section
seems feasible using the ZKP’s simulators. This is however requires a more thorough
analysis and is left open for future work.
Further, BPR2 has with the one-more RSA assumption and the random oracle model
much stronger assumptions on the model than BPR1. This leads to the conclusion
that BPR1 is the preferable protocol when strong security guarantees are required.
6.2 Performance & Implementation
While the BPR protocol from Section 4 has stronger security guarantees than the
SPC-based BPR protocol, performance of the SPC-based BPR protocol is significantly
better as discussed in the following. However, password registration is a task that is
performed rarely, such that it is acceptable for it to take a noticeable time. This is in
contrast to authentication, which is performed regularly and thus has to have execution
time that is not noticeable by the user. (All code from this section is available at
https://www.franziskuskiefer.de/data/thesis-src.zip.)
6.2.1 Performance
We first compare the two zero-knowledge-based BPR protocols from Section 3 and 4.
In the implementation of both protocols one can adopt several tricks aiming to improve
performance. First, we can pre-compute and reuse values gπi on client and server side.
Further, computation of bi can be performed in a way that allows to re-use previously
calculated values and the implementation of the proof can be optimised allowing the
client to use π. Considering this, we can estimate performance of the BPR protocol
by counting the number of exponentiations as follows. Note that we do not count
exponentiations with small exponents. The client in the BPR protocol has to perform
about 4n+ 2∑i |ωi|+ 113 exponentiations. (About 4n exponentations are needed to
compute commitments and the PoS; 2∑i |ωi| exponentations are needed for the PoM,
i. e. in the number of characters and size of significant sets; and 113 corresponds to the
remaining exponentations used throughout the client side of the algorithm.) The server
must perform 5n+ 2∑i |ωi|+ 16 exponentiations if gπi is pre-computed and re-used.
(The number of exponentations is computes similar to the one on the client side, i. e.
the first factor accounts for PoS and PoE, the second one for PoM, and the last
for the remaining exponentations throughout the protocol.) In contrast, the generic
6 Blind Password Registration — Discussion and Analysis 99
approach for ZKPPC requires 3n + 3∑i(|ω∗i | − 1) + 7 exponentiations on the client
side and 3∑i |ω∗i |+ 8 on the server side. Note that ω∗i in the ZKPPC context depends
on the maximum password length and thus contains all characters from ωi plus all
characters from ωi shifted by j = 1, . . . , nmax positions. (The number of exponentations
in the case of ZKPPC are dominated by the PoM execution, which is responsible
for the factor that includes ω∗i . The client has to compute commitments in addition,
which is reflected in the first factor.) Therefore, the cost of a ZKPPC-based password
registration protocol is given by 3n+2nmax
∑
i(|ωi|−1)+7 exponentiations on the client
side and 2nmax
∑
i |ωi|+ 8 on the server side. A ZKPPC-based password registration
protocol is thus much less efficient than the BPR protocol from Section 4: in the optimal
case where n = nmax the difference can be estimated by 2(n− 1)∑i |ωi| − 2n2−n− 106
additional exponentiations for the client and 2(n − 1)∑i |ωi| − 5n − 8 additional
exponentiations for the server.
The SPC-based BPR protocol from Section 5 is based on mainly symmetric prim-
itives, which yields a significant lower complexity. In particular, the server in the
SPC-based BPR protocol has to perform nmin + |V| exponentiations where the size
of the server set |V| is ∑i xi|ωi| for xi being the number of characters required from
subset ωi. The client performs n exponentiations. We refrain from counting symmetric
operations as they do not have significant impact on the performance. (Client and
server only need to comput exponentiations in the SPC-based BPR to compute ui and
u′i, i. e. perform blind RSA signatures and prepare the server’s set.)
6.2.2 Implementation
We implemented a prototypes of all three password registration protocols and measured
their real world performance. The implementations are in C and use OpenSSL 1.0.2.c-
14 for underlying cryptographic operations. In the experiments, we set the security
parameter to 80-bit and use 1024-bit RSA keys and SHA-1. The two zero-knowledge-
based protocols use the NIST P-192 elliptic curve [161]. All experiments were run on a
laptop with an Intel Core Duo P8600 at 2.40GHz with 8GB RAM.
The running time of the protocols is shown in Table 2. We measured the running
time with different policies and password lengths. The passwords are printable ASCII
strings. The alphabet is partitioned into the four usual classes: digits, lower case,
upper case and symbols. We used three policies P1, P2 and P4 in the experiments,
which require at least one, two and four characters in all character classes respectively.
In the first row of the table, the pairs indicate the policy and the password length that
4https://www.openssl.org
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(P1, 10) (P2, 10) (P4, 20) (P2, 20) (P2, 40)
Total Pol-ck Total Pol-ck Total Pol-ck Total Pol-ck Total Pol-ck
ZKPPC (Section 3) 14,461 14,453 8,264 8,257 41,594 41,578 72,993 72,976 499,070 499,028
BPR (Section 4) 1,216 1,204 682 672 1,365 1,346 2,314 2,296 5,569 5,533
SPC (Section 5) 132 5 247 11 489 23 266 11 300 11
Table 2: Protocol Performance (Running Time in Milliseconds)
(P1, 10) (P2, 10) (P4, 20) (P2, 20) (P2, 40)
BPR ZKPPC BPR ZKPPC BPR ZKPPC BPR ZKPPC BPR ZKPPC
PoM 1,144 14,449 614 8,252 1,234 41,573 2,183 72,971 5,290 499,023
PoE/PoC 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
PoS 55 - 53 - 108 - 107 - 238 -
Table 3: Proof Performance (Running Time in Milliseconds)
were used in the experiment, e. g., (P1, 10) means policy P1 is used and the password
was 10 characters long.
The table shows the total running time as well as the time spent on checking the
policies (Pol-ck) in each protocol. As expected, the ZKPPC approach is significantly
slower than the two BPR protocols. The main differences in all protocols comes from
the policy checking time. Differences between the general ZKPPC approach and BPR
come from the set membership proofs and therefore differ depending on the password
length and its relation to the password policy. Table 3 gives a more detailed overview
on ZKPPC and BPR performance with timings for each individual zero-knowledge
proof (PoM, PoE/PoC, PoS), again showing that the time for both approaches is
dominated by the proof of membership and that the PoM proofs in the BPR protocol
are significantly more efficient (due to the smaller set size). The measurements further
show that the actual time needed for policy checking in the SPC-based BPR protocol
is indeed independent of the password length (it depends on the password policy as
everything else is negligible).
Discussion SPC-based BPR The time for computing ui and u′i is linear in the
password length, and the time for computing Sˆ and executing SPC is linear in the
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size of Sˆ. The most costly step is in the setup phase when the server computes the
encrypted version of the alphabet Sˆ. A possible optimisation is to take this step offline.
Since the computation of Sˆ does not depend on the client’s password, the server can
generate a random RSA key pair and pre-compute Sˆ before engaging with the client.
The keys and pre-computed values can be stored together. Later when a client sends a
registration request, the server can retrieve them and run the protocol. If this step is
taken offline, then the online computation cost is very small.
7 Password Authenticated Key Exchange for BPR
Password verifiers ver, set up with one of the three password registration protocols
proposed in the previous sections, can be used by the server to authenticate a user based
on his password pwd. To this end this section describes VPAKE protocols that can be
used with each verifier ver. This concludes description of the password registration
and authentication framework, proposed in this chapter.
7.1 Building VPAKE from PAKE
Before specifying a concrete VPAKE protocol we want to discuss a general way of
constructing VPAKE-like protocols from any PAKE, discuss its security, and why it
might not be the best approach. Note that the approach discussed here is used but
has never been written down and discussed as such to the best of our knowledge.
Figure 12 gives an overview of this straight forward approach. Recall that a verifier
ver contains two parts, some randomness r and some kind of hash value H that can
be computed from the client’s password pwd and randomness r. In order to use verifier
ver for authentication, the client first has to retrieve randomness r from the server.
After sending r to the client, C can compute ver, which can then be used any regular
PAKE protocol instead of the password. It may also be desirable to use a standard key
derivation function such as PBKDF2 [125] on top of H such that the key is derived
by repeatedly applying a pseudorandom function and the added work load makes
dictionary attack more difficult. Often it is possible to piggyback the first message to
retrieve randomness r on a regular PAKE message to avoid increasing communication
round. Using the UC-secure PAKE protocol by Benhamouda et al. [30] for example,
the randomness can be piggybacked on the first server message sent in the PAKE
protocol. Thus we do not increase the round complexity and the protocol remains a
one-round protocol.
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Client C Server S
Input: pwd Input: C, ver = (H, r)
ver = (H, r)← ϕ(pwd, r) r←−−−−−−−−−−
PAKE on H←−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 12: Not a real VPAKE protocol
Discussion – Practical Implications Sending verifier randomness to the client
obviously exposes this randomness to an attacker. While transport could be secured
with another protocol such as TLS, this is not desirable in the PAKE setting. (This is
fine though in the PACCE setting.) Exposing (secret) randomness to an attacker is in
general a security risk, as this provides the attacker with leverage. However, in terms
of dictionary attacks, an attacker does not gain anything by this additional knowledge,
as he is always able to either perform an online dictionary attack against the server, or
and offline dictionary attack after corrupting the server.
Security Discussion The VPAKE protocol from Figure 12 resembles a common
way of constructing what is informally considered a VPAKE protocol such as tSoke
(described in Section 2.3.2). While it is a secure PAKE protocol, it is in general
not compatible with the security model for VPAKE from Section 2.3.2 and offers
PAKE security guarantees instead of VPAKE. When an attacker corrupts server S
and retrieves verifier ver for client C, the attacker is able to log on to S, i. e. perform
a successful VPAKE execution with S, and thus win the VPAKE security experiment.
While this would be ok in the PAKE setting (looking at AKE security the adversary
can compute the session key anyway), this renders a protocol insecure in the VPAKE
model (and the real world). Using a VPAKE protocol for authentication allows an
attacker to authenticate towards the server without breaking the password hash first,
i. e. rendering the purposed of storing randomised hash values void. However, VPAKE
protocols such as the one proposed by Benhamouda and Pointcheval [31] as well as the
new instantiation proposed in the following section are secure in this context as well.
This is because the client actually has to know the password and the verifier in order
to authenticate (not just the authenticator as in the protocol from Figure 12).
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7.2 A New VPAKE Protocol
We now propose a new VPAKE protocol where server S uses ver stored from the
BPR protocol in Section 4 to authenticate client C using password pwd. The proto-
col is constructed from the general VPAKE framework introduced by Benhamouda
and Pointcheval [31] rather than the framework from Figure 12, which results in
a secure VPAKE protocol. Their framework constructs one-round VPAKE proto-
cols with C and S sending one message each, independently, using a generic pass-
word hashing scheme (PSetup, PPHSalt, PPreHash, PHSalt, PHashP) with deterministic
PPreHash, labelled public key encryption scheme (KGen, Enc, Dec), and secure SPHFs
(KGenH, KGenP, Hash, PHash) for two languages LH = {(ℓ, C)|∃r : C = Encpkℓ,H; r)}
and Ls,H = {(ℓ, C)|∃P, ∃r : C = Encpk(ℓ,H; r) ∧ H = PHashP(pP, P, s)}. Their
approach can directly be used for the password hashing scheme proposed in Section
2 with randomised PPreHash if we assume that Ls,H is defined using s = (sP , sH).
This readily gives us a generic VPAKE protocol that is suitable for BPR construction
in Section 4 such that security follows from the analysis of the framework in [31].
Note that the protocol proposed by [31] is the first and only VPAKE protocol with a
thorough security model such that comparison with other VPAKE protocls is pointless.
For the concrete VPAKE construction based on our password hashing scheme from
Section 2 we can use labelled CS encryption scheme. The common input of C and S
contains the CS public key pk = (p, g1, g2, h, c, d,Hk), where generators g1 = g and h
must be the same as in the BPR protocol. Since H = (H1, H2) we need to slightly
update language LH = {(ℓ, C)|∃r : C = EncCSpk (ℓ,H2; r)} by using H2 as message.
We can still use the SPHF for CS ciphertexts from Section 3.7 to handle this LH .
Since the pre-hash salt sP is not transmitted in the registration phase, i. e. S stores
(id,H, sH) where H = (H1, H2) with H1 = gsP1 and H2 = Hπ1 hsH , we replace Ls,H with
the following language LsH ,H = {(ℓ, C)|∃π,∃r : C = EncEGpk (ℓ, gπ1 ; r) ∧ H2 = Hπ1 hsH}
and construct a suitable SPHF for LsH ,H as follows:
• KGenH(LsH ,H) generates kh = (η1, η2, θ, µ, ν) ∈R Z1×5p .
• KGenP(kh, LsH ,H) derives kp = (hp1, hp2, hp3) = (g
η1
1 g
θ
2h
µcν , gη21 d
ν , gµ1H
−µ
1 ).
• Hash(kh, LsH ,H , C) outputs hash value h = u
η1+ξη2
1 u
θ
2[e/(H2h−sH )]µvν .
• PHash(kp, LsH ,H , C, π, r) outputs hash value
h = (hp1hp2ξ)rhp3π = gη1r1 gθr2 hµrcνrg
η2ξr
1 d
νξr(gµ1H−µ1 )π.
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Client C Server S
Input: pk,S, π Input: pk, C, ver = (H1, H2, sH)
kh ← KGenH(LH) kh′ ← KGenH(LsH ,H)
kp ← KGenP(kh, LH) kp′ ← KGenP(kh′, LsH ,H)
r ∈R Zp; ℓ = (id,S, kp) r′ ∈R Zp; ℓ′ = (S, id, kp′)
C ← Encℓ(pk, gπ1 ; r) C ′ ← Encℓ′(pk, H2; r′)
kp, C−−−−−−−−−−→
kp′, C ′, H1, sH←−−−−−−−−−−
ℓ′ = (S, id, kp′); H2 ← Hπ1 hsH ℓ = (id,S, kp)
K1 ← Hash(kh, LH , C ′); K1 ← PHash(kp, LH , C ′, r′)
K2 ← PHash(kp′, LsH ,H , C, π, r) K2 ← Hash(kh′, LsH ,H , C)
K ← K1 ·K2 K ← K1 ·K2
Fig. 13: A VPAKE Protocol for Passwords registered with ZKPPC-based approaches
Note that projection key kp depends on H1 ∈ G, which can be seen as a parameter in
the definition of LsH ,H , but kp does not depend on C. The resulting VPAKE protocol
can thus still proceed in one round. The smoothness of our SPHF construction for
LsH ,H can be shown as follows. Let π ← PWDtoINT(pwd), H2 = Hπ1 hsH , with H1 = gsP1
for some unknown sP , and (ℓ, C = (u1, u2, e, v)) ̸∈ LsH ,H , i.e. C ← Encℓ(pk, gπ∗1 ; r)
for some π∗ ̸= π. Assuming the second pre-image resistance of the password hashing
scheme it follows that (u1, uξ1, u2, e/(H2h−sH ), v) ̸= (gr1, grξ1 , gr2, gπ−sP π1 hr, (cdξ)r) with
overwhelming probability for all (r, rξ) ∈ Z2p. Since (hp1, hp2, hp3) are linearly indepen-
dent the resulting hash value h = uη11 uξη21 uθ2[e/(H2h−sH )]µvν is uniformly distributed in
G.
Our concrete VPAKE construction is illustrated in Figure 13. We assume that C
uses π ← PWDtoINT(pwd) as its input and has already sent its login name id to S who
picked the corresponding tuple (id, ver) from its password database. Note that C can
also act as initiator and send its id as part of its message, in which case S must act as
a responder. Which SPHF algorithms KGenH, KGenP, Hash, PHash are used by C and S
is visible from the input language, either LH or LsH ,H . By inspection one can see that
if both C and S follow the protocol and H used on the server side is a password hash
of π used on the client side then both parties compute the same (secret) group element
K = K1 ·K2. Note that C derives K1 using its own hashing key kh and the server’s
CS ciphertext C ′ that encrypts H2, whereas S derives K1 using the client’s projection
8 Demo 105
key kp, its own C ′, and r′. Similarly, S derives K2 using its own hashing key kh′ and
received client’s CS ciphertext C that encrypts gπ1 , whereas C derives K2 using the
server’s projection key kp′, its own C, and r. Security of this VPAKE protocol follows
from the security of the generic scheme.
8 Demo
To demonstrate real-world usage of the framework proposed in this Chapter we imple-
mented a demo application that allows to set password policies, register clients, and
use the registered clients to login to a web application.
The cryptographic password framework consists of a server and a client component.
The server is implemented in Python5 (using the bottle framework6) with a MariaDB7
backend for data storage. The client is implemented in JavaScript8 as a Firefox9
extension. This approach has the advantage of platform independence, but trades some
efficiency due to the use of JavaScript. (This could be improved using WebCrypto10 once
it supports all necessary features.) All code is available at https://www.franziskuskiefer.
de/data/thesis-src.zip and a virtual machine with this demo installed can be downloaded
from https://goo.gl/QLNYz4.
8.1 Registration
The client registration has two different views that would require login for server side
in a production environment, but reside on the same open website for demonstration
purposes here.
Admin Interface To configure the server’s password policy the admin interface
(shown in Figure 14) allows the web admin to define a policy expression as well as a
minimum password length, prospective client passwords have to comply with. Entered
values are stored automatically for this session and used for the BPR process.
Client Interface Selecting the Client Registration link presents the user with a
simple website asking the user to register a new user and password. To this end
5https://www.python.org/
6http://bottlepy.org/docs/dev/index.html
7https://mariadb.org/
8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JavaScript
9http://firefox.com/
10http://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI/
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Fig. 14: Demo — Admin interface
the user has to click the registration/login button in the browser toolbar to open
the registration form. This button is only active for websites that support the BPR
registration process and provides the user with a trusted path to a trusted registration
form. Note that it is important that the registration form is trusted and not provided
by the server as the server is not trusted with secure handling of the client password.
After clicking “Register Now” the extension performs the BPR protocol from Section 4
with the server. The JavaScript implementation makes use of cryptographic libraries11),
while the server uses the Charm library by Akinyele et al. [16].
8.2 Login
Clicking on the “Client App” link provides the user with a simple website asking the
user to log into the application using the registration/login button in the browser
toolbar. Similar to the registration process, the user is presented with a trusted login
form. After entering user name and password, and clicking “Login”, the extension
performs the tSoke protocol with the server. As discussed before, tSoke is a VPAKE
protocol that additionally uses a tag to make it usable in the PACCE setting. Thereby,
11http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~tjw/jsbn/,
https://github.com/bitwiseshiftleft/sjcl
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Fig. 15: Demo — Client Registration interface
client and server perform a PACCE protocol, which hands the session over to the client
application when done.
8.3 Demo Application
The client demo application, a simple to-do application, is depicted in Figure 17. It is
an independent component and embedded in the framework website as an iframe. It
uses NodeJS12 as RESTful13 server, MongoDB14 for storage, and jade15 as template
engine.
9 Conclusion
This chapter proposed a password registration and authentication framework for the
single server setting, gave efficient instantiation and a demo application to show its use.
Using ZKPPC as basis, Section 4 proposed an efficient Blind Password Registration
protocol with security model. An alternative approach to the problem of BPR is
12https://nodejs.org/
13https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representational_state_transfer
14https://www.mongodb.org/
15http://jade-lang.com/
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Fig. 16: Demo — Client Login interface
Fig. 17: Demo — Client Application interface
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proposed in Section 5 using set theory. Comparison of the two proposed BPR protocols
show that the set-based approach is significantly faster due to the use of symmetric
primitives, while requiring a different security model with stronger assumptions. The
second step in the framework, password-based authentication, is solved by a new
VPAKE protocol in Section 7.2. Implementation (Section 6) and demonstration
(Section 8) showed practicability of the proposed approach.
The first leg of the proposed framework securely registers passwords chosen by the
client at a remote server while simultaneously achieving the following properties: (1)
registered passwords are never disclosed to the server and the only way for the server or
any attacker who compromises the server to recover passwords is by mounting an offline
dictionary attack on the stored verifier; (2) each registered password provably satisfies
the server’s password policy. While the proposed ZKPPC approach lays ground for
this, BPR gives a more appropriate security model and protocol to solve this problem.
BPR in particular formalises the two requirements as dictionary attack resistance and
policy compliance. The proposed BPR protocol for ASCII-based password policies
makes use of efficient Pedersen commitments and the shuffling proof from [96], and
fulfils both security goals under standard assumptions. Our discussion on various ways
to strengthen or (reasonably) weaken the security requirements implies the possibility
of introducing trade-offs between security and efficiency for this type of BPR protocol.
To achieve higher performance we further introduced a different approach to BPR
based on set theory. To this end we introduced a new notion called Set-based Policy
Checking, a new privacy preserving protocol. SPC allows a server to check whether a
set held by a client is compliant with its policy, which is defined as a monotone access
structure over a public set. At the end of the protocol, the server learns only a single
bit of information, i. e. whether the client’s set complies with the policy or not, and
nothing else. SPC was then used to propose a highly efficient protocol for BPR. To
underline practicality, facilitate adoption, and compare the different BPR approaches
we gave implementations of all three protocols together with an analysis.
To implement the second leg of the framework proposed in this chapter we discussed
general techniques to generate VPAKE protocols from known PAKE protocols and
proposed a new VPAKE protocol that allows authentication with verifiers registered
with one of the proposed BPR protocols. We further discussed advantages and
disadvantages of VPAKE protocols and their models.

Chapter IV
Password Authentication Framework in the Two-
Server Setting
While PAKE and VPAKE solve one of the most pressing problems in user authentication
they are still vulnerable to offline dictionary attacks once the server is compromised. To
alleviate the impact of password leaks, threshold PAKE has been proposed. However,
research in this area is rather limited compared to the single-server case. This chapter
proposes a framework for the two-server setting, similar to the framework from Chapter
III, which uses 2PAKE for user authentication and a Two-Server Blind Password
Registration (2BPR) protocol for password share registration. We further propose
a new security model for two 2PAKE protocols in the UC model and an according
2PAKE protocol that is secure in the new model.
This chapter is based on work in [135, 138, 139]1.
Introduction Considering that “password-cracking tools” such as Hashcat [117]
and John the Ripper [164] are very efficient, it is reasonable to assume that leaking
password hashes is more or less equivalent to leaking passwords [39, 78, 157, 194].
Further, VPAKE can have other security issues as discussed in Section 7.1 Chapter III.
The notion of threshold and two-server password authenticated key-exchange [92, 145]
has been proposed where the password is not stored on a single server but split between
a number of servers such that leakage of a password database on a non-qualified subset
does not reveal the password. The two-server setting is regarded as more practical (in
comparison to a more general threshold setting) given that if one server is compromised
a notification to change the password can be sent out to the clients. 2PAKE protocols
[45, 127, 184] split the client’s password pwd into two shares s1 and s2 such that each
1This chapter contains the products of joint research between myself and Mark Manulis. All
contributions in this chapter are mainly my own.
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share is stored on a distinct server. During the authentication phase both servers
collaborate in order to authenticate the client. Yet, no server alone is supposed to learn
the plain password. A second, more recent development in two-server (and threshold)
password protocols is PPSS [18, 57, 122] where a client stores shares of a (high-entropy)
secret key on a number of servers and uses a (low-entropy) password to authenticate
the retrieval process.
Registering password shares for 2PAKE/PPSS protocols however makes it impossible
for the servers to verify their password policies upon registration unless the password
is transferred to each of them in plain. Yet, this would imply that the client trusts
both servers to securely handle the password, which contradicts the purpose and trust
relationships of multi-server protocols. The use of two-server password protocols in
a remote authentication setting therefore requires a suitable password registration
procedure in which none of the servers would receive information enabling it (or an
attacker in control of the server) to deliberately or inadvertently recover the client’s
password. This registration procedure must further allow for policy compliance checks
to be performed by the servers since secret sharing does not protect against weak
passwords. A trivial approach of sending s1 and s2 to the corresponding servers over
secure channels is not helpful here since it is not clear how the two servers can perform
the required compliance check.
The concept of blind password registration for two-server password protocols
proposed as first step in this chapter shows how to realise secure registration of
password shares in a way that protects against at most one malicious server (if both
servers are malicious, the attacker obviously gets the password), yet allows both
servers to check password compliance against their mutual password policy. 2BPR
is not vulnerable to offline dictionary attacks as long as one server remains honest.
This is in contrast to the single-server setting from the previous chapter where an
attacker is always able to perform offline dictionary attacks on password verifiers after
compromising a server.
The second step in the framework can either be a 2PAKE or a two-server PPSS
protocol. We show how to use password shares set up with the 2BPR protocol to
authenticate the client in both cases. Further, we propose a new framework for 2PAKE
protocols that leads to a new security definition for 2PAKE protocols in the UC model.
Outline This chapter consists of six sections. The first section describes modelling of
passwords, policies and password shares for the two-server setting. Section 2 proposes a
Blind Password Registration for the two-server setting, closely related to the approach
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in Chapter III Section 4. For the authentication step Section 4 proposes a 2PAKE
framework using D-SPHFs that are introduced in Section 3. To strengthen security
guarantees of 2PAKE protocols we propose a security definition of 2PAKE in the
UC framework in Section 5. Section 6 concludes this chapter by summarising and
discussing results.
1 Modelling Passwords and Policies
Passwords and policies in the two-server setting are defined similar to the single-server
setting from Chapter III but require additional treatment for this setting.
We adopt the reversible, structure-preserving encoding scheme introduced in Section
1 of Chapter III that (uniquely) maps strings of printable ASCII characters to integers.
We also use pwd for the ASCII password string, ci = pwd[i] for the i-th ASCII character
in pwd, and integer π for the encoded password string.
Remark While password distribution is important for the security of a password
registration protocol in the verifier-based PAKE setting from Chapter III the password
distribution plays a different role in the two-server setting. Since the server stores
only a password share instead of a password verifier, offline dictionary attacks from an
attacker controlling only one of the two servers are impossible. The notion for 2BPR
proposed in this chapter is therefore independent of the password, chosen by the client.
Note however that the password strength still continues to play a role in the usage
of 2PAKE/PPSS protocols, where it influences the probability of successful online
dictionary attacks.
1.1 Password Sharing
We focus on the additive password sharing of client passwords, i. e. π = s0 + s1 mod p
over Zp. Such sharing has been used in various two-server PAKE protocols, including
[124, 127, 198]. To be used in combination with two-server PPSS protocols such as
the one proposed by Camenisch et al. [57] one can define the password as gπ and thus
create a multiplicative sharing gπ = gs0gs1 . Password shares are created as s0 ∈R Zp
and s1 = π − s0 mod p. We remark that other sharing options such as xor [45, 184]
have been used in literature but these are not supported by the proposed protocol.
114 Password Authentication Framework in the Two-Server Setting
1.2 Password Policies
We represent password policies using an approach based on the policy definition from
Chapter III Section 1, i. e. a simplified password policy f = (R, nmin) consists of a
policy expression R that defines ASCII subsets that must be present in the chosen
password string and the minimum length nmin of the password string. R is defined over
the four ASCII subsets Σ = {d, u, l, s} with digits d, upper case letters u, lower case
letters l and symbols s, and gives the minimum frequency of a character from the subset
that is necessary to fulfil the policy. In the two-server password setting each of the two
servers may have its own policy, i. e. f0 and f1. The registered passwords must comply
with their mutual policy defined as f = f0 ∩ f1 = (max(R0, R1),max(nmin0, nmin1)),
where max(R0, R1) is the policy expression with the maximum number of characters
from each of the subsets u, l, d, s from the two expressions R0 and R1. A mutual policy
is thus fulfilled, i. e. f(pwd) = true, iff f0(pwd) = true and f1(pwd) = true, and not
fulfilled, i. e. f(pwd) = false, iff f0(pwd) = false or f1(pwd) = false. We mainly
operate on the integer representation π of a password pwd throughout this chapter
and therefore sometimes write f(π), for f(pwd) with π ← PWDtoINT(pwd). Further
recall that a character ci ∈ pwd is called significant if it is necessary to fulfil a policy
expression R and we say the corresponding set Rj ∈ R is the according significant set.
2 Two-Server Blind Password Registration
2BPR allows a client to register password shares with two servers for later use in
2PAKE/PPSS protocols and prove that the shares can be combined to a password
that complies with the mutual password policy of both servers, without disclosing the
password. A 2BPR protocol is executed between client C and two servers S0 and S1
with password policies f0 and f1 respectively. C interacts with S0 and S1 in order to
distribute shares of a freshly chosen password string pwd and prove its compliance with
the mutual policy, i. e. f0(pwd) = true and f1(pwd) = true. A 2BPR protocol between
an honest client C and two honest servers S0 and S1 is correct if S0 and S1 accept their
password shares if the client is able to prove the following statement for f = f0 ∩ f1:
(pwd, s0, s1) : PWDtoINT(pwd) = s0 + s1 ∧ f(pwd) = true. (1)
Note that the 2BPR protocol can be used to register new clients or to register new pass-
words for existing clients. The following definition formally captures the functionality
of 2BPR protocols.
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Definition 31 (Two-Server Blind Password Registration). A 2BPR protocol is executed
between a client C and two servers S0 and S1, holding a password policy fb each, such
that the servers, when honest, eventually accept password shares sb of a policy compliant,
client chosen password pwd iff f(pwd) = true for f = f0∩f1, PWDtoINT(pwd) = sb+s1−b
and b ∈ {0, 1}. ♢
Definition 31 requires that password shares s0 and s1 can be combined to the policy-
compliant integer password π. The corresponding verification must therefore be part
of the 2BPR protocol. Otherwise, the client could register password shares s0 and s1
that can both be combined to a policy compliant password in the respective proofs
with the servers, but combining s0 and s1 might result in a password that is not policy
compliant, i. e. f(s0+ s′) = true and f(s1+ s′′) = true but f(π) ̸= true. This further
ensures that servers hold valid password shares, which is crucial for the security of
2PAKE/PPSS protocols that should be executed later with these password shares. We
assume that the servers distributed their policy to the client before the protocol starts.
We further assume that the servers communicate with each other in order to confirm
correctness of the password shares. This requirement can be relaxed by requiring the
client to forward messages (authenticated and confidential) between the two servers.
For simplicity however we assume direct communication between the two servers in
our model.
2.1 Model
Security of 2BPR protocols, given according to Eq. (1), has to guarantee that the client
knows the sum PWDtoINT(pwd) of the password shares s0 and s1, and that pwd fulfils
both password policies f0 and f1 in case both servers accept the registration. This model
is related to the BPR model from Chapter III Section 4 but requires handling of two
servers and server corruption. We translate Eq. (1) into a game-based security model
that captures the relation using two different security definitions. The first notion, like
in BPR, can be directly converted from Eq. (1) and captures Policy Compliance of
the password. In particular, if both servers are honest while accepting their password
shares in the 2BPR protocol, the combination π of the shares represents a password
compliant with the mutual password policy f = f0 ∩ f1, i. e. f(sb + s1−b) = true. The
second notion relates to the fact that servers should not learn anything about the
password and therefore called Password Blindness (PB), in contrast to BPR, where the
server is always able to perform offline dictionary attacks on the password verifier. PB
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requires that a malicious server Sb must not be able to learn anything else from the
2BPR execution about the client’s password than the fact that it is policy compliant.
We observe that the blindness property has to hold for all possible password
policies and all compliant passwords. It should not be possible to mount an offline
dictionary attack after observing 2BPR protocol executions or while gaining access to
and controlling at most one of the two servers.
Setup and Participants Protocol participants C,S0,S1 with C from the universe
of clients and S1,S2 from the universe of servers have common inputs, necessary for
the execution of the protocol. Instances of protocol participants C or S are denoted
Ci, S0,i or S1,i. Protocol participants without specified role are denoted by P , and Sb
and S1−b for unspecified servers. A client can only register one password with one
server pair, but can register passwords at an arbitrary number of server pairs. Client
C and servers Sb are unique and used as identifier on the server, i. e. as username to
store alongside the password share on S1−b. We say a client registers a client, server
pair at a server, i. e. a client C registers a password share for (C,S1−b) at a server Sb
and a password share for (C,Sb) at server S1−b. Further, a server only allows a single
registration from a client, server pair such that any attempt to register a password
with a server that already stores a password share for this client, server pair overwrites
existing entries, i. e. resets the password. An entry (C,S1−b, sb) is only stored on server
Sb if the 2BPR protocol is successful.
Oracles To interact with protocol participants, PPT adversary A has access to Setup,
Send, Execute and Corrupt oracles.
• Setup(C,S0,S1, pwd′) creates new instances of all participants and stores identifiers
of the other parties to each participant. To this end the client receives the server
policies f0∩f1 = f and either chooses a new policy compliant password pwd ∈ Df
if pwd′ = ⊥ or uses pwd = pwd′.
• Execute(C,S0,S1) models a passive attack and executes a 2BPR protocol between
new instances of C, S0 and S1. It returns the protocol transcript and the internal
state of all corrupted parties.
• SendC(C,Sb,j,m) sends message m, allegedly from client C, to server instance Sb,j
for b ∈ {0, 1}. If Sb,j does not exist, the oracle aborts. Note that any instance
Sb,j was thus set up with Setup and therefore has an according partner instance
S1−b,j. If all participants exist, the oracle returns the server’s answer m′ if there
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exists any. Necessary inter server communication is performed in SendC queries.
If m = ⊥, server Sb,j returns its first protocol message if it starts the protocol.
• SendS(Sb, Cj,m) sends message m, allegedly from server Sb for b ∈ {0, 1}, to
client instance Cj . If Cj does not exist, the oracle aborts. Note that any instance
Cj was set up with Setup and therefore has an according partner instance S1−b,i.
If all participants exist, the oracle returns the client’s answer m′ if there exists
any. If m = ⊥, server Sb returns its first message if he starts the protocol.
• SendSS(Sb,S1−b,j,m) sends message m, from server Sb for b ∈ {0, 1}, to server
instance S1−b,j. If S1−b,j does not exist, the oracle aborts. Note that any S1−b,j
was set up with Setup. If all participants exist, the oracle returns the server’s
answer m′ if there exists any.
• Corrupt(Sb) allows the adversary to corrupt a server Sb and retrieve its internal
state, i. e. stored messages and randomness, and the list of stored password
shares (C,S1−b, sb). Sb is marked corrupted.
Note that we allow the adversary to register passwords with servers such that we do
not require the existence of a client instance Ci after a successful registration (client
identities C are unique but not secret and can therefore be used by the adversary).
Policy Compliance PC is the first natural security property of 2BPR protocols,
requiring that a password set up with a 2BPR protocol by a client is compliant with
the policy of the two servers f(pwd) = true. The attacker here plays the role of the
client that tries to register a password pwd that is not policy compliant on two honest
servers.
Definition 32 (Policy Compliance). Policy Compliance of a 2BPR protocol holds if
for every PPT adversary A with access to Setup and SendC oracles the probability that
two server instances Sb,i and S1−b,j exist after A stopped that accepted (C,S1−b, sb),
(C,Sb, s1−b) respectively, with f(sb + s1−b) = false is negligible. ♢
Password Blindness The second security property requires that every password,
chosen and set up by an honest client must remain hidden from an adversary even if
he corrupts one of the two used servers, gets its internal state and controls its actions.
We model this with a distinguishing experiment where the attacker, after interacting
with the oracles, outputs a challenge comprising two passwords pwd0 and pwd1, two
clients C0 and C1, and a pair of servers S0 and S1. After randomly assigning the two
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passwords to the two clients, the adversary interacts with the oracles again and has to
decide which client uses which password, i. e. guess the random bit b. The notion is
formalised in the following definition.
Definition 33 (Password Blindness). The Password Blindness property of a 2BPR
protocol Π holds if for every PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function ε(·)
such that
AdvPBΠ,A =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ExpPBΠ,A = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε(λ).
ExpPBΠ,A :
(C0, C1,S0,S1, pwd0, pwd1)← ASetup(·),SendS(·),SendSS(·),Execute(·),Corrupt(·)1 (λ,D, {C}, {S})
check pwd0, pwd1 ∈ Df0∩f1, |pwd0| = |pwd1|, C0, C1 ∈ {C} and S0,S1 ∈ {S}
b′ ← ASetup′(·),SendS(·),SendSS(·),Execute(·),Corrupt(·)(λ,D, {C}, {S})
if S0 or S1 is not corrupted, return b = b′; otherwise return 0
Setup′ (in contrast to Setup) uses pwdb for client C0 and pwd1−b for C1 with b ∈R {0, 1}
instead of choosing a random password or using the provided one. ♢
2.2 An Efficient Two-Server BPR Protocol
Before describing technical details, we give a high-level description of our 2BPR
protocol. We assume that client C selected two servers S0 and S1 to register with, and
server authenticated channels between each of the two servers and the client as well as
between the two servers have been established. Note that the connection between the
two servers is necessary in order to verify the correctness of the password shares. Server
authenticated and confidential channels between each server and the client is a rather
weak assumption that can be implemented with a TLS channel [80, 121, 143]. This
essentially prevents the attacker from querying the SendS or SendSS oracle without
prior corruption of the according server and further provides an attacker only with
encrypted transcripts unless he performs active attacks or corrupts a participating
server. The protocol further relies on a common setup, given a CRS. The CRS contains
all necessary parameters, i. e. crs = (g, h, p) with generators g and h for group of
prime-order p where logg(h) is not known. At the beginning of the registration phase
the client commits to the integer representation π of the chosen password string pwd
and sends this commitment together with a password share sb to the corresponding
server Sb, b ∈ {0, 1}, along with auxiliary information that is needed to perform the PC
proof. For the latter, the client needs to prove the knowledge of π in the commitment
such that π = s0 + s1 and that it fulfils both policies f1 and f2. Thus, servers S0 and
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S1 eventually register the new client, accept and store the client’s password share, iff
each Sb holds sb such that s0 + s1 = π for π ← PWDtoINT(pwd) and f(pwd) = true for
f = f0 ∩ f1.
The general protocol is similar to the BPR protocol proposed in Chapter III Section
4 for the single server setting. While Proof of Membership and PoS are essentially the
same, a Proof of Correctness (PoC) replaces the PoE from BPR to prove correctness
of shares. We further require zero-knowledge proofs that are secure against malicious
verifiers (servers) since the attacker is allowed to corrupt one server in the protocol,
i. e. we do not assume semi-honest servers.
2.2.1 Protocol Overview
In Figure 18 we give an overview of the 2BPR protocol involving a client C and two
servers Sb, b ∈ {0, 1}. The protocol proceeds in three phases. In the first phase (Client
Preparation) the client, encodes the chosen password pwd to π, computes shares s0 and
s1, and computes commitments C0,C1,D0,D1 to the shares and the password.
In the second phase (Password Registration) C interacts with each server Sb,
b ∈ {0, 1} over a server-authenticated and confidential channel. C computes a com-
mitment Ci for each encoded character πi ← CHRtoINT(ci), ci ∈ pwd, and a second
commitment C ′i as a re-randomised version of Ci. The set C ′ containing the re-
randomised commitments C ′i, is then shuffled and used to prove in the Proof of
Membership protocol that each character committed to in C ′i ∈ C ′ is a member of some
character set ωϕ(i), chosen according to policy f . Note that PoM must be performed
over the shuffled set C ′ of commitments as the server would otherwise learn the type
(lower/upper case, digit, or symbol) of each password character. To further prove
that transmitted commitments C,Cb, and Db are correct, namely that the product of
commitments in C commits to password pwd, Cb contains the correct share sb, and Db
contains pwd, client and server execute the Proof of Correctness protocol. Finally, the
client proves to each server that set C ′ is a shuffle of set C by executing the Proof of
Shuffle protocol. This proof is necessary to finally convince both servers that (1) the
characters committed to in C ′ are the same as the characters in the commitments in
C, which can be combined to password pwd (as follows from the PoC protocol) and (2)
each commitment Ci is for a character ci ∈ pwd from some set ωi, chosen according
to policy f (as follows from the PoM protocol). For all three committed Σ protocols
(PoM, PoC, PoS) we use variables as defined in Chapter II Section 3.3.1. If each server
Sb, b ∈ {0, 1} successfully verifies all three committed Σ protocols and the length of
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Client C
Input: S0,S1, f = f0 ∩ f1
pwd, crs
I – Client Preparation
encode π ← PWDtoINT(pwd)
compute password shares:
s0 ∈R Zp, s1 = π − s0
commit to shares:
r0, r1 ∈R Zp
C0 = gs0hr0 , C1 = gs1hr1
D0 = C0gs1 , D1 = C1gs0
Client C Server Sb
Input: S0,S1, f = f0 ∩ f1 Input: C,S1−b
pwd, crs f = f0 ∩ f1, crs
II – Password Registration
commit to all characters:
Ci = gπihri ; C ′i = Cihr
′
i
shuffle C ′ s.t. C ′i = Cϕ(i)h
r′
ϕ(i)
with permutation ϕ
for ci ∈ pwd identify set ωϕ(i)
execute PoC, PoM, PoS
m1PoM,m1PoC,m1PoS−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
cPoM, cPoC, cPoS←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− choose challenges
m2PoM,m2PoC,m2PoS−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Proceed if
|C| = |C ′| ≥ nmin,PoM
PoC and PoS all holds
Server S0 Server S1
Input: C,S1 Input: C,S0
f = f0 ∩ f1, crs f = f0 ∩ f1, crs
III – Share Verification
D′1 = C1gs0
D′1−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ D′0 = C0gs1
If D′0 = D0
D′0←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− If D′1 = D1
store (C,S1, s0) store (C,S0, s1)
Fig. 18: Two-Server BPR Protocol — A High-Level Overview
ω contains character sets of cϕ(i) ordered according to permutation ϕ, used in PoM
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the committed password pwd is policy-conform, then both servers proceed with the
last phase.
In the third phase (Share Verification) the two servers S0 and S1 interact with each
other over a mutually-authenticated and confidential channel. Each Sb computes its
verification value D′1−b and sends it to S1−b. Upon receiving D′b, Sb checks it against
Db to verify that the client used the same password with both servers in the second
phase, i. e. that sb + s1−b = π. If this verification is successful, Sb stores the client’s
password share (C,S1−b, sb) and considers C as being registered.
2.2.2 Specification
In the following we give a detailed description of the 2BPR protocol. To this end we
describe the three proofs PoC, PoM and PoS detailing on their computations. We
describe the interaction between client C and server Sb and therefore only consider one
policy fb. Note that C and each server Sb perform the same protocol. If both servers
accept, the password fulfils the policy f = fb ∩ f1−b. The following largely recalls the
zero-knowledge proofs from Section 4.2.2 in Chapter III but with committed Σ proofs.
We first describe the client’s pre-computations such as password encoding and
sharing before giving a detailed description of the proofs. The protocol operates on
a group G of prime-order p with generator g. Further, let h, fi ∈R G for i ∈ [−4,m]
denote random group elements such that their discrete logarithm with respect to g is
unknown. Public parameters of the protocol are defined as (p, g, h,f , H) with f = {fi}
where m is at least n = |pwd|, and hash function H. In practice m can be chosen big
enough, e. g., 100, in order to process all reasonable passwords. Note that we use the
range i ∈ [0, n− 1] for characters pwd[i] and their commitments Ci, but [1, x] for most
other ranges.
Client Preparation We assume that password policies f0 and f1 are known by
the client. This can be achieved by distributing them beforehand with other set-up
parameters. The client encodes password pwd ∈ Df to π ← PWDtoINT(pwd). The
password is shared by choosing a random sb ∈R Zp and computing s1−b = π − sb. The
client then commits to both password shares Cb = gsbhrb and C1−b = gs1−bhr1−b with
rb, r1−b ∈R Zp and computes commitments to the entire password π with the same
randomness, i. e. Db = Cbgs1−b and D1−b = C1−bgsb . For the following proofs the client
further encodes every character ci ∈ pwd as πi ← CHRtoINT(ci).
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Password Registration The client iterates over all encoded characters πi to perform
the following operations:
• commit to πi by computing Ci = gπihri , C ′i = Cihr
′
i for ri, r′i ∈R Z∗p;
• choose a random permutation vector given by function ϕ(i) over [0, n − 1] to
shuffle C ′i;
• if πi is significant for any Rj ∈ R, set ωϕ(i) ← Rj , otherwise ωϕ(i) ← Σ (all ASCII
characters).
Let further li ∈ N denote the index in ωϕ(i) such that ci = ωϕ(i)[li]. Values (Ci, C ′i, ωϕ(i),
ϕ(i), li, πi, ri, r′i) are used in the following zero-knowledge proofs. The client combines
previously computed values C = {Ci}. Shuffled commitments C ′ϕ(i) and sets ωϕ(i) are
combined according to the shuffled index ϕ(i), i. e. C ′ = {C ′ϕ(i)} and ω = {ωϕ(i)}. Once
these computations are finished C and Sb proceed with the protocol. In the following
we describe the three proofs PoM, PoC and PoS and define their messages. Similar to
the single-server case the following proofs are based on techniques first introduced in
by Chaum and Pedersen [66], Cramer et al. [71], Schnorr [177].
Proof of Correctness (PoC) This proof links the password shares, sent to each
server, to the proof of PoM and shows knowledge of the other password share. We
define the proof of correctness for an encoded password π, which proves that share
sb can be combined with a second share s1−b such that π = sb + s1−b and that the
received commitments to password characters ci can be combined to a commitment to
that same password π. PoC is defined as a committed zero-knowledge proof between
C and Sb for the statement
ZKP{(π, r1−b, rb, rCb) : C1−bgsb = gπhr1−b ∧
n−1∏
i=0
Cb
i
i = gπhrCb ∧Db = gπhrb}.
Ci = gπihri are character commitments from the set-up stage and rCb =
∑n−1
i=0 b
iri
is the combined randomness from character commitments Ci. C1−b = gs1−b hr1−b ,
Db = Cbgs1−b , and Cb = gsbhrb are share and password commitments from the client’s
preparation phase. This connects the link of the password commitment to the product
of the character commitments with the proof of knowledge of the combined password
π = sb + s1−b. Messages for PoC are computed as follows:
1. The client chooses random kπ, kρb, kρ(1−b), kρC ∈R Zp, computes tC(1−b) =
gkπhkρ(1−b) , tC = gkπhkρC and tDb = gkπhkρb . The first message with rm1PoC ∈R Zp
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is then given by
m1PoC = gH(C1−bg
sb ,{Ci},Db,tC(1−b),tC ,tDb)hrComPoC .
2. After receiving ComPoC from the client the server chooses a random challenge
cPoC,b ∈R Zp and sends it back to the client.
3. After receiving challenge cPoC,b, the client computes sπ = kπ + cPoC,bπ, sρ(1−b) =
kρ(1−b) + cPoC,br1−b, sρC = kρC + cPoC,b
∑n−1
i=0 b
iri and sρb = kρb + cPoC,brb before
computing the next message with rm2PoC ∈R Zp
m2PoC1 = gH(sπ ,sρ(1−b),sρC ,sρb)hrm2PoC .
4. Eventually the client sets the decommitment message to
m2PoC2 = (sb,C1−b, {Ci},Db, tC(1−b), tC , tDb, sπ, sρ(1−b), sρC , sρb, rComPoC , rm2PoC).
m2PoC1 and m2PoC2 form together m2PoC. The server verifies the proof by checking
the following:
ComPoC
?= gH(C1−bgsb ,{Ci},Db,tC(1−b),tC ,tDb)hrComPoC m2PoC1 ?= gH(sπ ,sρ(1−b),sρC ,sρb)hrm2PoC
gsπhsρ(1−b)
?= tC(1−b)(C1−bgsb)cPoC,b gsπhsρC ?= tC(
n−1∏
i=0
Cb
i
i )cPoC,b gsπhsρb
?= tDbD
cPoC,b
b
Proof of Membership (PoM) PoM proves cϕ(i) ∈ ωϕ(i) for every character cϕ(i) ∈
pwd running over the shuffled set of commitments C ′, i. e.
ZKP{{πi, ri}i∈[0,n−1] : C ′ϕ(i) = gπihri ∧ πϕ(i) ∈ ωϕ(i)}.
Note that the proof uses the shuffled commitments C ′ϕ(i) and not Ci and recall that cϕ(i)
belongs to the character set ωϕ(i) (we sometimes write πi ∈ ωi for πi ← CHRtoINT(ci)).
This PoM is essentially the proof used in BPR (cf. Chapter III Section 4) in committed
form.
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1. To prove that every C ′ϕ(i) commits to a value in the according set ωϕ(i) the client
computes the following values for the first move of the proof:
– ∀πj ∈ ωϕ(i) ∧ πj ̸= πϕ(i) : sj ∈R Zp, cj ∈R Zp and tj = gπjhsj(C ′ϕ(i)/gπj)cj
– kρi ∈R Zp; tlϕ(i) = gπihkρi
Values (tϕ(i), sϕ(i), cϕ(i), kρi), with tϕ(i) = tj∪{tlϕ(i)}, sϕ(i) = {sj}, and cϕ(i) = {cj}
are stored for future use. Note that tlϕ(i) has to be added at the correct position
lϕ(i) in tϕ(i). A commitment m1PoM = gH(ω,C
′,tϕ(i))hrm1PoM with rm1PoM ∈R Zp is
computed as output with ω = {ωϕ(i)}.
2. The server stores received values, checks them for group membership, and chooses
a random challenge cPoM = c ∈R Zp.
3. After receiving the challenge c from the server, the client computes the following
verification values for all commitments C ′ϕ(i) (note that sj and cj for all j ≠ lϕ(i)
are chosen already):
clϕ(i) = c⊕
|ωϕ(i)|⊕
j=1,j ̸=lϕ(i)
cj slϕ(i) = kρϕ(i) − clϕ(i)(ri + r′ϕ(i)),
where i is the index of C ′ϕ(i) before shuffling. The client then combines s =
sϕ(i)∪{slϕ(i)} and c = cϕ(i)∪{clϕ(i)}. Note again that the set union has to consider
the position of lϕ(i) to add the values at the correct position. A commitment
m2PoM1 = gH(s,c)hrm2PoM with rm2PoM ∈R Zp computed is as output.
4. Eventually the client sets the decommitment message with t = {tϕ(i)}, ω =
{ωϕ(i)}, rm1PoM = {rm1PoMi}, , rm2PoM = {rm2PoMi}, and C ′ = {C ′ϕ(i)} to
m2PoM2 = (ω,C ′, t, s, c, rm1PoM , rm2PoM).
m2PoM1 and m2PoM2 form together m2PoM. To verify the proof, i. e. to verify that
every commitment C ′ϕ(i) in C ′ commits to a character ci from either a subset of Σ if
significant or Σ if not, the server verifies the following for every set ωϕ(i) ∈ ω with
i ∈ [0, n− 1]:
• Let cj ∈ ci for ci ∈ c and verify c ?= ⊕|ωi|j=1 cj
• Let πj ∈ ωϕ(i), si ∈ s, ti ∈ t, and ci ∈ c, and verify ti[j] ?= gπjhsi[j](C ′i/gπj)ci[j]
for all j ∈ [1, |ωϕ(i)|]
2 Two-Server Blind Password Registration 125
The server further verifies commitments
m1PoM
?= gH(ω,C′,t)hrm1PoM and m2PoM ?= gH(s,c)hrm2PoM .
The verification of the proof is successful iff all equations above are true and ω contains
all significant characters for fb.
Proof of Shuffle (PoS) The proof of correct shuffling PoS is committed version of
the PoS used for BPR in Chapter III Section 4. Note that indices for commitments C
and C ′ run from 1 to n and index ranges in the following change frequently.
1. In the first move, the client (prover) builds a permutation matrix and commits
to it. First he chooses random A′j ∈R Zp for j ∈ [−4, n]. Let Aij denote a matrix
with i ∈ [−4, n] and j ∈ [0, n], i. e. of size (n+ 5)× (n+ 1), such that a n× n
sub-matrix of Aij is the permutation matrix (built from permutation ϕ). Further,
let ϕ−1 be the inverse shuffling function. This allows us to write the shuffle as
C ′i =
∏n
j=0C
Aji
j = Cκihr
′
κi with C0 = h and κi = ϕ−1(i) for i ∈ [1, n]. The matrix
Aij is defined with Aw0 ∈R Zp, A−1v ∈R Zp and A0v = r′ϕ(v) for w ∈ [−4, n] and
v ∈ [1, n]. The remaining values in Aij are computed as follows for v ∈ [1, n]:
A−2v =
n∑
j=1
3A2j0Ajv; A−3v =
n∑
j=1
3Aj0Ajv; A−4v =
n∑
j=1
2Aj0Ajv
After generating Aij the client commits to it in (C ′0, f˜ ,f ′, w, w˜) for f ′ = {f ′v}
with v ∈ [0, n]:
f ′v =
n∏
j=−4
f
Ajv
j ; f˜ =
n∏
j=−4
f
A′j
j ; w˜ =
n∑
j=1
A2j0 − A−40
C ′0 = g
∑n
j=1 πjAj0hA00+
∑n
j=1 rjAj0 ; w =
n∑
j=1
A3j0 − A−20 − A′−3 (2)
Note that C ′0 =
∏n
j=0C
Aj0
j = hA00
∏n
j=1C
Aj0
j , but Eq. (2) saves n − 1 exponen-
tiations. The output is then created as m1PoS = gH({Ci},{C
′
ϕ(i)},C′0,f˜ ,f ′,w,w˜)hrm1PoS
with rm1PoS ∈R Zp.
2. When receiving m1PoS the server chooses c = {cv} with cv ∈R Zp for v ∈ [1, n]
and sets cPoS = c.
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3. After receiving challenges c from the server, the client computes the following
verification values (s, s′) for s = {sv} and s′ = {s′v} with v ∈ [−4, n] and c0 = 1:
sv =
n∑
j=0
Avjcj; s′v = A′v +
n∑
j=1
Avjc
2
j
The client sets m2PoS1 = gH(s,s
′)hrm2PoS with rm2PoS ∈R Zp.
4. Eventually, the client sends the decommitment message to the server
m2PoS2 = (C ′0, f˜ ,f ′, w, w˜, s, s′, rm1PoS , rm2PoS).
Note that {Ci} and {C ′ϕ(i)} are omitted here as they are part of m2PoC2, m2PoM2
respectively, already. If this proof is used stand-alone, those values have to be
added to m2PoS2.
m2PoS1 and m2PoS2 form together m2PoS. The server verifies now that the correctness of
the commitments m1PoS ?= gH({Ci},{C
′
ϕ(i)},C′0,f˜ ,f ′,w,w˜)hrm1PoS and m2PoS1 ?= gH(s,s
′)hrm2PoS ,
and that the following equations hold for a randomly chosen α ∈R Zp and C0 = h:
n∏
v=−4
f sv+αs
′
v
v
?= f ′0f˜α
n∏
j=1
f ′j
cj+αc2j ;
n∏
v=0
Csvv
?=
n∏
j=0
C ′j
cj
n∑
j=1
(s3j − c3j) ?= s−2 + s′−3 + w;
n∑
j=1
(s2j − c2j) ?= s−4 + w˜
The server accepts the proof iff all those verifications succeed. This concludes the proof
of correct shuffling.
Share verification To verify that the client used the same password pwd and shares
s0, s1 with both servers S0 and S1, the servers compute the commitment D′b from the
share commitment Cb and their share s1−b, and exchange it. Comparing D′b with the
value Db received from the client, the server verifies share correctness. This concludes
the 2BPR protocol and each server Sb stores (C,S1−b, sb) if all checks were successful.
2.2.3 Security Analysis
We show that the proposed 2BPR protocol is secure using the model from Section 2.1
and therefore offers Policy Compliance and Password Blindness. Note that PoM, PoC,
and PoS are minor modification from the proofs used for the BPR protocol in Chapter
III Section 4. We therefore omit proofs here and only give according lemmata.
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Lemma 7. The PoC protocol from Section 2.2.2 is a concurrent zero-knowledge proof
if the discrete logarithm problem in the used group G is hard and H : {0, 1}∗ 7→ Zp is a
collision resistant hash function.
Lemma 8. The PoM protocol from Section 2.2.2 is a concurrent zero-knowledge proof
if the discrete logarithm problem in the used group G is hard and H : {0, 1}∗ 7→ Zp is a
collision resistant hash function.
Lemma 9. The PoS protocol from Section 2.2.2 is a concurrent zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge of shuffling ϕ if the discrete logarithm problem in the used group G is
hard and H : {0, 1}∗ 7→ Zp is a collision resistant hash function.
Theorem 3. If G is a DL-hard group of prime-order p with generators g and h, and
H a collision resistant hash function, the construction in Figure 18 provides Policy
Compliance according to Definition 32.
Theorem 4. If G is a DL-hard group of prime-order p with generators g and h, and
H a collision resistant hash function, the construction in Figure 18 provides Password
Blindness according to Definition 33.
Regarding combination of PoC and PoM it is worth noting that they do not use
common values and can be therefore regarded as independent. Further, both proofs do
not need rewinding as we do not build extractors.
Proof of Theorem 3. To prove PC we show how to build an adversary on the soundness
properties of the three proofs PoC, PoM, and PoS such that PC follows directly from
Lemmata 7, 8, 9. We first show how to build a successful attacker on the soundness
of PoC and PoM using a successful attacker on PC. The PC-adversary has access to
Setup and SendC oracles.
G0 : This game corresponds to the correct execution of the protocol.
G1 : In this game we change how SendC(C,Sb,j,m) queries are answered. If message
m from the adversary is parsed as (m1PoM,m1PoC,m1PoS), m1PoM is used by the
challenger as output to the PoM verifier. This provides the challenger with challenge
cPoM that is used as reply to the SendC query (other challenges are generated at
random). If message m from the adversary is parsed as (m2PoM1,m2PoC1,m2PoS1) or
(m2PoM2,m2PoC2,m2PoS2) and the first SendC query from that session was forwarded
to the verifier, m2PoM1, m2PoM2 respectively, is used as output to the PoM verifier.
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It is easy to see that the challenger breaks soundness of PoM if the adversary uses
a password pwd ̸∈ Df and PoM verifies successfully. If this is the case we have the
desired contradiction. It is therefore safe to assume for the following experiments that
pwd ∈ Df .
G2 : In this game we change again how SendC(C,Sb,j,m) queries are answered. If
message m from the adversary is parsed as (m1PoM,m1PoC,m1PoS), m1PoC is used
by the challenger as output to the PoC verifier. This provides the challenger with
challenge cPoC that is used as reply to the SendC query (other challenges are generated
at random). If message m from the adversary is parsed as (m2PoM1,m2PoC1,m2PoS1) or
(m2PoM2,m2PoC2,m2PoS2) and the first SendC query from that session was forwarded
to the verifier, m2PoC1, m2PoC2 respectively, is used as output to the PoC verifier.
It is easy to see that the challenger breaks soundness of PoC if s0 + s1 ̸= π, i. e. the
password share sb can not be used with a second share s1−b to rebuild the password π
committed to in C, i. e. ∑i biπi ̸= π. We further see that the second share s1−b has to
be stored on server S1−b, i. e. the attacker has not performed the set-up with Sb and
S1−b with shares that do not combine to the same encoded password π. Otherwise we
can break the binding property of Pedersen commitments. In particular, the attacker
has to generate commitments C0,C1,D0 and D1 such that C0gs1 = D0 or C1gs0 = D1.
We can therefore safely assume that the password share sb received by server Sb can
be combined with the second share s1−b of server S1−b to an encoded password π with
according character commitments Ci.
G3 : In this game we change how SendC(Ci,Sb,j,m) queries are answered. If message
m from the adversary is parsed as (m1PoM,m1PoC,m1PoS), m1PoS is used by the
challenger as output to the PoS verifier. This provides the challenger with challenge
cPoS that is used as reply to the SendC query (other challenges are generated at
random). If message m from the adversary is parsed as (m2PoM1,m2PoC1,m2PoS1) or
(m2PoM2,m2PoC2,m2PoS2) and the first SendC query from that session was forwarded
to the verifier, m2PoS1, m2PoS2 respectively, is used as output to the PoS verifier.
It is easy to see that if the attacker is rewindable, the challenger can act as a
knowledge extractor for PoS. In particular, we can extract shuffling function ϕ and
re-randomiser {r′i} to break soundness of PoS. It is therefore safe to assume that C ′ is
a shuffle of C. This concludes the proof of Theorem 3 by observing that the password
shares stored on both servers can be combined to a policy compliant password.
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Proof of Theorem 4. We give a sequence of games that each changes the way an oracle
is computed. In the last game all interaction of a server with a client is simulated and
therefore password independent such that an attacker can only guess which client used
which password.
G0 : This is the correct execution of the protocol.
G1 : The challenger computes crs such that it knows trapdoor τ = logg(h). This does
not change anything else.
G2 : The challenger changes the way Execute oracles are answered if at least one of
the participating servers is not corrupted. In case both servers are corrupted the
attacker retrieves the password anyway and can not win the game. Instead of correctly
executing the protocol all messages from zero-knowledge proofs are simulated and
messages between the servers chosen accordingly. However, two correct password shares
are stored on the two servers. This allows future corruption of the servers without
noticing this change. Note that as long as the attacker did not corrupt any of the
participating servers, Execute does not provide any information to the attacker since
the communication is encrypted between the client and each server as well as between
the two servers. In this case the change from Game1 to Game2 is not noticeable. In
case the attacker corrupted one of the participating servers, he is able to decrypt the
messages and therefore gets the communication between the client and the corrupted
server. While the attacker receives the protocol transcript now, he is not able to
distinguish it from a correct execution unless we can build a distinguisher for one of
the three zero-knowledge proofs, which is covered by Lemmata 7, 8, and 9.
G3 : In this game the challenger changes the way SendS and SendSS are answered
if the second participating server is not corrupted. Recall that SendS queries are
only accepted by the client if S has been corrupted before and provided the attacker
with necessary keys. Instead of computing answers to SendS correctly the challenger
simulates the zero-knowledge proofs (Lemmata 7, 8, 9). We further change how SendSS
is answered by sending D′b = Db instead of computing it correctly. To allow future
corruption of the honest server without noticing this change we save an appropriate
share. This change to the simulation is not noticeable by an attacker unless we can
build a distinguisher against one of the three zero-knowledge proofs. In this last game
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all proofs are simulated such that an attacker can only guess which password is used
by which client.
2.3 Performance Discussion
Considering similarities between 2BPR and BPR, performance of the proposed 2BPR
protocol is very similar to the performance of the BPR protocol from Section 4 Chapter
III. We therefore refrain from implementing this protocol and refer to the performance
discussion on BPR (Section 6.2 Chapter III) for details of the BPR protocol, which
reflects the time between the client and a single server in the 2BPR case. The additional
time needed for committed zero-knowledge proofs is negligible compared to the time
needed for PoM.
2.4 Application to 2PAKE/PPSS protocols
The 2BPR protocol can be used to register passwords for two-server protocols such as
2PAKE and two-server PPSS. 2BPR can be used with two-server protocols that adopt
additive password sharing in Zp or multiplicative sharing inG. This includes the 2PAKE
protocols by Katz et al. [127], which does not consider password registration such that
our protocol can simply be used as part of the registration process. This equally applies
to the 2PAKE protocols proposed in Sections 4 and 5 of this chapter. Integration of
2BPR into PPSS on the other hand is more involved as password registration is part of
the PPSS protocol, i. e. the secret sharing phase. Two-server PPSS protocols in general
can be divided in two stages: password and secret registration/sharing and secret
reconstruction. While the approach from Bagherzandi et al. [18], as well as subsequent
work using similar approaches [56, 122, 174], does not actually share the password
and could therefore use other means to verify policy compliance of a prospective
password, the UC-secure two-server PPSS protocol from Camenisch et al. [57] uses
multiplicative password sharing in G. To use our 2BPR protocol in conjunction with
the setup protocol from Camenisch et al. [57] we redefine the encoded password to
gπ with π ← PWDtoINT(pwd) such that shares are computed as gπ = gs0gs1 . The first
message (step 1) from the setup protocol in [57, Figure 4] can piggyback the first 2BPR
protocol message. The subsequent three messages between the client and each server
are performed between step 1 and step 2, while the inter-server communication can be
piggybacked on step 2 and step 3. In addition to checking correctness of shares done in
the setup of [57] the servers can now verify the 2BPR proofs and thus the password’s
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policy compliance. This adds three flows to the setup protocol of [57] in order verify
policy compliance of password shares.
3 Distributed Smooth Projective Hashing
Smooth projective hashing allows to compute the hash value of an element from a set
in two different ways: either by using a secret hashing key on the element, or utilising
the public projection key and some secret information proving that the particular
element is part of a specific subset under consideration. In addition, smooth projective
hash values guarantee to be uniformly distributed in their domain as long as the input
element is not from a specific subset of the input set. This allowed Canetti et al. [62]
to build the first UC secure PAKE protocol. All subsequently proposed UC secure
PAKE protocols follow a similar approach and use SPHFs to ensure UC security. In
this section we extend SPHFs to work in the three-party setting and thus enable us to
build UC secure PAKE protocols.
In particular, this section extends research on Smooth Projective Hash Functions
by considering divergent parameterised languages in a single smooth projective hash
function that allows multiple parties to jointly evaluate the result of the function. To
this end we propose the notion of D-SPHF that enables joint hash computation for
special languages, which is then used to construct a new 2PAKE framework and show
how it helps to explain the protocol from Katz et al. [127] in the following section.
Distributed Smooth Projective Hash Functions as introduced in this section are
designed in order to propose a new framework for 2PAKE that leans itself towards
UC security. The majority of UC secure PAKE protocols use SPHFs as they allow
to simulate the PAKE protocol in the security proof using the two different ways of
computing the hash value. Further, the PAKE framework by Gennaro and Lindell
[101] shows the usage of SPHFs in the PAKE protocol proposed by Katz et al. [128],
which is the basis for the 2PAKE protocol by Katz et al. [127]. It therefore seems
natural to extend the definition of SPHFs to the two-server setting.
3.1 Extending Smooth Projective Hashing
We introduce an extended notion of smooth projective hashing that allows us to
distribute the computation of the hash value. The new notion of extended SPHF is
defined in the following setting: We consider a language Laux with words (ciphertexts)
C that are ordered sets of n = x + 1 ciphertexts (C0, . . . , Cx). Parameter aux, a
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language is indexed with, allows us to easily describe languages that differ only in the
secret part aux′. The secret variable information aux′ is chosen from the additive group
(P,+) = (Z+p ,+) with a (sharing) function h : P 7→ Px. Let LLaux denote the language
of ciphertexts encrypting the secret part aux′ from aux with public key pk from aux
using encryption scheme L. For all Ci, i ∈ {1, . . . , x} it must hold that Ci ∈ LLauxi
where auxi = (pk, aux′i) with aux′i = h(aux′)[i]. For C0 it must hold that C0 ∈ LLaux.
Furthermore, the ciphertexts must offer certain homomorphic properties such that
there exists a modified decryption algorithm Dec′ and a combining function g such that
Dec′π(C0) = Dec′π(g(C1, . . . , Cx)), where π denotes the secret key for the corresponding
public key pk from crs.
The idea of extended SPHF is to be able to use the SPHF functionality not only
on a single ciphertext, but on a set of ciphertexts with specific properties, i. e. over
encrypted shares of aux′. Due to the nature of the words considered in extended SPHF
they produce two different hash values. One can think of the two hash values as h0 for
C0 and hx for C1, . . . , Cx. The hash value h0 can be either computed with knowledge
of the hash key kh0 or with the witnesses w1, . . . , wx that C1, . . . , Cx are in LLauxi each.
The hash value hx can be computed with knowledge of the hash keys kh1, . . . , khx or
with the witness w0 that C0 is in LLaux.
Definition 34 (Extended SPHF). Let Laux denote a language such that C = (C0, C1, . . . ,
Cx) ∈ Laux if there exists a witness w = (w0, w1, . . . , wx) proving so and there exist
functions h(aux′) = (aux′1, . . . , aux′x) and g : Gl 7→ Gl′ as described above. An ex-
tended smooth projective hash function for language Laux with Γ ∈ Gk×n consists of the
following six algorithms:
• KGenH(Laux) generates a hashing key khi ∈ Z1×np for i ∈ {0, . . . , x} and language
Laux.
• KGenP(khi, Laux) derives the projection key kpi = Γ⊙khi ∈ G1×k for i ∈ {0, . . . , x}.
• Hashx(kh0, Laux, C1, . . . , Cx) outputs hash value
hx = Θxaux(C1, . . . , Cx)⊙ kh0.
• PHashx(kp0, Laux, C1, . . . , Cx, w1, . . . , wx) returns hash value
hx =
x∏
i=1
(λi ⊙ kp0), where λi = Ω(wi, Ci).
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• Hash0(kh1, . . . , khx, Laux, C0) outputs hash value
h0 =
x∏
i=1
(Θ0aux(C0)⊙ khi) = Θ0aux(C0)⊙
x∑
i=1
khi.
• PHash0(kp1, . . . , kpx, Laux, C0, w0) returns hash value
h0 =
x∏
i=1
(λ0 ⊙ kpi), with λ0 = Ω(w0, C0).
♢
The correctness of the scheme can be easily verified by checking that Hashx = PHashx
and Hash0 = PHash0.
3.1.1 Security Analysis
We refine definitions of smoothness and pseudorandomness to account for the two
different hash functions. Therefore, we add both hash values to the indistinguishable
sets, as well as the vector of projection keys. We start with smoothness of extended
SPHF. The smoothness proven in Theorem 5 follows directly from the proof given in
[29, Appendix D.3] and follows the same approach for smoothness proofs as in previous
works on SPHF [29, 101, 130]. Recall that we are only concerned with adaptive
smoothness. Let kp denote the vector of projection keys kpi for i = 0, . . . , x. For any
functions f, f ′ to Ω \ Laux (for output space Ω of f, f ′) the following distributions are
statistically ε-close:
{(kp, h0, hx) | h0 ← Hash0(kh1, . . . , khx, Laux, f(kp0)); hx ← Hashx(kh0, Laux,
f ′(kp1, . . . , kpx));∀i ∈ {0, . . . , x} : khi
$← KGenH(Laux); kpi ← KGenP(khi, Laux)}
ε={(kp, h0, hx) | h0 ∈R G; hx ∈R G;∀i ∈ {0, . . . , x} : khi $← KGenH(Laux);
kpi ← KGenP(khi, Laux)}.
Theorem 5 (Extended SPHF Smoothness). The extended SPHF construction from
Definition 34 on cyclic groups is statistically smooth.
Proof. We show that the logarithm of the projection keys kp and the logarithm
of the hash values h0 and hx are defined by linearly independent equations and
thus h0 and hx are uniform in G, given kp. In addition to this general proof we
give an extended proof of extended SPHF smoothness instantiated with labelled
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Cramer-Shoup encryption for better understanding in Section 3.4.1. To show that
(kp, h0, hx) is uniformly distributed in Gk+2 for C ̸∈ Laux, i. e. ε-close to (kp, g0, gx)
for random g0, gx ∈R G, we consider a word C = (C0, C1, . . . , Cx) ̸∈ Laux and a
projection key kpj = Γ⊙ khj such that one Cj does not fulfil the property Cj ∈ Lauxj ,
i. e. ∃j ∈ {0, . . . , x},∀λj ∈ Z1×kp : Θauxj(Cj) ̸= λj ⊙ Γ. From [29, Appendix D.3] it
follows directly that Θauxj(Cj)⊙ khj is a uniformly distributed element in G, and thus
Θxaux(C1, . . . , Cx)⊙ kh0 and
∏x
i=1(Θ0aux(C0)⊙ khi) are uniformly distributed in G. The
projection key kp is uniformly at random in Gk anyway, given the randomness of all
khi. Note that any violation of Dec′π(C0) = Dec′π(g(C1, . . . , Cx)) implies the existence
of an index j such that Cj ̸∈ Lauxj .
While smoothness is the foremost property of (extended) smooth projective hash
functions, cases like PAKE require pseudorandomness of the produced hash values.
Let kp denote the vector of projection keys kpi for i = 0, . . . , x. An extended SPHF is
pseudorandom if its hash values are computationally indistinguishable from random
without knowledge of the uniformly chosen hash keys kh or the witnesses w, i. e. for all
C = (C0, . . . , Cx) ∈ Laux the following distributions are computationally ε-close:
{(kp, C, h0, hx) | ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , x} : khi $← KGenH(Laux); kpi ← KGenP(khi, Laux);
h0 ← Hash0(kh1, . . . , khx, Laux, C0); hx ← Hashx(kh0, Laux, C1, . . . , Cx)}
ε= {(kp, C, h0, hx) | ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , x} : khi $← KGenH(Laux); kpi ← KGenP(khi, Laux);
h0 ∈R G;hx ∈R G}
To prove pseudorandomness of an extended SPHF we use modified experiments from
[101] given in Definition 35.
Definition 35 (Extended SPHF Pseudorandomness). An extended SPHF Π is pseu-
dorandom if for all PPT algorithms A there exists a negligible function ε(·) such
that
AdvPrΠ,A =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ExpPrΠ,A = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε(λ)
ExpPrΠ,A(λ) :
b ∈R {0, 1}
kpi ← KGenP(khi, Laux, Ci) and khi ← KGenH(Laux) for all i ∈ 0, . . . , x
b′ ← AΩLpk(·)(λ, kp0, . . . , kpx)
return b = b′
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ΩLpk(ℓ, aux) returns elements C = (C0, . . . , Cx) ∈ Laux with C0 ← EncLpk(ℓ0, aux′; r0)
and Ci ← EncLpk(ℓi, aux′i; ri) for all i ∈ 1, . . . , x and pk ∈ aux using encryp-
tion scheme L and according labels ℓi. It additionally returns Hash0(kh1, . . . ,
khx, Laux, C0), Hashx(kh0, Laux, C1, . . . , Cx) if b = 0 or h0, hx ∈R G if b = 1. ♢
The following theorem shows pseudorandomness of hash values in extended SPHFs.
Theorem 6 (Extended SPHF Pseudorandomness). The extended SPHF construction
from Definition 34 on cyclic groups is pseudorandom if L is a CCA-secure labelled
encryption scheme.
Proof. Pseudorandomness of extended SPHF follows immediately from its smoothness
and the CCA-security of the used encryption scheme. First we change ΩLpk such that it
returns the encryption of 0 for a random i ∈ 0, . . . , x. This change is not noticeable by
the adversary due to the CCA-security of the encryption scheme. Assuming 0 is not a
valid message, i. e. aux′ ̸= 0 and auxi ̸= 0 for all i ∈ 1, . . . , x, the pseudorandomness of
extended SPHF follows from its smoothness.
Katz and Vaikuntanathan [130] highlight that this definition of pseudorandomness
is not enough when used in PAKE protocols if the hash values are not bound to a
specific session by signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MACs). Therefore,
they prove pseudorandomness under re-use of hash keys and ciphertexts. Taking
into account re-use of SPHFx values such as ciphertexts and keys we formalise the
notion of concurrent pseudorandomness for extended SPHF following the approach
from Katz and Vaikuntanathan [130]. Let kp denote the vector of projection keys kpi
for i = 0, . . . , x. An extended SPHF is pseudorandom in concurrent execution if the
hash values are computationally indistinguishable from random without knowledge of
the uniformly chosen hash keys or the witnesses, i. e. for fixed l = l(λ) the following
distributions are computationally ε-close:
{(kp1, . . . , kpl, C1, . . . , Cl, h0,1, . . . , h0,l, hx,1, . . . , hx,l) |
∀i ∈ {0, . . . , x}, j ∈ {1, . . . , l} : khi,j $← KGenH(Laux); kpi,j ← KGenP(khi, Laux);
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , l} : h0,j ← Hash0(kh1,j, . . . , khx,j, Laux, C0,j);
hx,j ← Hashx(kh0,j, Laux, C1,j, . . . , Cx,j)}
ε= {(kp1, . . . , kpl, C1, . . . , Cl, h0,1, . . . , h0,l, hx,1, . . . , hx,l) |
∀i ∈ {0, . . . , x}, j ∈ {1, . . . , l} : khi,j $← KGenH(Laux); kpi,j ← KGenP(khi, Laux);
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , l} : h0,j ∈R G;hx,j ∈R G}
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We extend Definition 35 to capture re-use of hash keys and ciphertexts. The corre-
sponding experiment in Definition 36 generates l hash values to each ciphertext, one
for each hash key.
Definition 36 (Extended SPHF Concurrent Pseudorandomness). An extended SPHF
Π offers concurrent pseudorandomness if for all PPT algorithms A and polynomials l
there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that
AdvPrΠ,A =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ExpPrΠ,A = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε(λ)
ExpPrΠ,A(λ) :
b ∈R {0, 1}, kpj = (kp0, . . . , kpx) with
kpi ← KGenP(khi, Laux, Ci) and khi ← KGenH(Laux)
for all i ∈ 0, . . . , x and j ∈ 1, . . . , l
b′ ← AΩLpk(·)(λ, kp1, . . . , kpl)
return b = b′
ΩLpk(ℓ, aux) returns elements C = (C0, . . . , Cx) ∈ Laux with C0 ← EncLpk(ℓ0, aux′; r0) and
Ci ← EncLpk(ℓi, auxi; ri) for all i ∈ 1, . . . , x and pk ∈ aux using encryption algo-
rithm L and according labels ℓi. It additionally returns Hash0,j(kh1,j, . . . , khx,j, Laux,
C0), Hashx,j(kh0,j, Laux, C1, . . . , Cx) if b = 0 or h0,j, hx,j ∈ G if b = 1 for all
j ∈ 1, . . . , l. ♢
The following theorem give concurrent pseudorandomness of the proposed construction
for extended SPHFs.
Lemma 10 (Concurrent Pseudorandomness of Extended SPHF). The extended SPHF
construction from Definition 34 on cyclic groups is pseudorandom on re-use of hash
and ciphertext values if L is a CCA-secure labelled encryption scheme.
Proof. Using a hybrid argument it is enough to show that the adversary can not
distinguish between experiment Exp1 where Ω returns random elements for the first i
hash values of the j-th query and all queries < j and correct hashes for all subsequent
queries and indices > i, and Exp2 where Ω returns random elements for the first i+ 1
hash values of the j-th query and all queries < j and correct hashes for all subsequent
queries and indices > i+ 1. Having this in mind the proof follows the same argument
as the one for extended SPHF pseudorandomness. We briefly recall the argument
there. We modify Exp1 to Exp′1 and Exp2 to Exp′2 such that Ω returns an encryption of
0 instead of correct encryptions for Cj. Note that we assume 0 is not a valid message
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such that Cj ̸∈ Laux in Exp′1. Due to CCA-security of L this step is not observable by
the adversary. Changing Exp′1 to Exp′2 the smoothness of extended SPHF ensures that
A can not distinguish between the two experiments, which proves the lemma.
3.2 Distributed Smooth Projective Hashing
Using extended SPHFs only makes sense in a distributed setting. We therefore consider
n = x + 1 entities participating in the distributed computation of extended SPHF
hash values h0, hx. Let Pi for i ∈ {1, . . . , x} denote parties, each knowing auxi and
computing the according ciphertext Ci and projection key kpi. Furthermore, let P0
denote the participant knowing aux and computing C0 and kp0. We define protocols in
this setting with the purpose that both P0 and P1 can eventually compute h0 and hx.
While P0 can compute PHash0 and Hashx after receiving all Ci and kpi, computation
of Hash0 and PHashx can not be performed solely by the previously described algorithms
in this setting, without disclosing witnesses or the hashing keys. To compute PHashx
and Hash0, parties P1, . . . , Px have to collaborate since they know only part of the
input parameters. D-SPHF defines protocols that allow secure calculation of h0 and hx.
Intuitively D-SPHF reaches the same security properties as extended SPHF, namely
smoothness and pseudorandomness in presence of a passive adversary, by additionally
ensuring that no protocol participant alone is able to compute the hash values. Note
that while we assume each Pi for i > 0 holds a key-pair and knows public keys of all
other Pi such that all communication between two Pi is secured by the receivers public
key, those keys are not authenticated, i. e. we do not assume a PKI, neither does P0
require a key.
A D-SPHF protocol between n participants P0, . . . , Px computing hx and h0 consists
of three interactive protocols Setup, PHashDx and HashD0 . Let Π denote the extended
SPHF algorithm that is being distributed.
• Setup(aux, P0, . . . , Px) initialises a new instance for each participant with (aux,
P0, P1, . . . , Px) for P0 and (auxi, Pi, P0, . . . , Px) for Pi, i ∈ {1, . . . , x}. Eventually,
all participants compute and broadcast projection keys kpi and encryptions Ci ←
EncLpk(ℓi, aux′i; ri) of their secret aux′i using Π.KGenH, Π.KGenP and the associated
encryption scheme L. Participants store incoming (kpi, Ci) for later use. After re-
ceiving (kp1, C1, . . . , kpx, Cx), P0 computes h0 ← Π.PHash0(kp1, . . . , kpx, Laux, C0, r0)
and hx ← Π.Hashx(kh0, Laux, C1, . . . , Cx).
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• PHashDx is executed between parties P1, . . . , Px. Each Pi performs PHashDx on
input (kp0, auxi, C1, . . . , Cx, ri) such that P1 eventually holds hx while all Pi for
i > 1 do not learn anything about hx.
• HashD0 is executed between parties P1, . . . , Px. Each Pi performs HashD0 on input
(aux′i, khi, C0, . . . , Cx) such that P1 eventually holds h0 and all Pi for i > 1 do not
learn anything about h0.
A D-SPHF is said to be correct if PHashDx = PHashx and HashD0 = Hash0 assuming
that all messages are honestly computed and transmitted. The security of a D-
SPHF in presence of a passive adversary follows immediately from smoothness and
pseudorandomness of the extended SPHF algorithms.
Remark Note that we focus on asymmetric distribution here such that only P1
computes the hash values. Building symmetric distribution protocols where all parties
Pi compute the same hash values from this is straightforward but requires a different
security model. Likewise, it is possible to build asymmetric distribution protocols
where all Pi compute different hash values (we will see an example of that later).
3.3 Security Model
Smooth projective hashing has not been used in a distributed manner before such that
it was not necessary to consider active adversaries. By introducing distributed computa-
tion of hash values HashD0 and PHashDx protocols are exposed to active attacks. However,
the adversary must still not be able to distinguish real hash values from random ele-
ments, i. e. smoothness and pseudorandomness must hold. Therefore we introduce a
security model for D-SPHF smoothness and pseudorandomness, capturing active attacks
in a multi-user and multi-instance setting. Let {(P j0 , P k1 , . . . , P lx)}P j0∈P0,Pki ∈P i∈{1,...,x}
denote all tuples (P j0 , P k1 , . . . , P lx) such that P
j
0 ∈ P0 knows aux and P k1 , . . . , P lx ∈ P
each know according auxi. We say P0 is registered with (P1, . . . , Px). The additional
indices j, k, l denote the instance of the respective participant.
Definition 37 (D-SPHF Security). A D-SPHF protocol Π is secure (offers adaptive
smoothness and concurrent pseudorandomness) if for all PPT adversaries A there
exists a negligible function ε(·) such that :
AdvD-SPHFΠ,A (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ExpD-SPHFΠ,A (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε(λ)
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ExpD-SPHFΠ,A (λ) :
b ∈R {0, 1}
b′ ← ASetup(·),Send(·),Test(·)(λ, aux2, . . . , auxx,L, crs)
return b = b′
• Setup(P0, . . . , Px) initialises new instances with (aux, P1, . . . , Px) for P0 reg-
istered with (P1, . . . , Px) and (aux1, P1, P0, . . . , Px) for P1 and returns ((kp0,
C0), (kp1, C1)) with Ci ← EncLpk(ℓ, aux′i; ri) and khi ← Π.KGenH(Laux), kpi ←
Π.KGenP(khi, Laux)
• Send(Pb, Pa,m) sends message m with alleged originator Pa to Pb and returns
Pb’s resulting message m′ if any.
• Test(P ji ) for i ∈ {0, 1} returns two hash values (h0, hx). If the global bit b is
0, the hash values are chosen uniformly at random from G, otherwise the hash
values are computed according to protocol specification Π. ♢
Note that we assume without loss of generality that all participants P2, . . . , Px are
corrupted by the adversary, who thus knows their secrets. Furthermore, note that A
can query the Test oracle only once.
The active security notion for D-SPHF computation covers smoothness and pseu-
dorandomess as defined before. The experiment is equivalent to the computational
smoothness definition when A computes and forwards all messages honestly but changes
at least one auxi. Note that this is actually a stronger notion than smoothness as we
require pseudorandomness of hash values output by the projection function on a word
not in the language. This is usually not included in the smoothness definition, which
is defined over the hash function. Further, Definition 37 is equivalent to Definition 36
when A computes and forwards all messages honestly and does not change any auxi.
3.4 Instantiation – Cramer-Shoup D-SPHF
We exemplify the D-SPHF definition on labelled Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts. The
ciphertexts are created as Ci = (u1,i, u2,i, ei, vi)← EncCSpk (ℓi, aux′i; ri) for all i = 1, . . . , x
with aux′i = h(aux′)[i] and C0 = (u1,0, u2,0, e0, v0) ← EncCSpk (ℓ0, aux′0; r0), where ℓi
consists of participating parties and the party’s projection key. We define modified
decryption as Dec′π(C) = e · u−z1 . The combining function g uses the homomorphic
property of u1 and e of the CS ciphertext such that g(C1, . . . , Cx) = (
∏x
i=1 u1,i,
∏x
i=1 ei)
and aux′ = ∑xi=1 aux′i. The following variables then define Cramer-Shoup D-SPHF:
140 Password Authentication Framework in the Two-Server Setting
Γ =
g1 1 g2 h c
1 g1 1 1 d
 ∈ G2×5, λ = (r, rξ) ∈ Z1×2p
Θ0aux(C0) = (u1, u
ξ
1, u2, e/aux′, v) ∈ G1×5
Θxaux(C1, . . . , Cx) = (
x∏
i=1
u1,i,
x∏
i=1
uξi1,i,
x∏
i=1
u2,i,
x∏
i=1
ei/aux′,
x∏
i=1
vi) ∈ G1×5
Using them in the extended SPHF Definition 34 yields the extended Cramer-Shoup
SPHF. Instead of aiming for absolute generality we describe the Cramer-Shoup D-SPHF
for x = 2 such that both participants P1 and P2 compute and broadcast (kpi, Ci),
while P0 computes and broadcasts (kp0, C0), i. e. for the 2PAKE setting. Let × denote
element wise multiplication, e. g., for El-Gamal ciphertexts C1 = (u1, e1), C2 = (u2, e2),
C1 × C2 is defined as (u1u2, e1e2). PHashDx and HashD0 protocols are defined as follows:
• PHashDx is executed between P1 and P2. P2 computes hx,2 = λ⊙ kp0 = (kp0[1] ·
kp0[2]ξ2)r2 and sends it to P1. Eventually, P1 holds hx = hx,2 · (λ ⊙ kp0) =
kp0[1]r1+r2 · kp0[2]ξ1·r1+ξ2·r2 . Note that P1 always performs checks that kp0 ∈ G
and G ∋ hx2 ̸= 0.
• HashD0 is executed between P1 and P2 such that P1 eventually holds h0. Let Pi
for i ∈ {1, 2} denote the participating party knowing (auxi, ski, khi = (η1, η2, θ,
µ, ν), pk1, pk2, C0 = (u1, u2, e, v, ξ)).
– P1 computes m0 ← EncEGpk1(g
−µ
1 ; r) and c′1 ← EncEGpk1(g
aux′1
1 ; r′), and sends
(m0, c′1) to P2.
– Receiving (m0, c′1) from P1, P2 computes
m1 ← (m0)aux′2 × (c′1)−µ × EncEGpk1(g
−µ·aux′2
1 · uη1+ξη21 · uθ2 · eµ · vν ; r′′)
and sends it to P1.
– Receiving m1, P1 computes the hash value
h0 = g
−µ·aux′1
1 · DecEGsk1(m1) · uη1+ξη21 · uθ2 · eµ · vν .
3.4.1 Smoothness of extended Cramer-Shoup SPHF
We want to discuss the statistical smoothness of extended SPHF from Theorem 5 in
this section. While the intuition and actual proof has been given in Section 3.1, we
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want to formulate what actually happens there. Therefore, we use the instantiation
of extended Cramer-Shoup SPHF and limit x = 2. Recall that we thus want to show
that (kp0, kp1, kp2, h0, hx) is uniformly distributed in Gk+2 for all C ̸∈ Laux. Actually,
we do not have to bother with the projection keys kp0, kp1, kp2, as they are uniformly
at random in Gk anyway, given the randomness of all khi. What we want to show is
that given kp0, kp1, kp2, the hash values h0 and hx are uniformly distributed in G. More
precisely, we show that for all C = (C0, C1, C2) ̸∈ Laux the projection keys kp0, kp1, kp2
are defined by functions that are linearly independent from the functions used in
Hash0 and Hashx, such that the resulting hash values h0 ← Hash0 and hx ← Hashx
are uniformly distributed in G. Computing the discrete logarithm in base g1 of hx, h0
and the projection keys kp1, kp1 and kp2 with m = gpwd and m′ = gpwd
′ such that
EncCSpk (m′) ̸∈ Laux we get the following equations:
logg1(h0) = logg1(kp1[0]) · r0 + logg1(kp1[1]) · ξ0r0
+ logg1(kp2[0]) · r0 + logg2(kp2[1]) · ξ0r0 + logg1(m′/m) · (ν1 + ν2)
= r0(η1,1 + η1,2) + ξ0r0(η2,1 + η2,2) + logg1(g2) · r0(θ1 + θ2) + z · r0(ν1 + ν2)
(3)
+ logg1(c) · r0(ν1 + ν2) + logg1(d) · ξ0r0(ν1 + ν2) + logg1(m′/m) · (ν1 + ν2)
logg1(hx) = logg1(kp0[0]) · (r1 + r2) + logg1(kp0[1]) · (ξ1r1 + ξ2r2) + logg1(m′/m) · ν0
= (r1 + r2)η1,0 + (ξ1r1 + ξ2r2)η2,0 + logg1(g2) · (r1 + r2)θ0 + z · (r1 + r2)ν0
(4)
+ logg1(c) · (r1 + r2)ν0 + logg1(d) · (ξ1r1 + ξ2r2)ν0 + logg1(m′/m) · ν0
logg1(kp0[0]) = η1,0 + logg1(g2) · θ0 + logg1(h) · µ0 + logg1(v) · ν0 (5)
logg1(kp0[1]) = η2,0 + logg1(d) · ν0 (6)
logg1(kp1[0]) = η1,1 + logg1(g2) · θ1 + z · µ1 + logg1(v) · ν1 (7)
logg1(kp1[1]) = η2,1 + logg1(d) · ν1 (8)
logg1(kp2[0]) = η1,2 + logg1(g2) · θ2 + z · µ2 + logg1(v) · ν2 (9)
logg1(kp2[1]) = η2,2 + logg1(d) · ν2. (10)
Since C ̸∈ Laux we know that m ̸= m′ and thus m′/m ≠ 1. Therefore, the probability
for g0 = logg1(m′/m) · (ν1 + ν2) and gx = logg1(m′/m) · ν0 for any g0, gx ∈ G is 1/|G|
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even knowing the projection keys kp0, kp1, kp2. Note that these equations for g0 and
gx are linearly independent from Equations 5 - 10 such that every element from G
is equally likely to be the result. Equations 3 and 4 are fully determined by public
information C0, C1, C2 and kp0, kp1, kp2 such that their result is uniformly distributed
in G given the randomness of g0 and gx.
3.4.2 Security Analysis
We show now that the proposed Cramer-Shoup D-SPHF is secure. The intuition
behind the proof is that the pseudorandomness of hx can be reduced directly to the
DDH problem in G and CCA security of CS encryption, while pseudorandomness of h0
follows from the smoothness and pseudorandomness of the underlying extended SPHF
scheme.
Theorem 7 (Cramer-Shoup D-SPHF Security). The Cramer-Shoup D-SPHF instanti-
ation is secure against active adversaries according to Definition 37 when the DDH
assumption in the used group G holds and L = CS is CCA-secure.
Proof. First, note that the theorem follows immediately from smoothness and pseudo-
randomness in the passive case if the adversary queries Test(P0). We therefore focus
on Test(P1) queries. We start with the pseudorandomness of hx, i. e. for all g it holds
that Pr[hx = g] = 1/|G|. Consider an attacker A on input (λ, aux2,L, crs) and let
Exp0 denote the original D-SPHF experiment.
Exp1 : We change Test such that a uniformly at random chosen element gx ∈R G is
returned for hx.
Claim 3.
∣∣∣AdvExp0Π,A − AdvExp1Π,A ∣∣∣ ≤ ε(λ)
Proof. The hash value hx in Exp0 is computed as hx = (kp′0[1] · kp′0[2]ξ1)r1 · hx,2 with
adversarially generated hx,2 and kp′0. Indistinguishability of hx and gx, and thus the
claim, follows immediately as long as the DDH assumption in G holds (using DDH
triple (kp′0[1] · kp′0[2]ξ1 , gr1 , hx) and (kp′0[1] · kp′0[2]ξ1 , gr1 , gx)). Note that P1 aborts if
either hx,2 ̸∈ G or kp′0 ̸∈ G2.
To show the security (concurrent pseudorandomness and adaptive smoothness) of h0 we
define two Send queries that allow execution of the protocol: (m1, c′1)← Send1(P1, P2,
(kp′0, C ′0, kp′2, C ′2)) starts the protocol execution between P1 and P2 and provides the
attacker with (m1, c′1). Using these messages the adversary (P2) computes a message
m2 and sends it to P1 with Send2(P1, P2,m2). This reflects the execution of a single
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protocol run of HashD0 such that P1 eventually computes h0. In contrast to the passive
and classical SPHF proofs we can not replace the ciphertexts with encryptions of words
not in the language. However, this is not necessary as t is in fact the Hash computa-
tion of the classical Cramer-Shoup SPHF without cancelling the message, i. e. t = h·mµ.
Exp2 : We change Test such that a uniformly at random chosen element g0 ∈R G is
returned for h0.
Claim 4.
∣∣∣AdvExp1Π,A − AdvExp2Π,A ∣∣∣ ≤ ε(λ)
Proof. The hash value h0 in Exp1 is computed as h0 = g−µ1·aux
′
1 · DecEGsk1(m2) · t with
t = uη1,1+ξ0η2,11,0 uθ12,0eµ10 vν10 where m2 and C ′0 = (u1,0, u2,0, e0, v0) may be adversarially
generated. The value t is actually the Hash value of the classical Cramer-Shoup SPHF
without cancelled message, or in other words t is the result of a SPHF Hash computation
for language L(crs,0) such that any C ′0, encrypting some correct aux′ ̸= 0, is not in
this language. Due to smoothness of the Hash function [30] t is indistinguishable
from a uniformly at random chosen element. If the adversary encrypted 0 in C ′0,
pseudorandomness of Hash takes effect. Therefore h0 = d · t is indistinguishable from a
random group element for all d ∈ G.
In Exp2 the adversary always gets random group elements in answer to his Test query.
Therefore, he can not do better than guessing bit b.
3.5 Instantiation – ElGamal D-SPHF
Similar to Cramer-Shoup D-SPHF we can instantiate ElGamal D-SPHF. We use m
for the encrypted message, that is part of aux′ and pk for the ElGamal public key
h = gz from the crs. The ciphertexts are created as Ci = (u, e)← EncEGpk (mi; ri) for
all i = 1, . . . , x with mi = h(m)[i] and C0 = (u, e) ← EncEGpk (m; r0). The decryption
follows the ElGamal decryption such that Dec′π = DecEGz . The combining function g
uses the homomorphic property of u and e such that g(C1, . . . , Cx) = (
∏x
i=1 ui,
∏x
i=1 ei).
To use the SPHF framework we also need the following variables and functions:
Γ(C) = (g, h)T ∈ G2×1, λ = r ∈ Zp, Θ0aux(C) = (u, e/m) ∈ G1×2
Θxaux(C1, . . . , Cx) = (
x∏
i=1
ui,
x∏
i=1
ei/m) ∈ G1×2
Using them in the extended SPHF Definition 34 yields the following extended ElGamal
SPHF (building the according D-SPHF is then straightforward):
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• h0 ← Hash0(kh1, . . . , khx, Laux, C0) :
h0 =
x∏
i=1
Θ0aux(C)⊙ khi =
x∏
i=1
[(u0, e0/m)⊙ (η, θ)] =
x∏
i=1
[uηi0 (e0/m)θi ] ∈ G
• hx ← PHashx(kp0, Laux, C1, . . . , Cx, r1, . . . , rx) :
hx =
x∏
i=1
(λi ⊙ kp0) =
x∏
i=1
(ri ⊙ gη0hθ0) =
x∏
i=1
(gη0hθ0)ri ∈ G
4 Two-Server PAKE from Distributed SPHF
Using D-SPHF it is easy to build 2PAKE protocols. In this section we present a new
2PAKE framework based on D-SPHFs. Moreover, we show that the 2PAKE protocol
by Katz et al. [127] can be considered a variant of the proposed framework using a
mix of D-SPHFs for Cramer-Shoup and El-Gamal ciphertexts. We consider the same
setting as Katz et al. [127] here, in which the client computes two independent session
keys with the two servers.
4.1 A Two-Server PAKE Framework
Considering the setting from Katz et al. [127] means that a client negotiates independent
session keys with both servers that hold s1 + s2 = pwd. We omit the second server in
the description of the protocol as the framework is symmetric in the sense that the
second server S2 performs like S1. The framework follows the same principle as the
latest PAKE frameworks from SPHFs. In particular it can be seen as a two-server
variant of the PAKE protocol from Katz and Vaikuntanathan [130].
You can think of the two-server protocol as the execution of two D-SPHF protocols,
one between (C,S1,S2) and one between (C,S2,S1) where servers S2 and S1 swap roles,
such that (C,S1) and (C,S2) eventually hold common hash values that can be used to
generate a shared session key sk1 and sk2. The only overlap between the two D-SPHF
executions is the Hashx computation. The reuse of ciphertexts C1 and C2 in Hashx
functions across the two servers is covered by the concurrent pseudorandomness.
4.1.1 The Framework
The servers encrypt their password shares under a public key pk stored in the crs using a
CCA-secure labelled encryption scheme and distribute this ciphertext together with two
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appropriate projection keys for a secure D-SPHF, (kp1,1, kp1,2, C1) and (kp2,1, kp2,2, C2).
The client computes two independent encryptions of the password and generates two
independent according projection keys (kp0,1, C0,1, kp0,2, C0,2). The previously described
D-SPHF allows us to send all kpi, Ci in one round and therefore reach optimality for
this step. Using these values, the client can compute session keys as product of the
two hash values h0,1, hx,1 for sk1, which is shared with S1 and from h0,2, hx,2 for sk2
that is shared with S2.
Subsequently, the two servers perform the HashD0 and PHashDx protocols such that
S1 holds hash values h0,1 and hx,1 to compute sk1 and S2 holds h0,2 and hx,2 to compute
sk2. Eventually, C holds sk1 = h0,1 · hx,1 and sk2 = h0,2 · hx,2, S1 holds sk1 = h0,1 · hx,1
and S2 holds sk2 = h0,2 ·hx,2. An instantiation of the framework using labelled Cramer-
Shoup encryption and the aforementioned D-SPHF yields a secure 2PAKE protocol.
Note that this actually requires two D-SPHF executions.
4.1.2 Security Analysis
We use the well-known game based PAKE model first introduced by Bellare et al. [24]
in it’s two-server variant by Katz et al. [127] (cf. Section 2.4 Chapter II). Security of
the 2PAKE framework follows directly from the CCA-security of the used encryption
scheme and the security of the used D-SPHF.
Theorem 8. Let (KGenH, KGenP, PHash0, Hashx, HashD0 , PHashDx ) be a secure D-SPHF
and (KGen, Enc, Dec) a CCA-secure labelled encryption scheme, then the proposed
framework is a secure 2PAKE protocol.
Proof sketch. Let Π denote a secure instantiation of the 2PAKE framework. To prove
security of Π we introduce three experiments such that the adversary in the last
experiment Exp3 can not do better than guessing the password as all messages are
password independent, i. e. AdvExp3Π,A ≤ q/|D| for q active attacks. We initially focus on
the AKE-security of sk1.
Exp1 is identical to the two-server AKE-security experiment except that the simu-
lator knows π, the decryption key to pk in the crs (only a syntactical change) and
the following changes: If C0,1 or C1, handed to S1 or C are adversarially generated and
encrypt the correct password(share), the simulator stops and A wins the experiment.
If C0,1, C1 or C2, handed to S1 or C encrypt a wrong password(share), the key for that
session is drawn uniformly at random from G. The first change only increases the
adversarial advantage and the second one introduces a negligible gap according to the
adaptive smoothness of the used D-SPHF.
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Exp2 performs like Exp1 except that it draws the session key at random from G if
all Ci handed to C and S1 are oracle generated or encrypt the correct password and no
session key has been chosen for the partner in that session (otherwise that previously
drawn key is used). This introduces a negligible gap between advantages in Exp1 and
Exp2 due to the concurrent pseudorandomness of the used D-SPHF.
Exp3 acts like Exp2 except that it returns encryptions of 0 for C0,1 and C1 (note
that 0 is not a valid password). This step is covered by the CCA-security of the used
encryption scheme.
AKE-security of sk1 follows as all messages are password independent in Exp3 unless
the adversary guesses the correct password. Using the same sequence of experiments
but considering C and S2 instead of C and S1, AKE-security of sk2 follows.
4.2 The 2-Server KOY Protocol
Using D-SPHF we can “explain” the 2KOY proposed by Katz et al. [127]; similar to
Gennaro and Lindell [101] who “explained” the original KOY protocol from Katz et al.
[128]. We define encryption schemes and D-SPHF used in 2KOY, highlight changes to
our framework and discuss implications of this on the security of 2KOY.
The crs contains a public key pk for Cramer-Shoup encryption as well as a public
key g3 for El-Gamal encryption. Since 2KOY uses El-Gamal encryptions on the server
side, we have to use a combination of Cramer-Shoup and ElGamal based D-SPHF
here. Instead of using Cramer-Shoup encryptions and D-SPHF, the client computes
projection keys for an ElGamal D-SPHF.
Likewise, the servers compute projection keys for a Cramer-Shoup distributed GL-
D-SPHF and El-Gamal encryptions of their password shares.2 Recall that Gennaro and
Lindell [101] formally introduced the first use of SPHF in the PAKE setting, denoted
by GL-SPHF here. To describe GL-SPHF on labelled Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts in
the framework from [29] it is sufficient to define the following variables:
Γ(C) =
g1 g2 h c
1 1 1 dξ

T
∈ G4×2
λ = r ∈ Zp and Θaux(C) = (u1, u2, e/m, v) ∈ G1×4
2Note that an additional signature on the session transcript in round three ensures “non-malleability”
of these ciphertexts.
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Client C Server S1
Input: crs, pwd,S1,S2 Input: crs, s1, C,S2, Cˆ2
(vk, sk)← Gen, ℓ = (C, vk) (kh1, kh′1)← KGenHCS(Laux)
C1,0 ← EncCSpk (ℓ, pwd; r1)
C2,0 ← EncCSpk (ℓ, pwd; r2)
C1,0, C2,0, vk−−−−−−−−→ (kp1, kp′1)← KGenPCS(kh1, kh′1, C1,0)
(kh1,0, kh2,0)
$← KGenHEG(Laux)
(kp1,0, kp2,0)← KGenPEG(kh1,0, kh2,0, Laux)
C1, kp1, kp
′
1←−−−−−−−− C1 ← EncEGg3 (gs11 ; r1)
C2, kp2, kp
′
2←−−−−−−−−
σ ← Sign(trans, kp1, kp2)
h0,1 ← PHashCS0 (kp1, kp2, Laux, C1,0, r1)
σ, kp1,0, kp2,0−−−−−−−−→ check C,G2, trans
h0,2 ← PHashCS0 (kp′1, kp′2, Laux, C2,0, r2) h0,1 ← HashD−CS0
hx,1 ← HashEGx (kh1,0, Laux, C1, C2)
hx,2 ← HashEGx (kh2,0, Laux, C1, C2) hx,1 ← PHashD−EGx
sk1 = h0,1hx,1, sk2 = h0,2hx,2 sk1 = h0,1hx,1
Fig. 19: Two-Server KOY [127] using D-SPHF
The client sends the projection keys in a third round together with a one-time
signature on the session transcript to the servers. The protocol is sketched in Figure
19 using our notation for D-SPHFs. Note that we have to move and rename several
computations but do not modify the protocol. The ElGamal encryption of the password
of server Si, Cˆi ← EncEGpki (gpwdi ; ri) is precomputed and stored on Sj, j ̸= i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Eventually, the client computes hash values using the PHash0 function of the GL-D-
SPHF scheme on CS ciphertexts and the Hashx function of the D-SPHF scheme on
ElGamal ciphertexts. Further, the servers execute the HashD0 protocol of the distributed
GL-D-SPHF scheme on Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts and the PHashDx protocol of the
D-SPHF scheme on ElGamal ciphertexts.
Security Analysis Security of the 2KOY protocol against passive adversaries follows
immediately from [127, Theorem 1] as we do not change the protocol in Figure 19
However, Katz et al. [127] need additional mechanisms to prove their protocol secure
against an active adversary. They add witness-indistinguishable Σ-protocols to the
PHashDx and HashD0 protocols that prove correctness of their messages. Without giving
a proof it seems that Theorem 8 also holds for the two-server KOY instantiation
without additional mechanisms. Examining the proof of [127, Theorem 2] shows that
the additional steps are only necessary to conduct the proof without actually giving
additional security. This shows the power of D-SPHF as they allow for much simpler
proofs of multi-party protocols. Furthermore, with the proposed framework the protocol
becomes more efficient than the two-server KOY protocol as it needs only two rounds
148 Password Authentication Framework in the Two-Server Setting
instead of three and does not need correctness proofs in the distributed hash and
projection protocols.
5 Universally Composable Two-Server PAKE
Using Distributed Smooth Projective Hash Function allows to construct efficient 2PAKE
protocols that are secure in the UC-framework. This follows the same approach as
PAKE protocols from SPHF protocols, which use the properties of SPHFs to construct
efficient PAKE protocols in the UC-framework. In this section we propose the first UC
functionality for 2PAKE protocols and give an efficient instantiation using a variant of
D-SPHF proposed in Section 3.
Before diving into technicalities we want to discuss 2PAKE and security guarantees
it should provide. We discuss informally several security requirements for 2PAKE
protocols, which is then the basis for the ideal functionality F2PAKE defined later. First
note that the adversary has full control over the communication channel between
client and servers as usual but communication between the two servers is confidential.
The first and foremost security requirement of password protocols is security against
offline dictionary attacks and therefore has to be fulfilled by 2PAKE protocols as
well. In particular, no eavesdropping adversary must be able to perform an offline
dictionary attack on the exchanged messages. Further, a malicious server must not be
able to impersonate a registered client in a 2PAKE execution. An attacker, even with
knowledge and capabilities of one of the two servers, must have success probability that
is not significantly better than the success probability of a brute-force attacker when
running a 2PAKE protocol on behalf of a registered client. The BPR-M game-based
security notion for PAKE and 2PAKE, which is derived from the AKE security notion,
captures security by testing whether an attacker is able to distinguish between a real
session key generated by a (two-server) PAKE protocol, and a randomly chosen session
key. This implies in particular that the client agrees on two independent session
keys with the two servers in the 2PAKE setting. UC-security in contrast requires
simulatability of a (two-server) PAKE protocol and is therefore harder to instantiate
because the protocol has to be simulated even in case the adversary is able to guess
the correct password (in which case the game-based model simply aborts the protocol
execution and declares the adversary won the game).
We want to further elaborate the difference between 2PAKE protocols where both
servers compute the same key, compared to a 2PAKE protocol where the servers
compute different keys. Note that asymmetric key generation may also imply that only
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one server calculates a key while the second server only assists in the computation.
In the symmetric setting both servers calculate the same session key as result of the
2PAKE protocol. Even though it is the first natural extension to the single server
PAKE scenario, to the best of our knowledge no such protocol has been proposed
yet. This may be due to the fact that corruption of a single server compromises the
session key of any execution of a 2PAKE protocol that involves this server. In the
asymmetric setting both servers generate different session keys as result of the 2PAKE
protocol, possibly none. Katz et al. [127] proposed the first password-only 2PAKE
protocol provably secure in the standard model, based on the Katz-Ostrovsky-Yung
(KOY) protocol [128]. While their protocol as well as the 2PAKE framework from the
previous section is symmetric in its execution the client computes two independent
session keys, one with each server. Other asymmetric 2PAKE protocols have been
proposed [124, 198] where the client interacts with only one server.
In this section we stick to the asymmetric setting where only one server computes a
session key. This however can be easily extended to a 2PAKE protocol that computes
an independent session keys for each server. To this end we propose the first UC
functionality for 2PAKE protocols, which brings all benefits UC-security carries in
the PAKE setting such as universal composability, security with arbitrary (related)
password choices, security on execution with non-matching password (shares), and so
on. For a comprehensible overview of advantages using UC in the PAKE setting we
refer to Canetti et al. [62]. To this end we extend D-SPHF to Trapdoor Distributed
Smooth Projective Hash Function (TD-SPHF) first.
5.1 Trapdoor D-SPHF
The 2PAKE protocol proposed in the following section makes use of TD-SPHF in order
to allow efficient instantiation. TD-SPHFs enable single round PAKE protocols because
they achieve simulatability even in the case where the attacker guessed the correct
password. To use T-SPHF in the two-server setting we extend the notion of T-SPHFs
(cf. Section 3.7.1 Chapter II) to the distributed setting of D-SPHFs (cf. Section 3.2).
TD-SPHF is in particular a distributed SPHF with a trapdoor that allows computation
of the hash value with knowledge of only the projection keys, ciphertexts, and the
trapdoor, i. e. without knowledge of any secret hashing key. While our description
is specific to the 2PAKE setting with languages over Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts an
extension to more servers and other languages should be straightforward along the
lines of D-SPHF. We use Lp̂wd to denote Lpwd,s1,s2 .
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Definition 38 (TD-SPHF). Let Lp̂wd denote a language such that C = (C0, C1, C2) ∈
Lp̂wd if there exists a witness r = (r0, r1, r2) proving so, pwd = s1+ s2 and there exists a
function Dec′ such that Dec′(C1C2) = Dec′(C0). A TD-SPHF for language Lp̂wd consists
of the following ten algorithms:
• (crs′, τ ′) $← TSetup(crs) generates crs′ with trapdoor τ ′ from crs
• KGenH, KGenP, Hashx, PHashPx, Hash0, PHashP0 behave as for D-SPHF
• VerKp(kp, Lp̂wd) returns b
?= 1 iff kp is a valid projection key, b ?= 0 otherwise
• THashx(kp0, Lp̂wd, C1, C2, τ ′) computes hash value hx of ciphertexts C1 and C2
using projection key kp0 and trapdoor τ ′
• THash0(kp1, kp2, Lp̂wd, C0, τ ′) computes hash value h0 of C0 using projection keys
kp1 and kp2, and trapdoor τ ′
Security of TD-SPHF can be derived from D-SPHF security and the extensions made
on SPHFs for T-SPHFs. However, while modelling correctness and soundness, we
do not model security of TD-SPHF but rather incorporate it in the security proof
of the 2PAKE protocol in the following subsection. In particular, correctness of TD-
SPHFs extends correctness of D-SPHFs by the statement that for every valid ciphertext
triple (C0, C1, C2), generated by L, and honestly generated keys (kh0, kh1, kh2) and
(kp0, kp1, kp2), it holds not only that
Hash0(kh1, kh2, Lp̂wd, C0) = PHashP0(kp1, kp2, Lp̂wd, C0, r0) and
Hashx(kh0, Lp̂wd, C1, C2) = PHashPx(kp0, Lp̂wd, C1, C2, r1, r2)
but also that VerKp(kpi, Lp̂wd) = 1 for i ∈ {0, 1, 2} as well as
Hash0(kh1, kh2, Lp̂wd, C0) = THash0(kp1, kp2, Lp̂wd, C0, τ
′) and
Hashx(kh0, Lp̂wd, C1, C2) = THashx(kp0, Lp̂wd, C1, C2, τ
′).
To capture soundness of TD-SPHFs we define (t, ε)-soundness, complementing the
previous correctness extension as follows.
Definition 39 (TD-SPHF (t, ε)-soundness). Given crs, crs′ and τ , no adversary
running in time at most t can produce a projection key kp, a password pwd with shares
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s1 and s2, a word (C0, C1, C2), and valid witness (r0, r1, r2), such that (kp0, kp1, kp2)
are valid, i. e. VerKp(kpi, Lp̂wd) = 1 for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, but
THashx(kp0, Lp̂wd, C1, C2, τ
′) ̸= PHashPx(kp0, Lp̂wd, C1, C2, r1, r2) or
THash0(kp1, kp2, Lp̂wd, C0, τ
′) ̸= PHashP0(kp1, kp2, Lp̂wd, C0, r0)
with probability at least ε(λ). Perfect soundness states that the property holds for any t
and any ε(λ) > 0.
5.1.1 Cramer-Shoup TD-SPHF
Extending the Cramer-Shoup D-SPHF from Section 3 to a TD-SPHF is straight-forward
combining it with the Cramer-Shoup T-SPHF. This TD-SPHF is, like the Cramer-
Shoup T-SPHF, defined over groups with bilinear pairings. Let C = (ℓ, u1, u2, e, v)
denote a Carmer-Shoup ciphertext as defined in Section 3.4.2 Chapter II.
• TSetup(crs) draws a random τ ′ ∈R Zp and computes crs′ = ζ = gτ ′2
• KGenH(Lp̂wd) returns khi = (η1,i, η2,i, θi, µi, νi) ∈R Z1×5p for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}
• KGenP(khi, Lp̂wd) generates kpi = (kp1,i = g
η1,i
1,1 g
θi
1,2h
µicνi , kp2,i = g
η2,i
1,1 d
νi , kp3,i) with
kp3,i = (χ1,1,i, χ1,2,i, χ2,i, χ3,i, χ4,i) and χ1,1,i = ζη1,i , χ1,2,i = ζη2,i , χ2,i = ζθi , χ3,i =
ζµi , χ4,i = ζνi for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}
• Hashx(kh0, Lp̂wd, C1, C2) computes
h′x = (u1,1 · u1,2)η1,0+(ξ1+ξ2)η2,0(u2,1 · u2,2)θ0((e1 · e2)/gpwd1,1 )µ0(v1 · v2)ν0
and returns hx = e(h′x, g2)
• PHashPx(kp0, Lp̂wd, C1, C2, r1, r2) computes
h′x = kpr1+r21,0 kp
ξ1r1+ξ2r2
2,0
and outputs hx = e(h′x, g2)
• Hash0(kh1, kh2, Lp̂wd, C0) computes
h′0 = u
η1,1+η1,2+ξ0(η2,1+η2,2)
1,0 u
θ1+θ2
2,0 (e0/g
pwd
1,1 )µ1+µ2vν1+ν20
and outputs h0 = e(h′0, g2)
152 Password Authentication Framework in the Two-Server Setting
• PHashP0(kp1, kp2, Lp̂wd, C0, r0) computes
h′0 = (kp1,1kp1,2)
r0(kp2,1kp2,2)
r0ξ0
and outputs h0 = e(h′0, g2)
• VerKp(kpi, Lp̂wd) verifies that
e(kp1,i, crs
′) ?= e(g1,1, χ1,1,i) · e(g1,2, χ2,i) · e(h, χ3,i) · e(c, χ4,i)
and
e(kp2,i, crs
′) ?= e(g1,1, χ1,2,i) · e(d, χ4,i) for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}
• THash0(kp1, kp2, Lp̂wd, C0, τ ′) computes
h0 =
[
e(u1,0, χ1,1,1χ1,1,2(χ1,2,1χ1,2,2)ξ0)·
e(u2,0, χ2,1χ2,2) · e(e0/gpwd1,1 , χ3,1χ3,2) · e(v0, χ4,1χ4,2)
]1/τ ′
• THashx(kp0, Lp̂wd, C1, C2, τ ′) computes
hx =
[
e(u1,1u1,2, χ1,1,0χξ1+ξ21,2,0 ) · e(u2,1u2,2, χ2,0) · e((e1e2)/gpwd1,1 , χ3,0) · e(v1v2, χ4,0)
]1/τ ′
Distributed computation of PHashPx and Hash0 is done as in D-SPHF with additional
proofs for correctness and adding the pairing computation at the end to lift the
hash value into GT . We formalise execution of the Cramer-Shoup TD-SPHF in the
following paragraph. Necessary zero-knowledge proofs are described in the following
two paragraphs and only referenced in the description of the Cramer-Shoup TD-SPHF.
While the zero-knowledge proofs are Σ proofs (and therefore honest verifier ZKPoK)
we regard them as Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) (without knowledge extractor) in
order to avoid the necessity of rewinding the prover, and use them in committed form
to ensure security against malicious verifiers. Protocol participants are denoted C, S1
and S2 if their role is specified, or P , Q and R otherwise. Let further 0 denote the
client’s index and 1, respectively 2, denote the indices of server S1, S2 respectively. The
session ID is given by sid = C||S1||S2 and the unique query identifier qid is agreed
upon start using Finit.
5 Universally Composable Two-Server PAKE 153
All TD-SPHF participants have crs = (p, g1,1, g1,2, h, c, d,G1, g2, ζ,G2,GT , e,Hk)
as common input where τ = (x1, x2, y1, y2, z) is the crs trapdoor, i. e. the according
Cramer-Shoup secret key, and τ ′ the trapdoor, i. e. discrete logarithm to base g2, of
crs′ = ζ. Each server holds an ElGamal key pair (pk1, sk1) and (pk2, sk2) respectively
such that pk1 is registered with the CA for S1 and pk2 for S2 and thus available to all
parties (using Fca). An otherwise unspecified protocol participant P is initiated with
(NS, sid, qid, P, x). We further define s0 = pwd.
Cramer-Shoup TD-SPHF
1. Generate TD-SPHF keys khi ∈R Z5p and kpi = (kp1,i = g
η1,i
1,1 g
θi
1,2h
µicνi , kp2,i =
g
η2,i
1,1 d
νi , χ1,1,i = ζη1,i , χ1,2,i = ζη2,i , χ2,i = ζθi , χ3,i = ζµi , χ4,i = ζνi). Encrypt si to
C = (ℓi, u1,i, u2,i, ei, vi)← (ℓ, gri1,1, gri1,2, hrrgsi1,1, (cdξi)ri) with ξi = Hk(ℓi, u1,i, u2,i, ei)
for ℓi = sid||qid||kpi and ri ∈R Zp. If P = S1, set h0 = hx = NULL. Output
(sid, qid, 0, P, Ci, kpi) to Q and R.
2. When P , waiting for the initial messages, is receiving a message (sid, qid, 0,
Q, C1, kp1) and (sid, qid, 0, R, C2 ,kp2) it proceeds as follows. P proceeds
only if the projection keys kp1 and kp2 are correct, i. e. VerKp(kp1, Lp̂wd) = 1 and
VerKp(kp2, Lp̂wd) = 1. If the verification fails, P outputs (sid, qid,⊥,⊥) and
aborts the protocol.
(a) If P = C, compute
hx = e
(
(u1,1 · u1,2)η1,0+(ξ1+ξ2)η2,0(u2,1 · u2,2)θ0((e1 · e2)/gpwd1,1 )µ0(v1 · v2)ν0 , g2
)
and
h0 = e
(
(kp1,1kp1,2)
r0(kp2,1kp2,2)
r0ξ0 , g2
)
,
and output (sid, qid, h0, hx).
(b) If P = S2, compute hx,2 = (kp1,0 · kpξ22,0)r2 and Chx,2 = g
H(hx,2,m11)
1,1 h
rc1 with
rc1 ∈R Zp and ZKP m11 for hx,2 correctness, and send (sid, qid, PHashPx
,0, S2, Chx,2) to S1.
(c) If P = S1, compute m0 = EncEGpk1(g
−µ1
1,1 ; r) and c0 = EncEGpk1(g
s1
1,1; r′) with
r, r′ ∈R Zp and (sk1, pk1) retrieved from Fca, and send (sid, qid, Hash0, 0,S1,
m0, c0) to S2.
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3. On input (sid, qid, PHashPx, 0,S2, Chx,2) S1 in the correct state draws challenge
c ∈R Zp and returns (sid, qid, PHashPx, 1,S1, c) to S2.
4. On input (sid, qid, PHashPx, 1,S1, c) S2 in the correct state computes Cshx,2 =
g
H(m21)
1,1 h
rc2 with rc2 ∈R Zp and ZKP m21 for correctness, and sends (sid, qid,
PHashPx, 2, S2 ,Cshx,2 ) to S1. Subsequently, it sends (sid, qid, PHashPx, 3, S2,
hx,2, m11, m21,rc1, rc2) to S1, opening the ZKP.
5. On input (sid, qid, PHashPx, 2,S2, Cshx,2 ) S1 in the correct state stores it and
waits for the final PHashPx message.
6. On input (sid, qid, PHashPx, 3,S2, hx,2,m11,m21, rc1, rc2) S1 in the correct state
parses m11 as (t1, t2) and m22 as shx,2 and verifies correctness of commitments
and the ZKP and computes hx = e
(
hx,2 · (kp0,1 · kpξ10,2)r1 , g2
)
if the verifications
are successful, hx ̸= ⊥ and h0 ̸= ⊥, or sets h0 = ⊥ and hx = ⊥ otherwise.
7. On input (sid, qid, Hash0, 0,S1,m0, c0) S2 in the correct state retrieves pk1 from
Fca and computes CHash0,1 = gH(m1,m2,m12)1,1 hrc3 with rc3 ∈R Zp, m1 ← ms20 ×
c−µ20 × EncEGpk1(g
−µ2·s2
1,1 · uη1,2+ξ0η2,21,0 · uθ22,0 · eµ20 · vν20 ; r′′), m2 ← EncEGpk1(g
−µ2
1,1 ; r′′′) with
r′′, r′′′ ∈ Zp, and ZKP for correctness, and sends (sid, qid, Hash0,1,S2, CHash0,1)
back to S1.
8. On input (sid, qid, Hash0,1,S2, CHash0,1) S1 in the correct state draws challenge
c ∈R Zp and returns (sid, qid, Hash0,2,S1, c) to S2.
9. On input (sid, qid, Hash0,2,S1, c) S2 in the correct state computes Cm22 =
g
H(m22)
1,1 h
rc4 with rc4 ∈R Zp and ZKP for correctness, and sends (sid, qid, Hash0,3,
S2, Cm22) to S1. Subsequently, it sends (sid, qid, Hash0,4,S2,m1,m2,m12,m22, rc3,
rc4) to S1 opening the ZKP.
10. On input (sid, qid, Hash0,4,S2,m1,m2,m12,m22, rc3, rc4) S1 in the correct state
parsesm12 as (tm1, tm2, te2, tv2, tkp12, tkp22) andm22 as (ss2 , sµ2, sη12, sη22, sθ2, sν2, sr2),
verifies correctness of commitments and ZKP , and computes
h0 = e
(
g−µ1·s11,1 · DecEGsk1(m1) · u
η1,1+ξ0η2,1
1,0 · uθ12,0 · eµ10 · vν10 , g2
)
if the verifications are successful, hx ̸= ⊥ and h0 ≠ ⊥, or sets h0 = ⊥ and hx = ⊥.
11. Eventually S1 outputs (sid, qid, h0, hx) if h0 ̸= NULL and hx ̸= NULL.
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ZK Proof for PHashPx Correctness In order to ensure correct computation of hx
on S1 server S2 has to prove correctness of his computations. To this end S2 sends, in
addition to the PHashPx message hx,2 the following zero-knowledge proof.
ZKP
{
r2 : hx,2 = (kp1,0kp
ξ2
2,0)
r2 ∧ v2 = (cdξ2)r2
}
(11)
where r2 is the randomness used to create C2, ξ2 and v2 are part of C2, kp1,0, kp2,0 are
part of C’s projection key, and c, d are from the crs. The construction of the according
zero-knowledge proof is straight-forward. The prover computes commitments
thx2 = (kp1,0kp
ξ2
2,0)
khx2 ; tv2 = (cdξ2)khx2
with fresh randomness khx2 ∈R Zp, and response sr2 = khx2 − cr2 for verifier provided
challenge c. This allows the verifier to check
thx2
?= hcx,2(kp1,0kp
ξ2
2,0)
shx2 ; tv2 ?= vc2(cdξ2)shx2 .
It is easy to see that this zero-knowledge proof is correct, sound and (honest-verifier)
simulatable. We refer to the messages as m11 = (thx2, tv2), m21 = sr2, and c1 = c.
ZK Proof for Hash0 Correctness Let m1 and m2 denote the messages encrypted in
m1 and m2 respectively and m0,1 and c0,1 the second part (e) of the ElGamal ciphertext
m0, c1 respectively. In order to ensure correct computation of h0 on S1 server S2 has
to prove correctness of his computations. To this end S2 sends, in addition to Hash0,
m1, and m2 the following zero-knowledge proof
ZKP
{
(x, η1,2, η2,2, θ2, µ2, ν2, r2) : m1 = ms20,1c
−µ2
0,1 g
−µ2x
1,1 u
η1,2+ξ0η2,2
1,0 u
θ2
2,0e
µ2
0 v
ν2
0
∧ m2 = g−µ21,1 ∧ e2 = hr2gs21,1 ∧ v2 = (cdξ2)r2
∧ kp1,2 = g
η1,2
1,1 g
θ2
1,2h
µ2cν2 ∧ kp2,2 = g
η2,2
1,1 d
ν2
}
,
(12)
where r2 is the randomness used to create C2, ξ2 and v2 are part of C2, ξ0 is part of
C0, (µ2, η1,2, η2,2, θ2, ν2) is S2’s hashing key, s2 S2’s password share, and c, d are from
the crs. The construction of the according Σ proof is straight-forward. The prover
computes commitments
tm1 = ms20,1c
kµ2
0,1m
kx
2 u
kη12+ξ0kη22
1,0 u
kθ2
2,0 e
−kµ2
0 v
kν2
0 tm2 = g
kµ2
1,1 te2 = hkr2gs21,1 tv2 = (cdξ2)kr2
tkp12 = g
kη12
1,1 g
kθ2
1,2 h
kµ2ckν2 tkp22 = g
kη22
1,1 d
kν2 for ks2 , kµ2, kη12, kη22, kθ2, kν2, kr2 ∈R Zp
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and responses
ss2 = ks2 − cs2; sµ2 = kµ2 + cµ2; sη12 = kη12 − cη1,2; sη22 = kη22 − cη2,2;
sθ2 = kθ2 − cθ2; sν2 = kν2 − cν2; sr2 = kr2 − cr2
for verifier provided challenge c. This allows the verifier to check
tm1
?= mc1m
ss2
0,1c
sµ2
0,1m
ss2
2 u
sη12+ξ0sη22
1,0 u
sθ2
2,0e
sµ2
0 v
sν2
0 ; tm2
?= mc2g
sµ2
1,1 ; te2
?= ec2hsr2g
ss2
1,1 ;
tv2
?= vc2(cdξ2)sr2 ; tkp12
?= kpc1,2g
sη12
1,1 g
sθ2
1,2h
sµ2csν2 ; tkp22
?= kpc2,2g
sη22
1,1 d
sν2 .
While this is mainly a standard zero-knowledge proof tm1 uses m2 instead of g1,1 as base
for the third factor and ks2 as exponent (ss2 in the verification). This is necessary due to
the fact that the exponent −µ2s2 of the third factor inm1 is a product of two values that
have to be proven correct. The ZK proof uses the auxiliary message m2 to prove that
logg1,1(m2) = −µ2 such that it is sufficient to prove logm2(ms22 ) = s2. We refer to the
messages as m12 = (tm1, tm2, te2, tv2, tkp12, tkp22), m22 = (ss2 , sµ2, sη12, sη22, sθ2, sν2, sr2),
and c2 = c.
5.2 UC-secure Two Server PAKE (F2PAKE)
With TD-SPHF it is straight forward to build a 2PAKE protocol. We follow the
general framework described in the previous section to build 2PAKE protocols from
D-SPHFs. However, instead of aiming for key generation where the client establishes
a key with each of the two servers, we focus on a protocol that establishes a single
key with one server, w.l.o.g. the first server. By running the protocol twice, keys can
be exchanged between the client and the second sever. Note that UC security allows
concurrent execution of the protocol such that round complexity is not increased by
establishing two keys.
5.2.1 The Protocol
We use TD-SPHF to build our 2PAKE protocol. Although a 2PAKE protocol can
possibly be built from D-SPHF, the resulting construction would be less efficient. Client
C, server S1 and server S2 execute a TD-SPHF protocol as described in Section 5.1.
This provides C and S1 with two hash values h0 and hx each (if all protocol participants
execute the protocol honestly and all messages reach their destination unaltered). A
session key can then be derived by simply multiplying h0 and hx to sk = h0 · hx. If the
protocol is not terminated prematurely and a session key is computed by C and S1,
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this ensures that C and S1 share a unique random session key after finishing an honest
and correct protocol run and two independent random session keys sk in case one of
the parties inputs a wrong password (share) or the traffic is altered during transport.
5.2.2 UC Security Model for Two Server PAKE
We describe the ideal functionality F2PAKE for 2PAKE in Figure 20. F2PAKE can be seen
as an extension of the known ideal functionality for PAKE protocols from Canetti et al.
[62] and as such F2PAKE is very similar to their functionality for PAKE (cf. Chapter II
Section 2.2) but requires additional functions. In contrast to other password-related
ideal functionalities such as VPAKE [102], PPSS [57], or group PAKE [11] we consider
only the key-exchange functionality without explicit client authentication. While it is
compelling to model 2PAKE (as well as PAKE) similar to [57] and allow for throttling
on wrong password guesses,3 this is only possible if the servers are able to verify validity
of the client’s password, i. e. explicit authentication of the client. We want to keep the
2PAKE functionality simple and it is known that implicit authentication is sufficient
for secure channels [63] such that we settle for implicit authentication.
A Note on Corruptions We consider static corruptions, such that the corrupted
parties are chosen by the adversary in advance. If a server Sb is corrupted, the adversary
learns Sb’s password share. The password stays secret as long as the attacker does
not corrupt both servers. While there exist PAKE protocols in literature that are
UC-secure with adaptive corruptions [2, 3, 10, 12], we consider only static corruptions
in this work. PAKE constructions secure against adaptive corruptions in the UC model
proposed until now require complex SPHF constructions that are not translatable to
the D-SPHF approach. While adaptive corruptions obviously constitute a stronger
security notion that allow an attacker not only to execute a protocol on behalf of an
honest participant but interfere with the execution of an honest party while executing
the protocol, static corruptions in the UC model imply security in the BPR-M model
with adaptive corruptions for PAKE protocols according to Canetti et al. [62]. It
therefore seems reasonable to settle for static corruptions in the 2PAKE UC security
model for now. We discuss the relation between the proposed UC formalisation of
2PAKE and the known BPR-M-based security model in Section 5.3.
3Servers often lock accounts or require additional authentication after a certain number of failed
log-in attempts. This prevents automated online dictionary attacks, which are always possible in the
password authenticated key exchange setting.
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Functionality F2PAKE
The functionality F2PAKE is parameterised with security parameter λ. It interacts
with an adversary SIM, a client C and two servers S1 and S2 via the following
interfaces. Without loss of generality the key is exchanged between C and S1.
KEX InitC: Upon input (KEXinit, sid, qid, pwd) from client C, check that
sid is (C,S1,S2) and that qid is unique (entries (KEX, sid, qid,S1, s1) or
(KEX, sid, qid,S2, s2) may exist) and send (KEX, sid, qid, C) to SIM. If this
is a valid request, create a fresh record (KEX, sid, qid, C, pwd).
KEX InitS: Upon input (KEXinit, sid, qid, sb) from server Sb, b ∈ {1, 2}, check
that sid is (C,S1,S2) and that qid is unique (entries (KEX, sid, qid, C, pwd)
or (KEX, sid, qid,S3−b, s3−b) may exist) and send (KEX, sid, qid,Sb) to SIM.
If this is a valid request, create a fresh record (KEX, sid, qid,Sb, sb).
TestPwd: Upon input (TP, sid, qid, pwd′) from SIM check that a fresh record
(KEX, sid, qid, C, pwd) exists. If this is the case, mark (KEX, sid, qid,S1, s1)
as compromised and reply with “correct guess” if pwd = pwd′, and mark it
as interrupted and reply with “wrong guess” if pwd ̸= pwd′.
Failed: Upon input (FA, sid, qid) from SIM check that records
(KEX, sid, qid, C, pwd) and (KEX, sid, qid,S1, s1) exist that are not marked
completed. If this is the case, mark both as failed.
NewKey: Upon input (NK, sid, qid, P, sk′) from SIM with P ∈ {C,S1}, check
that a respective (KEX, sid, qid, C, pwd) or (KEX, sid, qid, S, s1) record exists,
sid = (C,S1,S2), |sk′| = λ, then:
• If the session is compromised, or either C or S1 and S2 are corrupted,
then output (NK, sid, qid, sk′) to P ; else
• if the session is fresh and a key sk was sent to P ′ with sid = (P, P ′,S2)
or sid = (P ′, P,S2) while (KEX, sid, qid, P ′, ·) was fresh, then output
(NK, sid, qid, sk) to P .
• In any other case, pick a new random key sk of length λ, and send
(NK, sid, qid, sk) to P .
In any case, mark qid as completed for P .
Fig. 20: Ideal Functionality F2PAKE
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2PAKE Functionality The ideal functionality for 2PAKE is very similar to the
PAKE functionality but considers two servers from which only one generates a session
key. The main difference is therefore the explicit modelling of participants (in contrast
to symmetric parties in the two-party case). We specify two initialisation interfaces
KEX Init, one for the client and one for the servers. A client is initialised with a
password pwd while server Sb gets password share sb. The TestPwd interface allows the
ideal world adversary to test client passwords. A tested session is marked interrupted
if the guess is wrong, i. e. client and server in this session receive randomly chosen,
independent session keys, or marked as compromised if the password guess is correct,
i. e. the attacker is now allowed to set the session key. The attacker can only test client
passwords but not password shares of the servers. Without knowledge of the password
or any password share, a share is a uniformly at random chosen element and therefore
not efficiently guessable. If the adversary corrupted server S2, retrieving the second
password share s1 from S1 is equivalent to guessing the password. Complementing
the TestPwd interface is a Failed interface that allows the adversary to let sessions
fail. This allows the attacker to prevent protocol participants from computing any
session key, i. e. failed parties do not compute a session key. Eventually the NewKey
interface generates session keys for client C and server S1. NewKey calls for S2 are
ignored. If client C or server S1 and S2 are corrupted, or the attacker guessed the
correct password, the adversary chooses the session key. If a session key was chosen
for the partnered party and the session was fresh at that time, i. e. not compromised
or interrupted, the same session key is used again. In any other case a new random
session key is drawn.
Instead of using a single session identifier sid we use sid and qid. The session
identifier sid is composed of the three participants (C,S1,S2) (note that we use the
client C also as “username” that identifies its account on the servers) and therefore
human memorable and unique. To handle multiple, concurrent 2PAKE executions of
one sid, we use a query identifier qid that is unique within sid and can be established
with Finit. In the multi-session extension F̂2PAKE the sid becomes ssid and sid is a
globally unique identifier for the used universe, i. e. server public keys (CA) and crs.
5.2.3 Security Analysis
The following theorem formalises the security of the previously defined 2PAKE protocol.
Note that we do not reduce to the security of TD-SPHF. Instead we reduce the security
of our 2PAKE protocol directly to the underlying problem (SXDH), thus giving an
indirect security proof of the proposed TD-SPHF.
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Theorem 9. The 2PAKE protocol from Section 5.2.1 securely realises F̂2PAKE with
static corruptions in the Fcrs-Fca-hybrid model if the DDH assumption holds in G1 and
G2 and Hk is a universal one-way hash function, i. e. Cramer-Shoup encryption is
secure in G1 and the DDH assumption holds in G2.
Sequence of Games We start the proof of Theorem 9 by giving a sequence of
games with G1 equal to the real-world execution with honest participants following
the protocol description and the real-world adversary A that may have control over a
set of participants, and G17 equal to the ideal-world execution where the protocol is
replaced with the ideal functionality F2PAKE acting on behalf of all honest protocol
participants and the ideal-world adversary SIM, detailed later. Let viewi denote the
view of environment Z when interacting with game Gi. Note that view is implicitly
parametrised with sid and security parameter λ. Security then follows from showing
that each viewi is computationally indistinguishable from the subsequent viewi+1,
such that we can eventually follow by an hybrid argument that view1 and view17
are computationally indistinguishable and the protocol therefore securely realises the
ideal functionality F2PAKE. All participants in the games are operated by challenger Q
(receiving the participant’s input from environment Z), which we modify from game
to game. Every session for an sid = (C,S1,S2) is started with a KexInit call for each
participant, defining secrets, roles, and the used query identifier. Invalid messages, i. e.
messages that do not pass the usual tests such as group membership, are discarded
by the challenger. Note that we usually only give the actual payload of messages and
omit additional “meta” information such as sid, qid etc.
G1 :Game 1 is the real-world experiment in which Z interacts with real participants that
follow, if honest, the protocol description, and the real-world adversary A controlling
corrupted parties. All participants are honestly simulated by challenger Q that knows
all their inputs.
G2 : This game is identical to G1, except that crs is generated by Q such that it knows
the according trapdoor τ . Note that the second trapdoor τ ′ for ζ is not controlled
by Q yet as this would destroy any security. Knowledge of τ allows Q to decrypt
ciphertexts Ci to retrieve the used password (share). This does not change anything
and is therefore perfectly indistinguishable from G1.
G3 :When Q, on behalf of S1, receives first messages (C0, kp0) and (C2, kp2), it decrypts
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C0 to pwd′ and checks if this is the correct password, i. e. pwd′ = pwd. If this is not the
case, pwd′ ̸= pwd, Q chooses a random h′0 ∈R GT if the subsequent Hash0 computation
with S2 is successful, i. e. all zero-knowledge proofs can be verified, and aborts S1
otherwise. We claim that view2 is computationally indistinguishable from view3. The
probability to distinguish the two games is bounded by the negligible probability to
notice that h0 is now chosen uniformly at random. Since C = (C0, C1, C2) is not in
Lpwd,s1,s2 the computation of Hash0 between S1 and S2 yields a uniformly at random
distributed hash value h0. This can be deduced by the following simplified argument.
As long as C ̸∈ Lpwd,s1,s2 the same argument as used for SPHF and D-SPHF can be
used, namely that h0 is linearly independent from the adversarially known values and
therefore indistinguishable from a random one. However, this is not sufficient in this
case as the attacker has the possibility to distinguish real h0 values from random ones
using the third projection keys kp3,i. To show that this is not possible we show how to
break the DDH assumption in G2 if there exists a distinguisher that can distinguish real
h0 from random ones. To this end we build a DDH triple (ζ, a, b) with crs′ = ζ = gτ
′
2
as follows. Let a = ζα and b = gα2 , then (ζ, a, b) is obviously a DDH triple. To link
this to the TD-SPHF we set α = khi,j, then a = kp3,i,j = ζkhi,j such that b = g
khi,j
2 . To
build a non-DDH triple (ζ, a, b) we choose random α and set a = kp3,i,j = ζkhi,j and
b = gαj2 . To guarantee correctness we have to choose α such that αj = khj,i + βj for
β ∈ ker
g1,1 1 g1,2 h c
1 g1,1 1 1 d
 for j ∈ [1, 5]. Note that this is possible because τ is
known, which contains the secret Cramer-Shoup key. If we can build a distinguisher
on h0, the distinguisher can now decide whether (ζ, a, b) is a valid DDH triple or not.
G4 : In this game we choose sk ∈R GT at random in case we choose h0 at random (the
setting described in G3) and computation of sk on S1 is successful. Since h0 on S1 is
uniformly at random already and sk = h0hx, view4 is perfectly indistinguishable from
view3.
G5 : Receiving an adversarially generated or modified C1 or C2 on behalf of client C,
challenger Q chooses hx ∈R GT uniformly at random instead of computing it with
Hashx if C1 or C2 do not encrypt the correct password share s1 or s2 respectively. We
claim that view5 is computationally indistinguishable from view4. In this case we have
(C0, C1, C1) ̸∈ Lp̂wd with overwhelming probability. The claim therefore follows by a
similar argument as in Game 3, i. e. from the DDH assumption in G2.
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G6 : In this game we choose sk ∈R GT at random in case we choose hx at random (the
setting described in G5) and computation of sk on C is successful (projection keys kp1
and kp2 are correct). Since hx on C is uniformly at random already and sk = h0hx,
view6 is perfectly indistinguishable from view5.
G7 : In this game we replace computation of hash values h0 and hx with a lookup table
with index (kh1, kh2, Lpwd,s2,s2 , C0) for h0 and (kh0, Lpwd,s2,s2 , C1, C2) for hx. If no such
value exists, it is computed with the appropriate Hash or PHashP function and stored
in the lookup table. Due to the correctness of the used Cramer-Shoup TD-SPHF view7
is perfectly indistinguishable from view6.
G8 : Instead of computing Hash0 for S1 in case pwd′ decrypted from C0 is the same as pwd,
Q draws a random h0 ∈R GT . That is, in this game h0 for S1 is always chosen uniformly
at random instead of computing it with Hash0. We claim that view8 is computationally
indistinguishable from view7. The claim follows from the CCA-security of the labelled
Cramer-Shoup encryption and the same argument as in Game 3, i. e. from SXDH. In
particular, we define G′7 and G′′7 with computationally indistinguishable views from G7
as intermediate games before G8 such that the claim follows. Note that the following
games modify the experiment only in the previously defined case. In G′7 challenger
Q computes C1 for S1 on a random value s′1 ∈R Zp, s′1 ̸= s1. The CCA-security of
the encryption scheme ensure that view7′ is computationally indistinguishable from
view7. In G′′7 we choose a random h0 ∈R GT instead of using the distributed Hash0
computation (the protocol is still performed but the values are not used). Using the
same argument as in G3, view7′′ is computationally indistinguishable from view7′ . The
only difference between G′′7 and G8 now is that Q encrypts a random value instead
of s1 in C1 in G′′7. The claim now follows by observing again that view7′′ and view8
are computationally indistinguishable considering the CCA-security of the labelled
Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme.
G9 : In this game we choose sk ∈R GT at random in case we choose h0 at random (the
setting described in G8) and computation of sk on S1 is successful. Since h0 on S1 is
uniformly at random and sk = h0hx, view9 is perfectly indistinguishable from view8.
G10 : Receiving correct C1 or C2, i. e. encrypting s1 and s2 respectively, on behalf of
client C, challenger Q chooses hx ∈R GT uniformly at random instead of computing
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it with Hashx. We claim that view10 is computationally indistinguishable from view9.
Since we have (C0, C1, C1) ∈ Lp̂wd in this case, the claim follows by a similar argument
as in Game 8, i. e. from the SXDH assumption.
G11 : In this game we choose sk ∈R GT at random in case we choose h0 at random
(the setting described in G10) and computation of sk on C is successful (projection keys
kp1 and kp2 are correct). Since hx on C is uniformly at random already and sk = h0hx,
view11 is perfectly indistinguishable from view10.
G12 : The entire crs including ζ is chosen by challenger Q in this experiment. The
view12 is perfectly indistinguishable from view11 since this does not change anything
else.
G13 : Upon receiving C1 and C2, encrypting correct password shares, Q uses THash0
to compute h0 on client C instead of PHashP0. This is possible because Q now knows
trapdoor τ ′. Due to TD-SPHF soundness, view13 is perfectly indistinguishable from
view12.
G14 : Upon receiving C0, encrypting correct password, Q uses THashx to compute hx
on server S1 instead of PHashPx. This is again possible because Q now knows trapdoor
τ ′. Due to TD-SPHF soundness, view14 is perfectly indistinguishable from view13.
G15 : Instead of encrypting the correct password pwd in C0 on behalf of client C, Q
encrypts 0 (which is not a valid password). We claim that view15 is computationally
indistinguishable from view14 under the DDH assumption in G1, i. e. the CCA-security
of the Cramer-Shoup encryption. Note that encryption randomness r is not used in
the computation of h0 anymore such that the claim follows from the Cramer-Shoup
CCA-security.
G16 : Instead of encrypting the correct password share si in Ci on behalf of server
Si with i ∈ [1, 2], Q encrypts a random element s′i ∈R Zp. We claim that view16
is computationally indistinguishable from view15 under the DDH assumption in G1,
i. e. the CCA-security of the Cramer-Shoup encryption. Note that the probability for
s′i = si is negligible such that the claim follows from the Cramer-Shoup CCA-security.
G17 : Instead of the challenger Q simulating the protocol execution the ideal function-
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ality F2PAKE is used to interact with the ideal-world adversary SIM. While this game is
structurally different from G16 its execution is indistinguishable from the latter. This
combined with the following description of the ideal world adversary SIM concludes
the proof.
Simulator We now describe the simulator SIM that is used in the last experiment
and acts as an attacker in the ideal world against the ideal functionality F2PAKE. It uses
a real-world adversary A in a way that the environment Z cannot distinguish whether
it is interacting with A and honest protocol participants in the real world, or with
SIM and dummy protocol participants (simulated by F2PAKE) in the ideal world. We
describe SIM for a single session sid = (C,S1,S2). The security then follows from the
UC composition theorem [59], covering multiple sessions of the protocol, and joint-state
UC composition theorem [64], covering the fact that Fca and Fcrs create a joint state
for all sessions and participants. As before, we assume that 0 is not a valid password.
First, SIM generates crs = (p, g1,1, g1,2, h, c, d,G1, g2, ζ,G2,GT , e,Hk) with Cramer-
Shoup secret key as trapdoor τ = (x1, x2, y1, y2, z) and second trapdoor τ ′ for ζ =
gτ
′
2 to answer all Fcrs queries with crs. Further, SIM generates ElGamal key pairs
(gz1 , z1) and (gz2 , z2), and responds to Retrieve(Si) queries to Fca from Si with
(Retrieve,Si, (gzi , zi)) for i ∈ {1, 2} and with (Retrieve,Si, gzi) to all other request.
We describe different scenarios in which the simulator operates. First we describe
simulation of the initial KEXInit call before showing the way SIM handles different
input messages and the key generation. The simulator essentially has to ensure that
the functionality chooses random, correct session keys if the execution is correct and
random, independent ones in case of an error during the execution.
When receiving (KEX, sid, qid, P ) with sid = (C,S1,S2) and P ∈ {C,S1,S2} from
F2PAKE, SIM starts simulation of the protocol for protocol participant P by computing
ciphertext, projection key pair Mi = (Ci, kpi) for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, encrypting a dummy
value (0 for P = C and a random value s′i ∈R Zp for P = Si, i ∈ {1, 2}). SIM outputs
the computed (Ci, kpi) to A. The first round of messages is handled as follows.
1. When any party receives an adversarially generated but well formed first message
Mi, i ∈ {1, 2} from uncorrupted Si, i. e. VerKp on the projection key kpi is 1, SIM
queries (FA, sid, qid), which marks the session failed for the receiving party
and thus ensures that the party receives an independent, random session key (if
any) on a NewKey query.
2. When any party receives an adversarially generated but well formed first message
M2 from a corrupted S2 while S1 is not corrupted, SIM decrypts C2 to s′2. If this
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value is not correct, s′2 ≠ s2 (the party is corrupted such that SIM knows the
correct value), SIM queries (FA, sid, qid) to ensure independent session keys on
NewKey queries.
3. When client C receives an adversarially generated but well formed first message
M1 from a corrupted S1 while S2 is not corrupted, SIM decrypts C1 to s′1. If this
value is not correct, s′1 ̸= s1, SIM queries (FA, sid, qid) to ensure independent
session keys on NewKey queries.
4. When any party receives adversarially generated but well formed first messages
M1,M2 from corrupted S1,S2, SIM decrypts C1 and C2 to s′1, s′2 respectively, and
verifies their correctness against s1 and s2. If they are correct, SIM computes
h0 ← THash0(kp1, kp2, Lp̂wd, C0, τ ′), hx ← Hashx(kp0, Lp̂wd, C1, C2), and skC =
h0 · hx. Otherwise choose a random skC ∈ GT .
5. When an honest S1 or S2 receives an adversarially generated but well formed
first message M0, i. e. VerKp on kp0 is true, SIM extracts pwd′ from C0 and
sends (TP, sid, qid, C, pwd′) to F2PAKE. If the functionality replies with “correct
guess”, SIM uses pwd′, crs and τ ′ to compute hx ← THashx(kp0, Lp̂wd, C1, C2, τ ′),
h0 ← Hash0(kh1, kh2, Lp̂wd, C0), and skS = h0 · hx.
6. If verification of any kpi fails at a recipient, SIM aborts the session for the receiving
participant.
If a party does not abort, it proceeds as follows. After C received all ciphertext, projec-
tion key pair messages and the previously described checks were performed SIM sends
(NK, sid, qid, C, skC) to F2PAKE if an skC for this session exists, or (NK, sid, qid, C,⊥)
otherwise. After S1 and S2 received all ciphertext, projection key pair messages and
the previously described checks were performed, SIM simulates all further messages for
honest parties, i. e. PHashPx and Hash0 computation between S1 and S2, with random
elements and simulated zero-knowledge proofs. If all messages received by S1 are oracle
generated, send (NK, sid, qid,S1, skS) to F2PAKE if this session is compromised and
(NK, sid, qid,S1,⊥) if not. If any PHashPx or Hash0 message received by S1 can not be
verified, i. e. validation of the zero-knowledge proof fails, SIM does nothing and aborts
the session for S1.
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5.3 F2PAKE Discussion
In this section we discuss some additional points of the F2PAKE functionality and
investigate relations to other 2PAKE security models and UC models in the password
setting.
5.3.1 F2PAKE and the BPR-M 2PAKE Model
While other security models for 2PAKE protocols were proposed, e. g., by Szydlo
and Kaliski [184], the BPR-M-like security model by Katz et al. [127] is the most
comprehensible and (in its two-party version) established model. We therefore discuss
relation between the proposed 2PAKE UC-security using F2PAKE and the BPR-M-like
security model by Katz et al. [127]. To compare security of a 2PAKE protocol Π in a
game-based and UC setting we have to ensure that it supports session ids (necessary in
the UC framework). We therefore assume that Π already uses UC compliant session ids.
Note that it is easy to transform any 2PAKE protocol into a 2PAKE protocol with such
session ids by exchanging random strings that are concatenated to a common unique
session id. Before looking into relation between the full game-based model for 2PAKE
and F2PAKE we want to point out that a protocol Π that securely realises F2PAKE offers
“forward secrecy”, i. e. even an adversary that knows the correct password is not able
to attack an execution of Π without actively taking part in the execution. With this in
mind we argue that Π, securely realising F2PAKE, is secure in the BPR-M-like model by
Katz et al. [127]. This is because the attacker is either passive, which is covered by the
previous observation, or is active and is therefore able to test one password per session.
Those password tests (TestPwd in F2PAKE and Send in the game-based model) give the
attacker a success probability of q/|D|, with q the number of active sessions and |D|
the dictionary size, when considering a uniform distribution in password dictionary D.
Note that while the attacker may have knowledge of a password share, this does not
increase this probability. Security of the model from Katz et al. [127] follows.
5.3.2 F2PAKE and FPAKE
While FPAKE and F2PAKE are very similar they contain some significant differences
we want to point out here. First, the key exchange is performed between all three
participants, but only C and, w.l.o.g., S1 agree on a common session key. The role is
a technical necessity in FPAKE for correct execution. Since we have explicit roles in
F2PAKE this is not necessary in this case. The asymmetric setting in F2PAKE restricts
TestPwd queries to the client since the servers hold high entropy password shares.
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While it is enough for the attacker to corrupt one party in FPAKE to control the
session key, in F2PAKE the attacker has to either corrupt or compromise the client,
or corrupt both servers. As long as only one server is corrupted, the adversary has
no control over the session keys and the parties receive uniformly at random chosen
session keys. In F2PAKE session ids are human memorisable, consisting of all three
involved parties (C,S1,S2), and a unique query identifier is used to distinguish between
different (possibly concurrent) protocol runs of one account (sid). This is a rather
technical difference to FPAKE that uses only session identifiers.
5.3.3 Corruptions
The two-server extension of the BPR-M 2PAKE model proposed by Katz et al. [127]
does not consider corruptions. While parties can be malicious in the model (static
corruption), the attacker is not allowed to query a corrupt oracle to retrieve passwords
or internal state of participants. In our model the attacker is allowed to corrupt parties
before execution as well. This however implies security in the model by Katz et al. [127]
even if the attacker is allowed to corrupt clients to retrieve their passwords. This is
because the environment can provide the BPR-M attacker with the password. However,
this does not increase his success probability. Dynamic corruptions in F2PAKE on the
other hand are much more intricate. While UC-secure 2PAKE protocols with dynamic
corruptions exist [3] their approaches are not translatable to the 2PAKE setting. The
challenge of dynamic corruptions is that the simulation has to be correct even if the
attacker corrupts one party after the protocol execution has started. This is left open
for future work.
6 Conclusion
This chapter proposed a framework for two-server password registration and authen-
tication. The password registration protocol allows the client to securely register
password shares on two servers, while the servers can verify that the client’s password
satisfies a password policy. To use the registered password shares in the second step,
password-based authentication, we proposed a new 2PAKE framework, a concrete
instantiation, and an enhanced protocol that satisfied the newly defined 2PAKE UC
functionality.
This first leg of the framework introduced the notion of 2BPR, complementing the
VPAKE approach from the previous chapter. 2BPR is a solution for secure registration
of policy-compliant, user-selected passwords for 2PAKE/PPSS protocols where each
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server only learns its own share of the password and whether the combined password
is conform with his password policy. The proposed 2BPR protocol can be used to
register 2PAKE/PPSS passwords satisfying server-chosen policies over the alphabet of
all 94 printable ASCII characters.
This second leg of the framework introduced the notion of extended and distributed
smooth projective hashing and gave an instantiation using Cramer-Shoup ciphertexts.
While we focused on 2PAKE as application of D-SPHFs in this chapter, D-SPHFs
are an interesting building block for future work on other multi-party and threshold
protocols. To show how to use D-SPHFs, we built a 2PAKE framework using them.
The framework allows to explain and simplify the two-server PAKE protocol from [127]
as well as construct UC-secure 2PAKE. To this end this chapter further introduced
TD-SPHF that introduces a trapdoor for D-SPHFs. TD-SPHFs allowed us to construct
an efficient 2PAKE protocol that can be proven secure in a newly proposed security
model for 2PAKE in the UC framework.
Chapter V
Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis made advancements in the field of password-based cryptography. It in
particular proposed two novel frameworks for password registration and authentication.
The first framework is based on the verifier-based (single-server) setting and allows a
client to register a password verifier with a server without disclosing the actual password,
while preserving the server’s ability to check policy compliance of the password that
is hidden in the password verifier, and supports client authentication (VPAKE and
tPAuth) with the password and registered verifier. We proposed three protocols with
according security models to achieve Blind Password Registration and implemented
them to compare performance in addition to security. To use the password together
with the registered password verifier we discussed and proposed new VPAKE protocols
usable with the registered verifiers. In order to show real world usage of the proposed
framework we implemented a demo that uses one of the proposed BPR protocols to
register passwords, an appropriate tPAuth protocol to perform Password Authenticated
and Confidential Channel Establishment, and an application to log into.
The second framework achieves similar goals to the first one but is based on the
two-server setting and allows a client to register password shares on two servers while
preserving the server’s ability to verify that the client’s password is policy compliant,
and supports client authentication (2PAKE and PPSS) with the password and registered
password shares. We proposed an efficient protocol with according security model
to achieve Two-Server Blind Password Registration. To use the registered password
shares in a 2PAKE protocol for authentication we propose the first 2PAKE framework
based on Distributed Smooth Projective Hash Functions, a new variant of SPHFs. By
further extending D-SPHFs to TD-SPHFs we were able to introduce the first 2PAKE
protocol that is secure in a newly proposed security definition for 2PAKE in the UC
framework.
170 Conclusion and Future Work
While PAKE is a very well researched field and probably does not require a lot of
further attention VPAKE, 2PAKE, and PPSS hold many open problems to investigate
starting with the actual security models used for these settings. The only VPAKE
protocol with security model, proposed by Benhamouda and Pointcheval [31], has not
yet been peer-reviewed. In the 2PAKE setting a very limited number of proven protocols
exist. A game-based and a UC model have been proposed but barely challenged or
used to prove other protocols. With PPSS protocols new interest in the two-server
setting has risen where different corruption scenarios and protocols tailored towards
real world applications are interesting for future research.
Password registration as an area in cryptographic research has only been created
with this work and has thus many open questions left. Interesting future work could be
to develop more efficient protocols based on different assumptions that can be proven
secure in the proposed security model. Another promising direction for future work in
this area would be to propose protocols that do not rely on a separate secure channel
or incorporating the underlying secure channel.
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